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我国上市公司董事会特征与财务舞弊的实证研究

发布时间:2018-03-09 20:05

  本文选题:财务舞弊 切入点:董事会特征 出处:《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:我国的资本市场自上世纪90年代建立以来,到目前已经取得了飞速的发展。与此同时,财务舞弊也随之产生和发展,大有层出不穷之势,如琼民源、红光实业、郑百文、猴王股份、华源制药和天颐科技等众多上市公司的财务舞弊行为浮出水面,然而这只是冰山一角,因此有关上市公司财务舞弊行为的问题已成为社会上的热点话题,上市公司财务舞弊行为的屡屡发生,将会导致人们对资本市场不信任,同时也有可能导致社会信用危机,信用危机的存在可能会导致市场低迷,而低迷的市场又将导致融资困难,使得企业的利润率下降,并最终引发财务舞弊行为的发生,这是一个恶性循环的过程。如果对财务舞弊行为视而不见,或者不严加打击和治理,必将影响我国资本市场健康、有序地发展。因此,对上市公司财务舞弊的研究将成为人们关注的重点。 股东大会选举产生董事会,并且赋予了董事会监督和战略决策职能。董事会在公司当中拥有最高的决策权,同时又是公司的内部监督机构。董事会不仅要负责挑选、评价和更换公司经理层并确定其薪酬水平,同时还要对公司的重大经营活动和投资计划进行决策和统筹。作为公司所有者股东的代理人和公司重大决策的参与人,董事的责任非常重大。董事会治理是为保障董事会科学决策和监督以及促成董事会高效的运作而所做的机制设计和制度安排。董事会治理是公司的内部治理机制,是公司治理的核心,起着非常重要的作用。根据国外董事会治理理论和一些经验数据可以得知,若一个董事的会的结构合理和运作有序,这将必然是一个高质量的董事会。如果董事会能够有效地发挥其监督和战略决策职能,公司的价值就会大大的增大,经营业绩也会大大提升,从而财务舞弊发生的可能性也将大大地降低。反之,在竞争激烈的资本市场中,无效的董事会将必然导致公司舞弊行为的存出不穷甚至破产或被收购。 因此,要想公司的业绩得以提高,降低财务舞弊发生的可能性,就必须要确保公司治理的核心-董事会能够发挥其应有的战略决策和监督的作用,要想董事会能够发挥其作用,就必须完善董事会治理机制,这些就可以通过董事会的结构及特征来反映了。不同的董事会特征对公司业绩的影响不同,对财务舞弊的影响也不同。国内外已有许多学者从多方面对财务舞弊问题进行过深入的研究和探讨。因此本文从董事会特征入手,通过上市公司的实证数据研究董事会的各种特征对财务舞弊的影响作用,然后找出有利于降低财务舞弊发生的特征,以便在实务中加以推广,这也是本文的贡献所在。本文一共分为五个部分: 第一部分:导论。本部分主要是对论文的背景、目的及意义进行简要的阐述,并概括出了论文的研究思路和创新点,这为后面的研究做铺垫。 第二部分:文献综述。本部分主要是对国内外有关董事会特征与财务舞弊的文献进行了简要的回顾,分别从董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事会会议次数、财经专业型独立董事、领导权结构、专业委员会的个数和董事会人员持股比例这七个方面与财务舞弊之间的关系来着手,并在此基础上对前人的研究加以评述。本部分将为下文的研究提供了借鉴依据。 第三部分:理论分析。本部分介绍了董事会的定义;概括了董事会的监督和战略决策职能以及董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事会会议次数、财经专业型独立董事比例、公司领导权结构、专业委员会的个数和董事会人员持股比例7个董事会特征;随后介绍了公司治理理论当中的委托代理理论、现代管家理论和资源依赖理论,并对这三个理论各自存在的缺点加以评述,如:代理理论的理论假设过于狭窄,它把人认为天生就具有偷懒和机会主义行为,现代管家理论克服了委托代理理论研究假设的不足,但是该理论的假设缺乏现实性,不太可能用实证数据来加以检验;紧接着介绍了董事会在公司治理体系当中的地位;最后介绍了财务舞弊的定义和财务舞弊成因的四个基本理论,其分别为冰山理论、三角理论、GONE理论和风险因子理论。本部分将为下文提供理论支持。 第四部分:实证分析。也是文章的重点章节。首先,笔者在前人对董事会特征和财务舞弊研究的相关理论的基础上,从董事会7个特征方面分别提出了7个研究假设,分别是董事会规模与财务舞弊呈负相关关系、独立董事与财务舞弊负相关、财经专业型独立董事与财务舞弊负相关、董事会会议次数与财务舞弊正相关、两职合一与财务舞弊正相关、专业委员会的个数与财务舞弊负相关和董事会人员持股比例与财务舞弊负相关。 在数据的选取方面,数据来源于我国沪市和深市所有的上市公司,从中筛选出了186家财务舞弊的上市公司,同时找到186家非财务舞弊的上市公司作为配对样本,在选取配对样本时,笔者参考Beaslev在1996年所采用的方法。这些样本数据的选择年度在2003年-2010年之间,笔者结合前人研究的理论成果,将董事会特征具体量化为7个可衡量的指标,另外还选取了公司资产规模、财务杠杆、公司的盈利状况这三个变量作为控制变量。然后用SPSS17.0软件对两组样本进行描述性统计、Pearson相关系数分析、配对T检验和Logistic回归分析。 通过描述性统计发现,在董事会规模方面,舞弊公司和非舞弊公司的均值非常接近;独立董事方面,两样本之间几乎不存在任何差异;在董事会会议次数上,两类样本公司在最大值和最小值之间悬殊的比较大,且两均值之间的差异也比较大;在财经专业型独立董事比例方面,非舞弊公司当中的财经专业型董事比例比舞弊公司的比例要高;领导权结构方面,两样本之间相差不大;在专业委员会的个数上,两类样本在最大值、最小值和均值上都完全相同,但其均值之间存在差异;董事会人员持股比例方面,舞弊公司的样本均值为0.34%,非舞弊公司的均值为0.38%,两者之间从表面上来看虽然相差很小,但实际上相差的还是非常大,因为所有样本公司中最大的董事会人员持股比例也不到1%。 最后通过配对T检验和回归分析,可以得到以下结论:董事会会议次数与财务舞弊显著正相关;财经专业型独立董事比例、专业委员会的个数和董事会人员持股比例与财务舞弊显著负相关;董事会规模与财务舞弊不显著负相关;独立董事比例和两职合一与财务舞弊不显著正相关。 第五部分:对策建议和展望。本部分针对董事会特征与财务舞弊关系,就如何对董事会进行改进和完善提出了一些对策建议。主要包括以下几点:第一,削减不必要的董事会会议次数,提高效率和质量:第二,增加财经专业独立董事的比例,完善独立董事知识结构;第三,完善专业委员会的立法规定;第四,适度推行董事会人员持股。最后对本文的研究提出了不足和展望。 本文的创新点在于:①新解释变量的引入。国内外学者对董事会特征与财务舞弊的研究,大部分都是把审计委员会的设置作为董事会特征的一个变量,只考虑了审计委员会的作用,而没有考虑到提名委员会、薪酬委员会等其他各种专业委员会的作用,本文创新地引入了专业委员会作为董事会特征的一个变量,研究其对财务舞弊的影响。②研究视角独特。国内外学者对上市公司财务舞弊的研究大多集中在财务舞弊的成因上,但本文是从董事会特征的角度出发,寻找其与财务舞弊之间的关系,希望能够通过设置合理的董事会特征从而达到抑制财务舞弊现象,另外本文选取了7个董事会特征对财务舞弊进行影响分析,较以前的研究具有系统性。③研究样本丰富。本文中样本的研究年度跨度大,为2003年-2010年,除了不满足条件被剔除的样本外,涵盖了中国证监会、上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所正式立案调查,并通报批评和公开谴责的非金融类上市公司。
[Abstract]:Since the capital market of our country since the last century, established in 90s, has been achieved rapid development. At the same time, with the emergence and development of financial fraud, has great potential as qiongminyuan, emerge in an endless stream, Hongguang, Zheng Baiwen, houwanggufen, financial fraud and Huayuan Pharmaceutical Tianyi Science and technology and many other listed companies surfaced however, this is just the tip of the iceberg, the financial fraud of listed companies has become a hot topic, the financial fraud of listed companies have occurred, will lead to distrust of the capital market, but may also lead to social credit crisis, the credit crisis may lead to market downturn, but the downturn the market will lead to the financing difficulties, the decline in corporate profit margins, and ultimately lead to the occurrence of financial fraud, this is a vicious cycle of the process. If we ignore or ignore the financial fraud, we will affect the healthy and orderly development of China's capital market. Therefore, the research on the financial fraud of listed companies will become the focus of attention.
The general meeting of shareholders elected the board of directors, and board of directors with oversight and strategic decision-making functions. The board of directors have the highest decision-making power in the company, and the company's internal oversight bodies. The board of directors is not only responsible for selection, evaluation and replacement of company managers and determine its salary level, at the same time, the company's major business plan activities and investment decision-making and co-ordinate. As people involved in the shareholders and the company agent of major decisions, the responsibility of the directors of the board governance is very significant. Institutional arrangements for mechanism design and for the protection of the board of directors of scientific decision-making and supervision as well as the operation of the board of directors, and to make the governance of the board of directors is the company's. The internal governance mechanism is the core of corporate governance, plays a very important role. According to the board of directors governance theory and empirical data show that if a The board of directors of reasonable structure and orderly operation of this must be a high quality of the board of directors. If the board can effectively play its oversight and strategic decision-making functions, the value of the company will be greatly increased, operating performance will be greatly enhanced, and thus the possibility of the occurrence of financial fraud will be greatly reduced and. And in the fierce competition in the capital market, is the board of directors will inevitably lead to the retention of corporate fraud is not poor or even bankruptcy or acquisition.
Therefore, to the company's performance can be improved, reducing the likelihood of financial fraud, it is necessary to ensure that the core of corporate governance of board of directors can play its proper strategic decision-making and supervisory role, to the board of directors can play its role, it is necessary to improve board governance mechanism, structure and characteristics of these can the board of directors to reflect the different effects of the board of directors. Different characteristics on the performance of the company, on the impact of financial fraud is different. Many scholars at home and abroad from the aspects of financial fraud issues through in-depth research and discussion. This article from the board of directors of various characteristics according to the empirical data of the board of directors of listed the company will impact on financial fraud, and then find out to reduce the characteristics of financial fraud, in order to be promoted in practice, this is also the contribution. This article is divided into five parts:
The first part is introduction. This part mainly introduces the background, purpose and significance of the thesis, and summarizes the research ideas and innovations of this paper, which will pave the way for future research.
The second part: literature review. This part is a brief review of the domestic and foreign on board characteristics and financial fraud literature, respectively from the scale, the proportion of independent directors, board meetings, financial professional independent directors, leadership structure, the number of Specialized Committee and the relationship between the board of directors shareholding the proportion of the seven aspects of financial fraud to begin, and on the basis of previous studies to be reviewed. This part will provide a reference basis for the following research.
The third part: theoretical analysis. This part introduces the definition of the board of directors; summarizes the supervision of the board and the function of strategic decision and board size, proportion of independent directors, board meetings, professional finance and the proportion of independent directors, corporate leadership structure, Specialized Committee and the number of the board of directors of the staff share 7 directors characteristics; then introduces the principal-agent theory, corporate governance theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory, and the theory of the three shortcomings are reviewed, such as: agency theory assumes that it is too narrow, the people that are born with laziness and opportunism, overcome the modern stewardship theory research on the principal agent theory is insufficient, but the theory hypothesis of the lack of reality, is unlikely to use empirical data to test them; then introduced the board of directors Finally, it introduces the four basic theories of the definition of financial fraud and the causes of financial fraud. They are iceberg theory, triangle theory, GONE theory and risk factor theory. This part will provide theoretical support for the following.
The fourth part is empirical analysis. This is the key chapter. Firstly, based on the relevant theory and previous research on the characteristics of financial fraud of the board of directors on the board of directors from the aspects of 7 features were proposed 7 hypotheses, which is the size of the board of directors has a negative correlation with financial fraud, independent directors and financial fraud negatively related to financial professional independent directors is negatively correlated with financial fraud, financial fraud and the number of meetings of the board of directors is positively related to the two level one and financial fraud are related with the number of Specialized Committee, financial fraud and negatively related to the board of directors shareholding ratio is negatively correlated with financial fraud.
In the selection of data, data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen all listed companies, selected from the 186 financial fraud of listed companies, and find 186 non financial fraud of listed companies as paired samples, the selection of paired samples, the method adopted by Beaslev in 1996. These samples the selection of the annual data in the years between 2003 -2010, combined with the theoretical results of previous studies, the characteristics of the board of directors for the 7 specific quantitative measurable indicators, it also selects the company asset size, financial leverage, the three variables the company's profitability as control variables. Then the two groups of samples by descriptive statistics SPSS17.0 software, Pearson correlation analysis, paired T test and Logistic regression analysis.
Through the descriptive statistics, the size of the board of directors, fraud companies and non fraud companies mean very close; independent directors, two sample almost no difference; in the number of meetings of the board, the two Sample Firms in between the maximum and minimum gap is relatively large, and the difference between the mean value of two relatively large; the proportion of independent directors in the financial professional, non fraud companies financial professional directors proportion is higher than the proportion of the company's fraud; aspects of leadership structure, difference between the two samples; in the number of Specialized Committee on the two types of samples in the maximum, minimum and mean value are exactly the same, but there are differences between the mean; the board of directors shareholding ratio, fraud sample average was 0.34%, the average non fraud companies was 0.38%, between the two from the surface to see though The difference is very small, but in fact, the difference is very large, because the largest share of the board of directors in all Sample Firms is less than 1%..
The paired T test and regression analysis, the following conclusions can be obtained: there was significantly positive correlation between the number of board meetings and financial professional financial fraud; the proportion of independent directors, the Specialized Committee and the number of the board of directors shareholding ratio and financial fraud is negatively correlated; the size of the board of directors and financial fraud is not significant negative correlation; the proportion of independent directors and the two level one of financial fraud is not significantly correlated.
The fifth part: suggestions and outlook. This part aims at the relationship between board characteristics and financial fraud, the board of directors on how to improve and perfect some suggestions. Mainly includes the following points: first, to reduce unnecessary board meetings, to improve the efficiency and quality: second, increase the financial professional independent directors the proportion of independent directors, perfect knowledge structure; third, perfect the legislation of the Specialized Committee; fourth, appropriate implementation of board of directors shareholding. The last of the paper put forward the deficiencies and prospects.
The innovation of this paper is: the introduction of the new explanatory variables. The researches on board characteristics and financial fraud, most of them are the audit committee as a set of variable characteristics of the board, only consider the role of the audit committee, and did not consider the nomination committee, remuneration committee and other various Specialized Committee the role of a variable in this paper, the introduction of innovative Specialized Committee as the feature of the board of directors, to study its effect on financial fraud. The unique research perspective. The causes of the financial fraud of listed companies at home and abroad are mostly concentrated in the financial fraud, but this is a feature from the board's point of view, looking for the relationship between with the financial fraud, hoping to set up a reasonable board characteristics so as to prevent financial fraud, this paper selects 7 Board of directors. Sign of impact analysis on financial fraud, the system compared with the previous research. The research sample is rich. This paper study the year span sample, 2003 -2010 years, but does not meet the conditions to be excluded out of sample, covering the Chinese Commission, the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange official investigation, and informed criticism and denounce the non-financial listed companies.

【学位授予单位】:西南财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F275;F832.51;F224

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