管理层持股对民营上市公司绩效的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-30 17:51

本文关键词： 民营上市公司管理层持股公司绩效　出处：《东北农业大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：现代公司制企业最显著的特征是公司所有权与经营权相分离,由此导致了委托代理关系的产生。如何在竞争性市场中不断提高公司的生产和管理效率,降低代理成本,使公司利润最大化或者所有者财富最大化,一直是公司治理结构中的一个核心议题。管理层持股作为解决委托代理问题的一种有效途径,也受到学术界越来越多的关注。理论上,随着我国股权分置改革的完成,非流通股得到解禁,上市公司股东的利益开始趋于一致,做大做强已逐渐成为公司的共同目标,在此基础上引入管理层持股激励模式对降低代理成本、提高公司绩效的确能起到正面的积极影响。然而管理层持股激励模式在我国能否产生其应有的作用,还有待于实践的检验。本文正是基于这种背景,选择管理层持股对公司绩效的影响进行深入的分析研究。另外,考虑到在国有上市公司中研究管理层持股对公司绩效的影响在理论上存在较大缺陷,进而会影响实证研究的结果,故仅选择民营上市公司作为研究对象,理论上更具有针对性和适用性,实际意义也更大。本文从理论与实证两个角度研究我国民营上市公司管理层持股对公司绩效的影响。首先回顾了国内外学者的研究成果并将相关的理论和假设进行梳理,在描述民营上市公司管理层持股与公司绩效现状的基础上,提出民营上市公司管理层持股中存在的问题,并分析了问题的成因。运用2008-2010年三年管理层连续持股的民营上市公司数据进行实证研究,旨在揭示管理层持股在民营上市公司中应用的实际激励效应。通过实证研究得出的主要结论：管理层持股对民营上市公司绩效的影响存在区间效应,呈N形曲线,即公司绩效随管理层持股比例的上升出现先下降,后上升,再下降的趋势。基于理论分析和实证研究的结论,本文提出了坚持实施管理层持股激励模式、重新定位管理层持股制度、确定合理的管理层持股水平、优化民营上市公司内部约束机制以及完善管理层持股外部环境等一系列提高民营上市公司绩效的建议。
[Abstract]:The most prominent feature of modern corporate enterprises is the separation of ownership and management right, which leads to the emergence of principal-agent relationship. How to improve the efficiency of production and management in competitive market. Reducing agency cost and maximizing corporate profit or owner's wealth is always a core issue in corporate governance structure. Management shareholding is an effective way to solve the principal-agent problem. In theory, with the completion of the reform of non-tradable shares in China, non-tradable shares have been lifted, the interests of shareholders of listed companies began to converge. Bigger and stronger has gradually become the common goal of the company, and on this basis, the introduction of managerial shareholding incentive mode to reduce agency costs. Improvement of corporate performance can indeed play a positive role. However, whether the incentive mode of managerial shareholding can play its due role in our country remains to be tested in practice. This paper is based on this background. In addition, considering the influence of management ownership on corporate performance in state-owned listed companies, there are some defects in theory. Then it will affect the results of empirical research, so only select private listed companies as the research object, theoretically more targeted and applicable, and practical significance is greater. This paper studies the impact of management ownership on corporate performance in China's private listed companies from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Firstly, it reviews the research results of domestic and foreign scholars and combs the relevant theories and assumptions. On the basis of describing the current situation of management ownership and corporate performance of private listed companies, this paper puts forward the problems existing in the management ownership of private listed companies. And analyzed the causes of the problem, using the 2008-2010 management of three years of continuous ownership of private listed companies for empirical research. In order to reveal the practical incentive effect of the application of management shareholding in private listed companies, the main conclusion of the empirical study is that there is an interval effect on the performance of private listed companies. N-shaped curve, that is, the company performance with the increase in the proportion of managerial ownership first decreased, then rose, then decreased. Based on theoretical analysis and empirical research conclusions. This paper proposes to insist on the implementation of management stock ownership incentive model, re-positioning management ownership system, and to determine a reasonable level of management ownership. A series of suggestions to improve the performance of private listed companies, such as optimizing the internal restraint mechanism of private listed companies and perfecting the external environment of management shareholding, are proposed.
【学位授予单位】：东北农业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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