上市公司治理机制对债务资金成本影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-05 15:50

本文选题：上市公司　切入点：公司治理　出处：《山东大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：由于我国证券市场的发展还不成熟,股权融资远远不能满足上市公司的融资需求,债务融资仍然是中国上市公司的主要融资来源,而债务成本关系着企业的融资效率,影响着企业的效益。但是近几年来,我国上市公司的债务资金成本却并不理想。债务资金成本严重影响着上市公司的融资情况,一旦债务资金成本偏高,就会使得公司的融资能力降低,最终导致公司在可盈利项目投资能力上欠缺,使得公司的业绩和效益有所下降。公司治理机制是公司用来处理不同利益相关者之间责、权、利关系的一系列制度安排,而公司治理的核心是降低现代企业管理制度中的代理成本。国内外的研究表明,上市公司债务资金成本受到公司治理机制的影响,综合水平较高的治理机制能够在一定程度上降低公司的债务资金成本。但中国的上市公司治理机制还并不完善,对于其作用还颇有争议,国内鲜有文献对其进行全面研究。本文选取深交所上市的公司2005年至2009年的A股市场的数据,采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,从股权结构、董事会治理和高管激励角度,对我国上市公司治理机制现状及其对公司债务资金成本影响的实证研究,发现其存在的主要问题,并在此基础上提出相应的对策和建议,为改善上市公司债务资金成本奠定了基础。本研究的实证结论包括： (1)在股权结构变量中,国有股持股比例与公司债务资金成本成正相关；法人股持股比例与债务资金成本不相关；流通股持股比例、第一大股东持股比例和前5位大股东持股比例与债务资金成本呈负相关。 (2)在董事会治理变量中,董事会规模和两职合一比例与债务资金成本呈正相关；年度董事会会议和监事会会议次数以及独立董事比例与债务资金成本呈负相关。 (3)在高管激励变量中,董事会持股比例和高管持股比例与债务资金成本呈负相关；监事会持股比例和经理层持股比例与债务资金成本不相关。根据上述实证研究结果,本研究分别对我国上市公司国有股调整、董事会运作效率提升以及高管激励效果等方面给出了建议,以期提高我国上市公司治理效果,从而降低上市公司债务资金成本。
[Abstract]:Because of the immature development of China's securities market, equity financing is far from meeting the financing needs of listed companies. Debt financing is still the main source of financing for listed companies in China, and the cost of debt is related to the financing efficiency of enterprises. However, in recent years, the cost of debt funds of listed companies in China is not ideal. The cost of debt funds seriously affects the financing situation of listed companies, once the cost of debt funds is on the high side, It will reduce the financing ability of the company, and eventually lead to the lack of investment ability in profitable projects, and the performance and efficiency of the company will be reduced. Corporate governance mechanism is a series of institutional arrangements used by companies to deal with the relationship among different stakeholders, and the core of corporate governance is to reduce the agency cost in modern enterprise management system. The cost of debt funds of listed companies is influenced by the corporate governance mechanism. A higher comprehensive governance mechanism can reduce the cost of debt funds to a certain extent. However, the governance mechanism of listed companies in China is not perfect. Its role is still controversial, there are few domestic literature on its comprehensive study. This paper selects the data of A share market of listed companies from 2005 to 2009 in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research, from the perspective of equity structure, board governance and executive incentive. An empirical study on the current situation of corporate governance mechanism and its impact on the capital cost of corporate debt in China is made, and the main problems are found out, and the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward. In order to improve the cost of debt funds of listed companies to lay the foundation. The empirical conclusions of this study include:. Among the variables of equity structure, the proportion of state-owned shares is positively related to the cost of debt funds; the proportion of corporate shares is not related to the cost of debt funds; the proportion of shares held by circulating shares is not related to the cost of debt funds; The proportion of the largest shareholders and the top five shareholders have negative correlation with the cost of debt funds. 2) in the governance variable of the board of directors, the size of the board of directors and the ratio of two positions in one place are positively correlated with the cost of debt funds, and the frequency of the annual board meetings and the meetings of the board of supervisors and the proportion of independent directors are negatively correlated with the cost of debt funds. Among the executive incentive variables, the proportion of board holding and the proportion of senior management holding are negatively correlated with debt capital cost, while the proportion of board of supervisors and manager has no correlation with debt capital cost. According to the above empirical research results, this study gives some suggestions on the adjustment of state-owned shares, the improvement of the efficiency of board of directors and the incentive effect of senior executives, in order to improve the governance effect of listed companies in China. So as to reduce the cost of debt funds of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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