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管理层薪酬契约对我国上市公司盈余管理影响的实证研究

发布时间:2018-02-25 00:10

  本文关键词: 管理层薪酬契约 盈余管理 上市公司 出处:《东北农业大学》2012年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:近年来,随着我国上市公司股权分置改革的推进和完成,资本市场迎来不小的变化。在股权分置改革的推动下,管理层薪酬机制在年薪制的基础上引入了股权激励。与此同时,上市公司盈余管理动机和行为方式也趋于复杂化。由于上市公司管理层的盈余管理行为直接影响着上市公司对外传递信息的准确性,进而影响投资人在资本市场中的投资决策。因此,加入股权激励后的管理层薪酬契约怎样影响以及是否能够约束趋于复杂化的上市公司盈余管理行为,对确保资本市场的健康发展具有重要意义。为了进一步揭示我国上市公司盈余管理行为并为管理层薪酬契约的制定提供理论依据、完善我国上市公司管理层激励制度、促进我国资本市场健康发展,本文在国内外有关管理层薪酬契约与盈余管理研究成果综述的基础上,借鉴国内外相关研究方法,针对管理层薪酬契约对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响进行实证研究。 本文在对以往外研究成果的基础上,采用了理论研究和实证研究相结合,在理论研究的基础上进行实证研究。在理论研究方面采用了规范分析与定性分析相结合的方式。在实证研究方面,使用了多元回归模型进行定量分析。 首先,通过对研究背景、目的及研究意义的介绍,确立本文研究价值;并在梳理和总结国内外先进经验的同时,对管理层薪酬契约与盈余管理的相关概念和理论基础进行界定与阐述,以明确本文的研究范围。其次,在对我国上市公司管理层薪酬契约与盈余管理现状描述和分析的基础上,运用EXCEL和SPSS软件,以深沪两市2008-2010三年间的上市公司为样本建立模型,针对管理层薪酬契约对盈余管理行为的影响进行实证研究。最后,结合现状分析和实证研究的结果,对如何完善我国上市公司管理层薪酬契约机制提出相应的对策建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the promotion and completion of the split share structure reform of listed companies in our country, the capital market is undergoing considerable changes. Under the impetus of the equity split structure reform, the management compensation mechanism has introduced equity incentive on the basis of the annual salary system. The motivation and behavior of earnings management of listed companies also tend to be complicated, because the earnings management behavior of the management of listed companies directly affects the accuracy of the information transmitted by listed companies to the outside. Therefore, how to influence the executive compensation contract after the equity incentive and whether it can restrain the earnings management behavior of the more complicated listed company, and then affect the investment decision of the investor in the capital market. It is of great significance to ensure the healthy development of the capital market. In order to further reveal the earnings management behavior of listed companies in China and provide theoretical basis for the formulation of management compensation contracts, it is necessary to perfect the incentive system of the management of listed companies in China. To promote the healthy development of China's capital market, this paper draws lessons from relevant research methods at home and abroad on the basis of summarizing the research results of management compensation contract and earnings management at home and abroad. This paper makes an empirical study on the effect of management compensation contract on earnings management behavior of listed companies. Based on the previous research results, this paper combines theoretical research with empirical research. On the basis of theoretical research, this paper adopts the combination of normative analysis and qualitative analysis in theoretical research. In empirical research, multiple regression models are used for quantitative analysis. First of all, by introducing the background, purpose and significance of the research, the author establishes the research value of this paper, and at the same time combing and summing up the advanced experience at home and abroad, This paper defines and expounds the related concepts and theoretical basis of management compensation contract and earnings management, in order to clarify the scope of this paper. Secondly, on the basis of describing and analyzing the current situation of management compensation contract and earnings management of listed companies in China. Using the software of EXCEL and SPSS, taking the listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets from 2008 to 2010 as samples, this paper makes an empirical study on the effect of management compensation contracts on earnings management behavior. Finally, combining with the current situation analysis and the results of empirical research. This paper puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions on how to perfect the management compensation contract mechanism of listed companies in our country.
【学位授予单位】:东北农业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F275;F832.51;F224

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