股权结构、会计稳健性与资本投资效率

发布时间：2018-03-13 10:09

本文选题：股权结构　切入点：会计稳健性　出处：《石河子大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国资本市场制度体系尚未健全，公司投资都是在这不完善的环境下进行的，基于严重的信息不对称和代理问题致使公司普遍存在无效率投资，即过度投资和投资不足。而会计稳健性是会计信息质量特征之一，它具有会计信息的治理功能，即能有效缓解信息不对称和代理问题，可改善公司非效率投资。一方面会计稳健性要求及时反映损失，经理人为维护自己的名誉而不会盲目选择损失项目，有效抑制过度投资；另一方面稳健性会计政策是充分及时披露会计信息，减少契约方间的信息不对称，抑制逆向选择问题来缓解投资不足。近年来国内外学者逐渐关注会计稳健性的经济后果，面临着普遍存在非效率投资的现象，会计稳健性越能体现其是一种重要的治理机制。当然我国的特殊制度和市场背景造成上市公司广为诟病的一股独大、所有者缺位的股权结构，并且因代理问题和信息不对称致使企业投资行为普遍受到扭曲。很多学者认为股权结构是公司重要的内部治理结构，会影响着治理机制的发挥。本文以委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、投资理论等作为理论支撑，借鉴国内外相关文献的研究方法和结论，，从我国特有的股权结构入手，分析其在上市公司会计稳健性与资本投资效率关系中的影响，以期可以为我国建立功能完善的资本市场提供相应的政策建议以及为投资者的投资决策提供参考。通过理论分析和实证研究，本文有如下发现： 1．提高会计稳健性可以改善公司资本的投资效率，即在其他条件一定的情况下，会计稳健性与公司资本投资的无效率水平负相关，会计稳健性与过度投资（投资不足）负相关，会计稳健性在公司资本投资中具有治理价值； 2．在国有控股上市公司中，会计稳健性可有效抑制过度投资和缓解投资不足，而在非国有控股上市公司里会计稳健性对非效率投资的改善作用较弱些，尤其是对过度投资行为产生的作用很弱； 3．股权集中度高易导致企业非效率投资，股权集中度与投资的无效率水平，过度投资（投资不足）显著正相关； 4．股权制衡度高说明股东权力牵制力强，可有效改善企业非效率投资，即股权制衡度高与投资的无效率水平，过度投资（投资不足）显著负相关； 5．股权集中程度对于会计稳健性与投资的无效率水平、过度投资（投资不足）之间的负相关关系具有显著的抑制作用； 6．股权制衡度对于会计稳健性与投资的无效率水平、过度投资（投资不足）之间的负相关关系具有显著的促进作用； 7．股权集中度在国有控股上市公司和非国有控股上市公司中对会计稳健性与非效率投资的负相关中都起到了抑制的作用，尤其是对国有控股公司的过度投资和非国有控股公司的投资不足，股权集中度的这种阻碍作用更为显著； 8．股权制衡度在国有控股上市公司和非国有控股上市公司中对会计稳健性与非效率投资的负相关中都起到了促进作用，尤其是对国有控股公司的过度投资，股权制衡度的这种促进作用更为显著。
[Abstract]:The system of capital market system in China is not perfect, the investment company is not perfect in this environment, serious information asymmetry and agency problems based on common causes the company inefficient investment, namely excessive investment and insufficient investment. Accounting conservatism is one of the characteristics of accounting information quality, it has the function of accounting information governance. Which can effectively alleviate the information asymmetry and agency problems, improve the company's non efficiency investment. On the one hand the accounting conservatism requirements reflect the loss of managers to maintain their reputation will not blindly choose loss projects, effectively curb excessive investment; on the other hand, the robustness of the accounting policy is full and timely disclosure of accounting information, reduce the information asymmetry between the contracting parties to alleviate the adverse selection problem, inhibition of lack of investment. In recent years, domestic and foreign scholars gradually focus on the economic consequences of accounting conservatism, face The widespread phenomenon of inefficient investment, accounting conservatism can reflect its is an important governance mechanism. Of course, special system background and market of our country caused by listed companies widely criticized for the dominance of the ownership structure and the absence of owners, due to agency problems and information asymmetry caused widespread corporate investment behavior twist. Many scholars believe that the ownership structure is the internal governance structure of the company important, will affect the governance mechanism of the play.
Based on the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, investment theory as the theoretical support, drawing on relevant literature research methods and conclusions at home and abroad, starting from the ownership structure of China, analyzes its influence on the relationship between listed companies accounting conservatism and capital efficiency, in order for China to establish a perfect function of capital the market provides some policy suggestion and provide reference for the investment decisions of investors. Through theoretical analysis and empirical research, this study found the following:
1. improve the accounting conservatism can improve the efficiency of investment capital, which in certain conditions, the level of capital investment inefficiency is negatively related to accounting conservatism and the company's accounting conservatism and overinvestment (underinvestment) negative correlation, accounting conservatism has value in capital investment in company governance;
2., in state holding listed companies, accounting conservatism can effectively curb excessive investment and ease investment, while in non state holding listed companies, accounting conservatism has little effect on inefficient investment, especially for overinvestment.
3. the concentration of equity is highly likely to lead to the inefficiency of the investment, the concentration of equity and the inefficiency of investment, and the significant positive correlation between over investment (insufficient investment).
4., the high degree of checks and balances indicates that the power of shareholders is strong, and it can effectively improve the inefficient investment of enterprises, that is, the high degree of equity check and the level of inefficiency of investment, and the over investment (underinvestment) are significantly negatively correlated.
5., the degree of ownership concentration has a significant inhibitory effect on the negative correlation between accounting conservatism and investment inefficiency level and over investment (underinvestment).
6. the balance of equity has a significant effect on the negative correlation between the accounting conservatism and the inefficiency of investment, the overinvestment (underinvestment).
7. ownership concentration in state-owned listed companies and non state-owned holding listed companies investment on Accounting Conservatism and non efficiency of the negative correlation plays an inhibitory role, especially the lack of excessive investment in state-owned companies and non state-owned holding company equity investment, set moderate this blocking effect is more significant;
8. degree of equity balances in state-owned listed companies and non state-owned holding listed companies investment on Accounting Conservatism and negative correlation in non efficiency have played a catalytic role, especially the excessive investment in state-owned holding companies, equity balance degree of this effect is more significant.

【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【参考文献】