上市公司定向增发中大股东代理行为实证研究

发布时间：2018-02-28 20:09

本文关键词： 定向增发定价基准日累计超额收益率持股比例　出处：《沈阳工业大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：股权分置改革后，定向增发正逐步成为我国证券市场中股权再融资的重要方式之一。对上市公司来说，定向增发可以为公司未来的发展和成长提供资金；对投资者来说，定向增发为他们提供了很好的投资机会。然而，定向增发作为一种新的融资方式，相关的法律法规还不够完善，存在如定价基准日不够明确、董事会权限过大之类的问题，使大股东通过压低增发价格或者增发有瑕疵的资产向自己输送利益成为可能，如何对上市公司定向增发行为进行分析和鉴别便成为了投资者当前紧迫而重要的任务。本文选取了2008-2011年已经完成定向增发的深沪两市的主板上市公司为研究样本，采用事件研究法和统计检验，分析上市公司大股东在定向增发中的代理行为。本文首先从定价基准日前后上市公司股价的变化情况进行分析，将全部样本按认购对象分为以大股东为主和以机构投资者为主的两种，分析不同增发对象分组下，定价基准日前后的累计超额收益率的变化情况。结果表明，以大股东为主的定向增发中，定价基准日前后分别有有负的和正的累计超额收益率；以机构投资者为主的定向增发中，定价基准日前后分别有正的和负的累计超额收益率，且二者均有统计上的显著性。以上结果证实了以大股东为主的定向增发中，定价基准日前20日大股东有操纵股价相对升高的行为，定价基准日后20日股价则相对逐渐降低；以机构投资者为主的定向增发中，，定价基准日前20日大股东有操纵股价相对下降的行为，而定价基准日后20日的股价则相对有所上升。接着本文对大股东定向增发注资问题进行了验证，试图通过检验金融机构在增发前后对上市公司持股比例的变化情况来推断出上市公司大股东是否存在增发有瑕疵资产的行为。结果表明，金融机构在上市公司定向增发后对上市公司的持股比例普遍低于增发前的持股比例，可以推断这是由于上市公司增发有瑕疵资产而产生的。本文对投资者对上市公司定向增发行为的鉴别和相关机构的管理具有一定的现实意义。
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure, private placement is gradually becoming one of the important ways of equity refinancing in China's securities market. For listed companies, it can provide funds for the future development and growth of the company. Private placement offers them a good investment opportunity. However, as a new financing method, the related laws and regulations are still not perfect, such as the pricing benchmark date is not clear enough, the board of directors has too much authority, and so on. It is possible for large shareholders to transfer profits to themselves by lowering the price of additional issue or issuing defective assets. How to analyze and identify the behavior of listed companies' directional placement has become an urgent and important task for investors at present. This paper selects the listed companies listed on the main board of Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange, which have completed the directional placement in 2008-2011, as the research samples, and adopts the event research method and the statistical test. This paper analyzes the agency behavior of large shareholders of listed companies in directional placement. Firstly, this paper analyzes the stock price changes of listed companies before and after the pricing benchmark day. All the samples are divided into two types according to the target of subscription: the majority shareholder and the institutional investor. The change of the cumulative excess return rate before and after the base date of pricing is analyzed under the groups of different issuing objects. The results show that, There are negative and positive accumulative excess returns before and after the base date of pricing, and there are positive and negative accumulative excess rates of return before and after the pricing base day in the directional additional offerings mainly by institutional investors. The above results confirm that the majority shareholders have the behavior of manipulating the stock price rising relatively in 20th before the benchmark date of pricing, and the stock price decreases gradually in 20th after the benchmark date of pricing; In targeted offerings dominated by institutional investors, the majority shareholders had the behavior of manipulating the relative decline of stock prices on 20th before the benchmark pricing date. However, the share price in 20th after the base date of pricing is relatively higher. Then, this paper verifies the problem of private additional capital injection of large shareholders. This paper attempts to infer whether the majority shareholders of listed companies have the behavior of issuing defective assets by examining the changes of the shareholding ratio of listed companies before and after the issuance of additional shares by financial institutions. The proportion of financial institutions holding shares in the listed companies after the IPO is generally lower than that before the issuance, It can be inferred that this is due to the issuance of defective assets by listed companies. This paper has a certain practical significance for investors to identify the behavior of directional issuance of listed companies and the management of related institutions.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】