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有限合伙制私募股权基金的利益平衡机制研究

发布时间:2018-03-13 04:12

  本文选题:私募股权基金 切入点:有限合伙制 出处:《华东政法大学》2012年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:自2004年美国新桥投资以12.35亿元收购深发展17.89%的相对控股权后,私募股权基金这个概念进入了国人的视线。在短短的几年间,中国的私募股权投资基金从无到有,从初露端倪到蓬勃发展,涌现出不少成功的投资案例,成为我国金融市场上颇具生命力的重要组成部分。而有限合伙制凭借灵活、自治的内部治理结构和充分的激励约束机制,将投资人的资金与基金管理人的丰富的专业管理经验和广阔的人际关系进行有效地结合,扬长避短,实现共同发展;成为私募股权基金的主流形式。 在有限合伙制私募股权基金中,存在着两个利益主体:一是基金投资人,,一是基金管理人。随着募集资金行为的产生,基金投资人和基金管理人之间建立了委托代理关系,又具有合伙关系;这种交错的双重法律关系使得基金投资人和基金管理人的利益既存在一致性,又不可避免地存在冲突。为了保护各主体的利益,实现交易效率和公平,有必要构建一套利益平衡机制,以期规范私募股权投资秩序,推动私募股权投资市场的持续发展。而在现行的法律、政策环境下,并没有“私募”的概念,亦没有专门规范私募股权基金的制度:《合伙企业法》为其提供了组织形式的依据,但短短的25条仅简单地规定了各主体的权利义务;《创业投资企业暂行管理规定》等都侧重对企业的组织形式、设立条件及外部监管等的规范;有关基金投资人和基金管理人的权利义务只能参照“证券投资基金”的相关制度;对基金投资人和基金管理人之间可能存在的利益失衡缺乏有效的解决方式。 因此,本文从基金投资人和基金管理人的各自利益出发,指出其利益冲突之处并剖析产生利益冲突的原因。在对私募股权基金中的价值取向进行选择的基础上,借鉴美国有限合伙制私募股权基金立法政策支持和有限合伙基金完善治理结构的成功经验,“内外兼修”,构建一套适合我国有限合伙制私募股权基金发展的利益平衡机制。 按照上述写作思路,本文的内容除了引言和结语之外主要分为四个部分: 第一部分对有限合伙制私募股权基金的利益平衡机制进行概述:首先介绍了私募股权基金的概念、特点、发展历程及有限合伙制基金中的利益相关主体;其次分析了利益平衡机制的理论基础,即委托代理关系和合伙关系;最后,概括介绍了有限合伙制中利益平衡机制的应有内容。 第二部分重点分析了有限合伙制私募股权基金的利益平衡机制:包括法律主体分析、主体之间的利益冲突;并深入分析了各主体产生利益冲突的根源和直接原因;最后在对利益平衡机制的价值目标进行选择的基础上,详细介绍了利益平衡机制的一整套制度安排。 第三部分是对美国利益平衡机制的比较借鉴:首先分析了美国立法和有限合伙人协议在利益平衡方面的制度设计;然后对我国现行利益平衡机制的制度安排予以介绍。 第四部分是完善有限合伙制私募股权基金的利益平衡机制:通过有限合伙基金的内部救济和立法政策的外部支持两方面予以完善,互相协调,实现基金投资人和管理人的利益平衡。
[Abstract]:Since 2004 the United States new investment to 1 billion 235 million yuan acquisition of Shenzhen Development 17.89% relative holding rights, the concept of private equity funds into people's sight. In just a few years, Chinese private equity investment fund from the horizon to flourish, the emergence of a lot of successful investment cases, become an important part of me in the financial market vitality. But the limited partnership with flexible internal governance structure, autonomy and adequate incentive and restraint mechanisms, investment funds and the rich professional management experience and broad interpersonal relationship were combined effectively, and avoid weaknesses, to achieve common development; become the mainstream form of private equity funds.
In the limited partnership private equity funds, there are two main benefits: one is a fund investors, fund managers. With the behavior of raising funds, establish the principal-agent relationship between fund investors and fund managers, and the partnership; thisstaggered dual legal relationship makes the fund investors and fund management the interests of both consistency and conflict inevitably. In order to protect the interests of all the main transaction efficiency and fairness, it is necessary to construct a mechanism of balance of interests, in order to regulate the private equity investment in order to promote the sustainable development of the private equity market. But in the current law, policy environment. And there is no concept of "private", there is no special system to regulate private equity funds: "Partnership Enterprise Law > provides a basis for the organization, but only a short period of 25. The single has stipulated the rights and obligations of each subject; "Interim Provisions on the administration of venture investment enterprises" etc. were focused on the organizational form of enterprise, the establishment of conditions and external regulatory norms; the fund investors and fund managers can only refer to the rights and obligations of the relevant system of securities investment fund "; the lack of effective ways to solve the problem of interest may exist between fund investors and fund managers of the imbalance.
Therefore, this article from the respective interests of fund investors and fund managers, points out the interests conflict and analyzes the reasons of conflicts of interest. Based on the selection of the value orientation of private equity funds in the United States, from the limited partnership private equity fund legislation and policy support and improve the successful experience of Limited partnership fund governance structure, "Neiwaijianxiu", construct a set of suitable for our limited partnership private equity fund development interests balance mechanism.
In addition to the foreword and conclusion, the contents of this paper are divided into four parts, in addition to the introduction and conclusion.
The first part of the Limited Partnership Private Equity Fund to balance the interests of the mechanism were summarized: firstly introduces the concept and characteristics of private equity funds, stakeholders and the development of limited partnership funds; secondly analyzes the theoretical basis of the mechanism of balance of interests, namely principal-agent relationship and partnership; finally, summarizes its the contents of the mechanism of balancing of interests in limited partnership.
The second part focuses on the analysis of the benefit balance mechanism of Limited Partnership Private Equity Fund, including the analysis of the legal subject, the conflict of interests between subjects; and in-depth analysis of root causes of the conflicts and direct reason; finally in the value of the benefits balance mechanism based on the selection of the subject, introduces a set of arrangement the system of interest balance mechanism.
The third part is the comparison of the American interest balance mechanism. First, it analyzes the system design of the interests balance in the US legislation and limited partnership agreement, then introduces the institutional arrangement of our current interest balance mechanism.
The fourth part is to improve the limited partnership private equity fund interest balance mechanism: through the limited partnership fund's internal relief and external support of legislative policy two aspects to improve and coordinate each other, so as to achieve the balance of interests between fund investors and managers.

【学位授予单位】:华东政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:D922.28;F832.51

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