京东方政府补贴案例分析
发布时间:2018-03-05 03:27
本文选题:京东方 切入点:国有控股上市公司 出处:《辽宁大学》2013年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:我国证券市场的建立不同于一般渐进式的发展模式,而是采取了政府领导的强制性的制度变迁的结果。建立初衷是为了最大限度地动员社会资金,支持我国改革开放初期经济的高速发展,尤其是为了支持国有企业的股份制改革,为国企的发展筹集融得所需资金。我国特殊的市场起源方式使得政府对国企的偏爱也转移到了证券市场中,其中比较突出的表现形式就是对国有控股上市公司的补贴。 作为干预证券市场的一种有效有段,政府补贴作用明显,效果显著。但目前,我国的政府对国有控股上市公司的补贴名目繁多,覆盖面广,,正呈现愈演愈烈的趋势。政府补贴在证券市场中对上市公司市场命运的影响力越来越显著,这在一定程度上促使国有控股上市公司倾向于借助自身预算软约束的优势,甚至以承担国家一定的政策性任务为借口,将获得政府补贴资金视作弥补自身经营不佳的捷径,而忽视作为上市公司本应提高经营水平,追求利润最大化的目标。因此,在政府补贴繁多的大背景下,探究如何规范国有控股上市公司在市场中的行为成我们急需解决的问题。 本文以证券市场中国有控股上市公司的典型代表——京东方科技集团有限公司为例,以政府对国有控股上市公司的巨额补贴为背景,阐述了我国现阶段证券市场中,国有控股上市公司普遍存在的种种不规范的行为。这些不规范行为不但限制着公司自身的发展,也给证券市场的发展造成负面影响。由于国有控股上市公司与政府存在纷繁复杂的联系,国有控股上市公司在市场中的不规范行为不仅源于自身的行为偏差,也受到政府在证券市场中的异化行为的作用和影响。同时,证券市场相关制度的漏洞为国有控股上市公司和政府的异化行为提供了制度性的便利,法律制度和监管体系的不健全也是重要原因之一。最后针对提出的问题和形成问题的原因,从如何合理定位国有控股上市公司角色、完善证券市场制度、健全法律和监管体系以及规范政府行为等方面提出了些许改善建议。
[Abstract]:The establishment of China's securities market is different from the general progressive development model, but the result of the compulsory institutional changes led by the government. The original intention of the establishment is to mobilize social funds to the maximum extent. To support the rapid economic development in the early stages of reform and opening up in China, especially in order to support the reform of the shareholding system of state-owned enterprises, The government's preference for state-owned enterprises is also transferred to the securities market because of the special market origination of our country, in which the more prominent form is the subsidy to the state-owned holding listed companies. As an effective part of intervening in the securities market, the government subsidy has obvious effect, but at present, the government subsidies to the state-owned holding listed companies are various in name and wide in coverage. The influence of government subsidies on the fate of listed companies is becoming more and more significant in the stock market, which to some extent urges the state-owned holding listed companies to take advantage of their own soft budget constraints. Even under the pretext of taking on a certain policy task of the country, it regards obtaining government subsidy funds as a shortcut to make up for its poor operation, while neglecting the goal that as a listed company should improve its management level and pursue the goal of maximizing profits. Under the background of various government subsidies, it is urgent for us to explore how to regulate the behavior of state-owned holding listed companies in the market. Taking Jingfang Science and Technology Group Co., Ltd, a typical representative of the state-owned holding listed company in the securities market, as an example, and taking the government's huge subsidy to the state-owned holding listed company as the background, this paper expounds the current situation of the securities market in our country. All kinds of non-standard behaviors of state-owned holding listed companies, which not only restrict the development of the company, but also restrict the development of the company itself. It also has a negative impact on the development of the securities market. Due to the numerous and complicated relations between the state-owned holding listed companies and the government, the non-standard behavior of the state-owned holding listed companies in the market is not only due to their own behavior deviations. At the same time, the loopholes in the relevant institutions of the securities market provide institutional convenience for the dissimilation of state-owned holding listed companies and the government. The unsoundness of the legal system and the supervision system is also one of the important reasons. Finally, aiming at the problems raised and the causes of the problems, how to rationally position the role of the state-owned holding listed companies and perfect the securities market system, A sound legal and regulatory system and the regulation of government behavior and other aspects put forward some suggestions for improvement.
【学位授予单位】:辽宁大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F832.51
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