金融环境、债务治理与大股东隧道行为

发布时间：2018-03-13 09:25

本文选题：银行借款规模　切入点：银行借款期限　出处：《石河子大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：与其他新兴市场国家一样，我国上市公司高度集中的股权结构、不完善的市场机制以及不健全的法律体系导致上市公司大股东对中小股东利益侵占的动机十分强烈，Johnson等首次用“隧道行为”（Tunneling）来形容大股东这一“不光彩”的行为。大股东隧道行为不仅损害中小投资者及债权人的利益，而且对上市公司的财务绩效、金融市场与资源配置效率都产生了消极影响。基于大股东隧道行为的严重经济后果，学者们从公司内部治理和外部治理两个角度对如何抑制大股东隧道行为进行了研究，其中就内部治理机制而言主要从股权结构、董事会特征及公司基本特征等方面进行研究，外部治理机制主要集中在社会审计、市场环境及法律环境等方面，而忽视了从大债权人银行的角度研究债务对其的影响。作为大债权人的银行拥有以较低的成本获取借款企业信息的优势，并且具有较强的监督动机和能力，因此研究其对大股东隧道行为的治理作用具有一定的理论依据。同时，内生于经济转轨时期的商业银行通过一系列改革逐步走向市场化，宏观金融环境的变化必然影响企业微观行为，因此在我国金融市场化进程中研究银行债务对大股东隧道行为的治理作用并检验政策的有效性，具有重要的现实意义。本文以2001-2010年我国A股上市公司为样本，研究发现银行借款规模对大股东隧道行为具有抑制作用，相对于短期借款而言，长期借款的治理作用更强；考虑了产权性质后，发现银行借款对非国有企业的治理作用显著强于国有企业；考虑到我国宏观经济环境，目前我国正处于经济转轨时期，商业银行的市场化改革作为宏观经济改革的重要组成部分必然对企业微观行为产生一定影响，因此，我们以金融环境为宏观背景分析了银行借款对大股东隧道行为的治理作用，本文从时间（商业银行市场化改革）和空间（地区间金融发展不平衡）两个维度检验了金融环境改善对银行债务治理作用的影响。研究表明：商业银行的市场化改革有效增强了银行借款对大股东隧道行为的治理作用，金融发展程度越高的地区，银行借款对大股东隧道行为的治理作用越强，，并且这一作用在国有企业中更为明显。这是因为金融环境的完善使得银行的商业化、独立性增强，进而有效改善了国有企业中的银企关系，而非国有企业与银行之间本来就是真实的债权债务关系，所以，金融环境的完善对国有企业中大股东隧道行为的影响更为明显。
[Abstract]:Like other emerging market countries, the highly concentrated ownership structure of listed companies in China, Imperfect market mechanism and imperfect legal system lead to the strong motivation of large shareholders of listed companies to encroach on the interests of minority shareholders. Johnson and others first use "tunneling" to describe this "disgraceful" behavior of large shareholders. The tunneling behavior of large shareholders not only harms the interests of small and medium investors and creditors, Moreover, it has a negative impact on the financial performance, financial market and resource allocation efficiency of listed companies. Scholars have studied how to restrain the behavior of large shareholders' tunnel from two angles of corporate internal governance and external governance. In terms of internal governance mechanism, they mainly study the ownership structure, the characteristics of the board of directors and the basic characteristics of the company. The external governance mechanism mainly focuses on social audit, market environment and legal environment, etc. The bank as a big creditor has the advantage of obtaining the information of the borrowing enterprise at lower cost, and it has strong supervision motivation and ability, while ignoring the influence of the debt from the perspective of the big creditor bank, the bank has the advantage of obtaining the information of the borrowing enterprise at a lower cost. Therefore, it has certain theoretical basis to study its governance effect on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders. At the same time, commercial banks born in the period of economic transition gradually move to marketization through a series of reforms. The change of macro financial environment will inevitably affect the microcosmic behavior of enterprises. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study the governance role of bank debt on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders in the process of financial marketization in China and to test the effectiveness of the policy. Based on the sample of A share listed companies in China from 2001 to 2010, this paper finds that the scale of bank borrowing has a restraining effect on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders, and the governance effect of long term borrowing is stronger than that of short term borrowing. It is found that bank borrowing has a stronger effect on the governance of non-state-owned enterprises than that of state-owned enterprises. Considering the macroeconomic environment in China, China is now in a period of economic transition. The market-oriented reform of commercial banks, as an important part of macroeconomic reform, must have a certain impact on the microcosmic behavior of enterprises. Therefore, we analyze the governance effect of bank loans on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders against the macro background of the financial environment. This paper examines the effects of the improvement of financial environment on the governance of bank debt from the two dimensions of time (market-oriented reform of commercial banks) and space (unbalanced financial development among regions). The results show that: commercial banks are market-oriented. The reform has effectively strengthened the governance role of bank loans on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders. The higher the level of financial development, the stronger the governance effect of bank loans on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders, and the more obvious this role is in state-owned enterprises. This is because the improvement of financial environment makes banks more commercialized and independent. Thus, the relationship between banks and enterprises in state-owned enterprises is improved effectively, and the relationship between non-state-owned enterprises and banks is the real creditor's rights and liabilities. Therefore, the improvement of financial environment has a more obvious impact on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders in state-owned enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51

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