财政分权、地方债务控制与预算软约束

发布时间：2018-02-27 19:24

本文关键词： 财政分权地方债务预算软约束社会福利　出处：《管理评论》2014年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：分权财政体制下,中央政府与地方政府之间由于税基交叠会产生纵向外部性,且这种纵向外部性容易导致以中央政府对地方政府进行转移支付为特征的预算软约束的出现。为分析这种预算软约束对社会福利的影响,本文建立了一个包含中央政府与代表性地方政府在内的跨期迭代模型,并比较了地方政府债务不受控和受控两种情形下的影响。在地方政府债务不受中央政府控制时,预算软约束对公共投资和地方债务都具有显著的正面效果,尽管其也会导致寻租活动的出现。而在地方政府债务受中央政府控制时,预算软约束并不一定刺激公共投资。无论哪种情况,只要中央政府所提供的公共产品边际价值相对较小或地方政府分享的税收份额相对较低,预算软约束都能增进社会福利水平。
[Abstract]:Under the decentralized fiscal system, the overlap of tax bases between the central government and local governments will produce vertical externalities. And this vertical externality easily leads to the emergence of soft budgetary constraints, which are characterized by the transfer payment from the central government to local governments, in order to analyze the impact of such soft budgetary constraints on social welfare. In this paper, an intertemporal iterative model including central government and representative local government is established, and the influence of local government debt is compared in two cases: the local government debt is not controlled by the central government, and the local government debt is not under the control of the central government when the local government debt is not under the control of the central government. Soft budget constraints have significant positive effects on both public investment and local debt, although they can also lead to rent-seeking activities. And when local government debt is controlled by the central government, Soft budgetary constraints do not necessarily stimulate public investment. In either case, as long as the marginal value of public goods provided by the central government is relatively small or the share of tax revenue shared by local governments is relatively low, Soft budget constraints can improve the level of social welfare.
【作者单位】：山东财经大学财政税务学院;山东省政府绩效评价软科学研究基地;山东财经大学;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目(13BJY164) 山东省软科学项目(2013RZB01002) 山东省社科规划项目(13CDYJ31)
【分类号】：F812.2;F812.5;F812.3

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