我国上市公司控制权收益研究

发布时间：2018-02-06 02:46

本文关键词： 合理控制权收益超控制权收益中国上市公司　出处：《东北财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：委托代理问题一直是公司治理研究的重点问题之一,随着资本市场的发展,学者发现并非所有的公司股权都是高度分散的。股权的相对集中,导致了控股股东的出现,由于控制权与所有权分离,控股股东就更有动力去谋取不被中小股东分享的那部分专属收益。中国作为世界的第二大经济体,研究我国控股股东的行为,及其与公司股权结构以及财务状况的联系,将有助于完善我国公司治理理论,并对进一步公司治理改革,保护中小股东权益提出重要的理论和实践意义。本文首先回顾了国内外学者对控制权收益的研究,并从控制权收益定义,度量方式以及影响因素等方面进行阐述。在文献的基础上,本文通过追溯我国一股独大现象的缘由,研究大股东获取控制权收益的动机、手段,以及部分影响因素。如何合理度量控制权收益,成为一个难题；如果沿袭原有的思想,将控制权收益完全定义为非有益的,将对实际中出现的一系列现象无法进行合理的解释。因此有学者提出将控制权收益分类,其中合理的控制权收益在一定程度上有助于企业的价值,只有超控制权收益才是大股东对中小股东的侵占,成为对企业价值有损害的部分。本文选取2004年至2008年我国A股主板市场上市公司基于市场交易制度进行的大宗股权转让交易为样本,采用公司净资产收益率指标(ROE)将样本数据分为合理控制权收益组和超控制权收益组。由于控股股东在获取上市公司控制权以及维系控制权的过程中付出了合理的成本,因此合理控制权收益为对大股东付出的合理补偿,这也是被中小股东接受；而当大股东索取超过合理部分时,才形成对中小股东的侵占,即超控制权收益。本文经过初步计算,得出我国上市公司侵占程度约为24.26%。之后本文选取了股东制衡度、交易后第一大股东持股比例、企业规模、净资产收益率、资产负债比以及行业这六个因素分析其对控制权收益的影响程度。最后提出政策建议,在不抑制大股东促进公司发展的积极性的同时,减少大股东对中小股东的侵占。本文的实证结果表明,净资产收益率ROE、交易后股东持股比例CR以及资产负债率LEV.同控制权收益水平正相关,公司规模LNSIZE、股东间的制衡度BAL.同控制权收益水平负相关。说明我国上市公司股权越集中,大股东获取的控制权收益随之增长；同时我国外部债权人的监管有效性较差,因此负债反而增加了我国上市公司大股东可操作资金；大公司的大股东实施侵占的行为更少,大公司的大股东受到的约束较大；我国上市公司股东间制衡度对控制权收益水平有一定的抑制作用。本文丰富了我国控制权收益的研究,拓宽了研究视角,力求更加全面、综合的考量我国控制权收益水平的影响因素。但是,本文选取的样本为2004年至2008年,对于全流通时代,大股东更加隐蔽的侵占行为,比如股价操纵尚未涉及。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent problem has been one of the key problems of corporate governance, with the development of capital market, equity scholars found that not all companies are highly dispersed. The relative concentration of ownership, led to the emergence of the controlling shareholder, because of the separation of ownership and control rights, the controlling shareholders will not be motivated to seek the exclusive benefits small and medium-sized shareholders share China. As the world's second largest economy, China's research on the behavior of controlling shareholders and the relationship with the company's ownership structure and financial condition, will contribute to the perfection of the corporate governance theory, and the further reform of corporate governance, the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders put forward an important theoretical and practical significance.
This paper first reviews the domestic and foreign research on the benefits of control, and from the definition of control benefits, measure mode and influence other aspects. On the basis of literature, this paper traces the reasons of China's dominance phenomenon, of large shareholders to obtain control benefits motive, means, and some influencing factors. How to reasonably measure control benefits, become a problem; if the original idea, control of income completely defined as non beneficial, for a series of phenomena that appear in reality cannot make reasonable explanation. So some scholars proposed to control income classification, the value of reasonable control return to help the enterprises to a certain extent, but excessive benefits of control is the Large Shareholder Expropriation of minority shareholders, a damage to the enterprise value.
In this paper, from 2004 to 2008 China's A shares motherboard market listed companies market trading system in the equity transfer transaction based on the sample, the company net assets yield index (ROE) of the sample data is divided into reasonable benefits of control group and excessive benefits of control group. Due to the controlling shareholder in the process to get control of a listed company and maintain control of pay reasonable cost, so the reasonable control right to pay reasonable compensation for large shareholders, which is the small and medium-sized shareholders accept; when the major shareholders for more than a reasonable part, only the formation of small and medium shareholders embezzlement, namely excessive benefits of control. In this paper, after a preliminary calculation, come to our country the listed company occupy about 24.26%. after the shareholders after the transaction, the proportion of the first shareholder, enterprise size, rate of return on net assets, asset liability ratio and The six factors of industry analyze the degree of its influence on the benefits of control. Finally, policy recommendations are put forward, which will not only inhibit the enthusiasm of large shareholders to promote the development of the company, but also reduce the expropriation of large shareholders to minority shareholders.
The empirical results show that the rate of return on net assets of ROE, after the transaction CR shareholding ratio and asset liability ratio LEV. is positively correlated with the control of income level, the size of the company LNSIZE, the balance between shareholders of BAL. with the yield of control rights is negatively related. China's listed companies are more concentrated, large shareholders to obtain control right income increase; poor effectiveness of supervision at the same time our external creditors, so that debt increased major shareholders of listed companies operating funds; major shareholders of Companies Implementing occupation behavior less, corporate shareholders constraints greatly; listed company shareholders balance on the benefits of control the level of inhibition.
This paper enriches the research on private benefits of control in China, broaden the research perspective, and strive to more comprehensive, comprehensive consideration of effect of the right of income level control in China. This paper selects factors but samples from 2004 to 2008, for the full circulation times, large shareholders more subtle invading behavior, such as stock price manipulation is not involved.

【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

【参考文献】