基于控制权配置的中国上市公司股权激励财富效应研究

发布时间：2018-01-31 05:53

本文关键词： 控制权配置股权激励财富效应短期效应长期效应上市公司　出处：《燕山大学》2013年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2006年以来，随着股权激励相关法规的陆续出台，股权激励制度不断完善，越来越多的上市公司宣告和实施了股权激励方案，股权激励已成为现代公司解决委托代理问题的重要手段。但现实中股权激励实施效果的差别以及学术界学者们对股权激励效应及其产生原因持不同的观点，使股权激励问题成为研究和讨论的热点。本论文选取2006-2011年宣告股权激励方案的上市公司作为研究样本，从公司控制权配置视角，揭示股权激励和控制权现状，并系统研究控制权配置对股权激励的影响以及股权激励的财富效应。首先，在文献回顾的基础上，阐述和界定股权激励偏好、股权激励成本、股权激励方式和股权激励强度等股权激励概念，终极控制人性质、第一大股东控制力、董事会结构以及高管持股等控制权及控制权配置概念；从短期和长期，绝对和相对两个层面界定财富效应，并阐述其衡量指标。阐述分析委托-代理理论、人力资本理论、不完全契约理论等股权激励理论，马克思的产权理论、现代企业理论、内部人控制理论等控制权理论以及有效市场理论和信号传递理论等财富效应理论。其次，从基本面、激励偏好、激励成本、激励方式和激励强度等五个方面揭示和分析股权激励现状；从终极控制人性质、第一大股东控制力、董事会结构和高管持股等四个方面揭示和分析宣告股权激励方案的上市公司控制权配置现状。再次，检验控制权配置对股权激励的影响。构建Logit模型以及多元线性回归模型，检验终极控制人性质、第一大股东控制力、董事会结构和高管持股等控制权配置变量分别对股权激励偏好、股权激励方式、股权激励成本和股权激励强度的影响。第四，测度股权激励的短期财富效应。运用事件研究法检验股权激励公告事件产生的市场反应，用CAR衡量股权激励短期绝对财富效应；构建SFA效率模型，以股权激励的成本和强度作为投入指标、CAR作为产出指标，并将终极控制人性质、第一大股东控制力、董事会结构、高管持股等控制权配置变量纳入模型，衡量股权激励的短期相对财富效应。第五，测度股权激励的长期财富效应。构建多元线性回归模型，分三个步骤系统考察股权激励独立作用、股权激励与控制权共同作用、股权激励与控制权交互作用等三种情况下股权激励的长期绝对财富效应；构建SFA效率模型，以股权激励的成本和强度作为投入指标、剔除掉行业影响的△Tobin’Q作为产出指标，并将终极控制人性质、第一大股东控制力、董事会结构、高管持股等控制权配置变量纳入模型，衡量股权激励的长期相对财富效应。最后，从增强公司的股权激励偏好、设定合理的股权激励方案、优化控制权配置结构三个方面提出提高股权激励财富效应的对策建议。
[Abstract]:Since 2006, with the introduction of equity incentive laws and regulations, the equity incentive system has been constantly improved, more and more listed companies announced and implemented the equity incentive scheme. Equity incentive has become an important means for modern companies to solve the principal-agent problem, but in reality, the difference of the effect of equity incentive and academic scholars have different views on equity incentive effect and its causes. This paper selects the listed companies that announced the equity incentive scheme from 2006-2011 as the research sample, from the perspective of corporate control allocation. It reveals the current situation of equity incentive and control right, and systematically studies the influence of control right allocation on equity incentive and the wealth effect of equity incentive. First of all, on the basis of literature review, this paper expounds and defines the concept of equity incentive, such as the preference of equity incentive, the cost of equity incentive, the mode of equity incentive and the intensity of equity incentive. The first major shareholder control power, board structure, executive ownership and other control rights and control rights allocation concept; From the short-term and long-term, absolute and relative levels to define the wealth effect, and explain its measurement indicators. Explain the principal-agent theory, human capital theory, incomplete contract theory and other equity incentive theory. Marx's property right theory, modern enterprise theory, insider control theory and wealth effect theory, such as efficient market theory and signal transmission theory. Secondly, the present situation of equity incentive is revealed and analyzed from five aspects: fundamental aspect, incentive preference, incentive cost, incentive mode and incentive intensity. From four aspects: the nature of ultimate controller, the first shareholder control power, the structure of board of directors and the ownership of senior executives, this paper reveals and analyzes the status quo of the allocation of control rights of listed companies. Thirdly, to test the influence of the allocation of control rights on the equity incentive. Construct Logit model and multiple linear regression model, test the nature of the ultimate controller, the largest shareholder control. The influence of board structure and executive ownership on equity incentive preference, equity incentive mode, equity incentive cost and equity incentive intensity. 4th, measure the short-term wealth effect of equity incentive, use event research method to test the market reaction of stock right incentive announcement event, and use CAR to measure the short-term absolute wealth effect of equity incentive; Construct SFA efficiency model, take the cost and intensity of equity incentive as the input index and car as the output index, and take the nature of the ultimate controller, the first shareholder control, the board of directors structure. Control allocation variables such as executive ownership are incorporated into the model to measure the short-term relative wealth effect of equity incentive. 5th, measure the long-term wealth effect of equity incentive. Build multiple linear regression model, examine the independent role of equity incentive, equity incentive and control of the joint action in three steps. The long-term absolute wealth effect of equity incentive under the interaction of equity incentive and control right. Build SFA efficiency model, take the cost and intensity of equity incentive as input index, eliminate the industry impact of Tobin'Q as output indicators, and the ultimate nature of the controller, the largest shareholder control. Board structure, executive ownership and other control allocation variables are incorporated into the model to measure the long-term relative wealth effect of equity incentive. Finally, the paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve the wealth effect of equity incentive from three aspects: strengthening the preference of equity incentive, setting up reasonable equity incentive scheme and optimizing the structure of control right allocation.
【学位授予单位】：燕山大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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