治理结构视角下的基金合约的优化研究

发布时间：2018-02-20 08:18

本文关键词： 基金管理人治理结构基金合约优化　出处：《中南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：摘要：自从20世纪90年代初证券投资基金在我国正式成立以来,我国的基金业取得了迅速的发展。基金管理公司不断增加,基金规模不断扩大,基金品种不断创新,基金业在我国资本市场中起着越来越重要的作用。在基金业取得迅速发展的同时,一系列的问题也逐渐的暴露出来,其中最重要的问题就是基金管理运作中的内部激励约束问题,这一问题也成为近些年国内外学者研究的焦点问题。由于基金管理人与基金投资者之间存在信息不对称,投资者无法观察到基金管理人的努力水平,基金管理人与投资者之间的目标函数不一致,容易引发基金管理人的道德风险,进行各种机会主义行为,损害投资者的利益。在传统的基金治理结构中,对基民与基金管理人的委托—代理合同进行优化,重激励、轻约束,不能从根本上消除基金管理人的道德风险。持基激励的模式在基金管理公司中的内部激励问题的研究中迈出了重大的一步,基金管理人从不承担风险转变成与投资者共担基金投资运作的风险。但是持基激励模式对基金管理人的约束也只是部分约束,权责不对等的问题依然存在,也难以遏制基金管理人的机会主义行为。本文从治理结构视角对基金合约进行优化,实现基金管理人从经理型向股东型的彻底转变,将基民与基金管理人的关系由传统的基金运行模式中的股东与经理的关系改造为优先股股东与普通股股东的关系。基金管理人的股东化转型,相对于经理型基金管理人而言,至少有两大功能：对基金管理人的机会主义行为的矫治功能；对基金管理人能力的甄别功能。
[Abstract]:Abstract: since the securities investment fund was formally established in China in 1990s, the fund industry in our country has made rapid development. The fund management company is increasing, the fund scale is expanding, the fund variety is innovating constantly. The fund industry plays a more and more important role in the capital market of our country. With the rapid development of the fund industry, a series of problems are gradually exposed. The most important problem is the problem of internal incentive and restraint in fund management, which has also become the focus of domestic and foreign scholars in recent years, because of the information asymmetry between fund managers and fund investors. The investors can not observe the level of the fund manager's effort, and the objective function between the fund manager and the investor is inconsistent, which can easily lead to the moral hazard of the fund manager, carry out all kinds of opportunistic behavior, and harm the interests of the investor. In the traditional fund governance structure, the principal-agent contract between the people and the fund manager is optimized. The moral hazard of fund managers cannot be fundamentally eliminated. The model of based-incentive has taken a significant step in the study of internal incentives in fund management companies. The fund manager has changed from not taking the risk to sharing the risk with the investor in the investment operation of the fund. However, the restriction on the fund manager by the base incentive mode is only partial, and the problem of unequal power and responsibility still exists. It is also difficult to restrain the opportunistic behavior of fund manager. This paper optimizes the fund contract from the perspective of governance structure and realizes the fund manager's thorough transformation from manager type to shareholder type. The relationship between people and fund managers is transformed from the relationship between shareholders and managers in the traditional fund operation mode to the relationship between preferred stock shareholders and common shareholders. There are at least two functions: correcting the opportunistic behavior of the fund manager and discriminating the fund manager's ability.
【学位授予单位】：中南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51

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