我国基金管理人显性激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-02-27 15:10

本文关键词： 基金管理人显性激励 BS期权管理费率　出处：《中南林业科技大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：证券投资基金在走过130多年的发展历程后依然显示出势不可挡的发展态势,近十年来增长了近百倍。证券投资基金是一种实行组合投资、专业管理、利益共享、风险共担的集合投资方式。由于投资基金是以委托的方式请他人代为投资和管理,因此,其从设立到终止都要支付一定费用。在林林总总的基金的费用列表中,基金管理人的报酬是其中最为重要的一项,称为基金管理费,因为作为基金运作过程中最主要的费用支出,故而对基金净收益从始至终都有着重大影响。在基金管理费这个问题上,由于需要由基金投资者承担,所以他们希望管理费用越少越好；但作为收入方,基金的运作和发展需要管理费来支撑,加上出于自身利益考虑,基金管理人必然希望管理费用越多越好。于是,就形成了基金管理人和基金投资者之间的严重利益冲突,因此本文建立一种有效的激励机制,既给予基金管理人合理的报酬以激励其向投资者提供质量更佳的投资服务,又保护投资的利益不受损害。另外本文利用布莱克斯科尔斯期权定价模型来设计基金管理费率,达到既激励管理人又保护投资者的双重效果,使得基金管理人显性激励机制得到进一步改进和完善。本文的具体研究内容如下：第一部分为绪论,具体介绍研究背景、研究意义,主要研究内容与研究方法,国内外的研究动态,以及本文的研究重难点和创新点。第二部介绍本文研究的主要理论基础及文献综述。第三部分对我国基金管理人显性激励机制进行必要性分析且介绍我国现有显性激励的现状和存在的问题。第四部分在对国外基金发展有了充分了解的基础上,细致分析国外基金管理人的显性激励机制,与我国的状况进行对比,吸取经验教训,为政府制定基金管理人激励政策和基金公司制定激励机制提供实践指导。第五部分具体利用BS期权定价模型对我国基金管理费率进行实证的研究与设计。第六部分在前文所分析的基础上,针对我国基金管理人显性激励机制所存在的问题提出一系列的具体对策。第七部分即为结论部分。
[Abstract]:After more than 130 years of development, securities investment funds still show an unstoppable trend of development, which has increased nearly 100 times in the past ten years. Securities investment funds are a kind of portfolio investment, professional management, and benefit sharing. A pooled form of risk-sharing. Since investment funds are invested and managed on behalf of others on a commissioned basis, there is a fee to be paid from establishment to termination. The remuneration of the fund manager is one of the most important items, known as the fund management fee, because it is the most important expense in the operation of the fund. Therefore, it has a significant impact on the net income of the fund from beginning to end. On the issue of fund management fees, since they need to be borne by the fund investors, they want the less management costs the better; but on the income side, The operation and development of the fund need to be supported by management fees. In addition, for the sake of its own interests, the fund manager must want as much as possible to manage the expenses. As a result, a serious conflict of interest between the fund manager and the fund investors is created. Therefore, this paper establishes an effective incentive mechanism, which not only gives the fund manager a reasonable reward to encourage them to provide investors with better quality investment services, In addition, this paper uses Blackscholes option pricing model to design the fund management fee rate, which can not only motivate the manager but also protect the investor. So that the dominant incentive mechanism of fund managers has been further improved and improved. The contents of this paper are as follows:. The first part is the introduction, which introduces the research background, research significance, main research content and research methods, domestic and foreign research trends, as well as the important difficulties and innovations of this paper. The second part introduces the main theoretical basis and literature review. The third part analyzes the necessity of dominant incentive mechanism of fund manager in China and introduces the present situation and problems of dominant incentive mechanism in China. On the basis of full understanding of the development of foreign funds, the 4th part carefully analyzes the dominant incentive mechanism of foreign fund managers, compares it with the situation in China, and draws lessons from experience. To provide practical guidance for government to formulate fund manager incentive policy and fund company to establish incentive mechanism. In the 5th part, we use BS option pricing model to study and design the fund management fee rate in China. On the basis of the previous analysis, the 6th part puts forward a series of concrete countermeasures against the problems existing in the dominant incentive mechanism of fund managers in China. Part 7th is the conclusion.
【学位授予单位】：中南林业科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51

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