市场化进程、控制人性质与高管薪酬契约有效性

发布时间：2018-02-16 04:38

本文关键词： 高管薪酬激励市场化进程控制人性质企业绩效　出处：《内蒙古财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国上市公司数量、规模的不断增加与扩大，企业高管薪酬虽然在总体上呈现出一种上升的趋势，但在个体上却出现了一些显著的异常变动：一些亏损公司的高管仍然得到丰厚的高薪；相反，绩效良好的公司高管薪酬却并不突出；一些公司高管薪酬的增长速度远远超过企业绩效的增长幅度。显然，我国高管薪酬的发展已经偏离了“最优契约理论”，高管薪酬在一定程度上已经不再与业绩挂钩，其所承担的激励效用也在减弱，因此，，对于我国上市公司高管薪酬有效性的研究就迫在眉睫。本文采用规范分析与实证分析相结合的方法对高管薪酬的有效性进行了研究，理论研究表明：出于保护股东和投资者利益的目的，把高管薪酬与公司绩效结合起来的激励契约是有效的。但是，高管薪酬激励契约制定依据的原则纷繁复杂，且不具有透明性。虽然激励的最终目的是提高企业价值、提升公司绩效，但是高管薪酬激励契约的制定还会受到众多公司内在或外在因素的影响，这些影响有可能是提高激励有效性的正面影响，也有可能会对激励有效性产生负面干扰。以往文献在研究高管薪酬激励契约有效性时，对公司规模、风险、成长性、行业和地区，以及公司治理结构等因素进行了充分的考虑，对企业家薪酬理论以及管理层激励理论的完善都起到了重要作用。本文在研究了高管薪酬与公司绩效关系的基础上，针对我国各地区市场化程度的不同，研究制度环境对高管薪酬与公司绩效关系的影响；与此同时，本文进一步考虑了政府干预对高管薪酬与公司绩效关系的影响，将企业按是否为政府控制进行分类，分别进行实证分析。最后，本文还综合考虑了市场化进程、控制人性质对高管薪酬与公司绩效关系的影响。可以说，本文为高管薪酬领域的研究增添了一个新的视角，同时对于完善我国上市公司的激励机制有一定的现实意义，也可以帮助我国政府更好地发挥政府职能。在理论分析的基础上，本文构建回归模型，利用2007 2010年上市公司的数据进行多元回归分析。结果发现：（1）高管薪酬与公司绩效存在相关性，且相关性显著，即上市公司高管薪酬契约具有激励有效性；（2）市场化指数与高管薪酬显著正相关，（3）相对于政府控制公司来说，非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约更具有激励有效性。（4）市场化进程对于非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约与业绩的敏感性的影响更大，而对于政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约与业绩的敏感性的影响相对较小。最后，本文给出如下建议：公司治理机制要依照制度环境的变化而进行相应的动态调整，只有适应环境的公司治理结构才能够充分发挥作用；对政府的经济职能要进行进一步的调整，才能保障市场经济发展的良性轨迹；应减少政府对市场和企业的干预，充分发挥市场自我调节作用。
[Abstract]:With the continuous increase and expansion of the number and scale of listed companies in China, the executive compensation of enterprises presents an upward trend on the whole. However, there are some remarkable changes on the individual level: some executives of loss-making companies are still well paid, while those with good performance are not outstanding. The development of executive compensation in China has deviated from the "optimal contract theory", and the executive compensation has to some extent been no longer linked to performance. Therefore, the research on the effectiveness of executive compensation of listed companies in China is imminent. This paper studies the effectiveness of executive compensation by the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis. The theoretical research shows that: to protect the interests of shareholders and investors, The incentive contract that combines executive compensation with corporate performance is effective. However, the principles on which executive compensation incentive contracts are based are complex and not transparent. Improve the performance of the company, but the establishment of executive compensation incentive contract will also be affected by many internal or external factors, which may be a positive impact to improve the effectiveness of incentives. There may also be negative interference with the effectiveness of incentives. When studying the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive contract, the previous literature has considered the factors such as company size, risk, growth, industry and region, and corporate governance structure, etc. This paper studies the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, aiming at the different degree of marketization in different regions of China. At the same time, this paper further considers the influence of government intervention on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, and classifies enterprises according to whether they are government control. Finally, this paper also considers the effect of marketization process and the nature of control on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. It can be said that this paper adds a new perspective to the research of executive compensation. At the same time, it has certain practical significance to perfect the incentive mechanism of listed companies in our country, and can also help our government to give full play to the government function. On the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper constructs a regression model and carries out multivariate regression analysis using the data of listed companies from 2010 to 2007.The results show that there is a significant correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance, and there is a significant correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance. That is, the incentive effectiveness of executive compensation contract in listed companies is significant positive correlation between market-oriented index and executive compensation. The market-oriented process of executive compensation contracts of non-government controlled companies has a greater impact on the sensitivity of executive compensation contracts and performance of non-government-controlled companies. However, the effect on the sensitivity of executive compensation contract and performance of government-controlled companies is relatively small. Finally, this paper gives the following suggestions: the corporate governance mechanism should be dynamically adjusted according to the changes of the institutional environment, only the corporate governance structure that adapts to the environment can play a full role; Only by further adjusting the economic functions of the government, can we guarantee the benign track of the development of the market economy, reduce the government's intervention in the market and enterprises, and give full play to the self-regulating role of the market.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F224

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