论我国资本市场机构投资者信用制度的构建
发布时间:2018-03-26 07:38
本文选题:资本市场 切入点:机构投资者 出处:《河北经贸大学》2012年硕士论文
【摘要】:随着生产力的发展、社会分工的进一步细化,所有权和经营权发生分离。中小投资者将资金交由机构投资者代理理财,通过组合投资、分散投资的投资方式,可以有效地规避风险,实现最大化的投资回报;同时,为企业的发展提供长期、稳定的资金支持,满足企业的融资需求。由于机构投资者具有资金优势、信息优势,在没有有效的制度安排下,可能会出现机构投资者滥用权利的行为。由于我国资本市场先天的制度性、结构性缺陷,资本市场要求的公开、公平、公正的市场环境并没有真正建立,信息传导不流畅、监管不到位、激励与惩戒制度不足、市场主体间相互制约的功能未能得到充分发挥,导致机构投资者诚信缺失现象严重。机构投资者信用制度的构建,能够有效地规制和防范机构投资者失信失范行为的发生,稳定资本市场秩序,完善资本市场的信用环境,对促进资本市场健康发展具有重要作用。 文章分为三个部分: 第一章介绍了机构投资者、信用制度的相关概念以及机构投资者信用制度构建对我国资本市场的重要意义。机构投资者是具有资金和信息优势、代理中小投资者理财的法人组织,指出目前我国典型的机构投资者是证券投资基金。信用是市场经济的基石,信用的建立是市场经济的要求。资本市场的有序运行需要制度化的信用予以保证,信用制度是对信用以及信用活动的制度安排,是约束人们信用活动和关系的行为规则。针对我国机构投资者典型的失信行为,进行机构投资者信用制度的构建,能够有效的规制机构投资者的失信行为,减少机构投资者失信行为的发生,保护中小投资者的利益,为企业发展提供资金支持以及完善资本市场的信用环境,是资本市场健康发展的重要保证。 第二章分析了我国机构投资者失信行为的现状和根源。我国资本市场中机构投资者的失信行为表现为:操纵股价,通过短线操作造成股价波动,从中谋取利益;“老鼠仓”行为,是指机构投资者的从业人员对其企业的失信行为,利用内幕信息以及委托人的资金,通过操纵股价从而谋取私利的行为,损害了广大中小投资者的利益;介绍了羊群行为和短视行为,指出我国机构投资者存在羊群行为,相对于个人投资者更容易造成股价波动,没有起到引导中小投资者理性投资的作用。机构投资者失信行为的原因主要在于制度的缺失,包括主体内部约束制度不足、机构投资者的信息披露义务不完善、对机构投资者的监管不足、机构投资者的信用规定不足、对机构投资者的法律责任规定不足、机构投资者信用制度构建的外部环境缺失等几个方面。 第三章通过借鉴美国对机构投资者的相关制度的规定,试提出我国机构投资者信用制度构建的设想。投资基金是我国主要的机构投资者,因此通过借鉴美国对共同基金监管的制度安排,结合我国基金是契约型基金的现状,试提出从加强内部约束、加强机构投资者相关信息披露、协调监管、加强机构投资者信用规定以及完善外部环境等方面对机构投资者失信行为进行规制,从而构建我国资本市场机构投资者的信用制度。
[Abstract]:With the development of productive forces, further refinement of the social division of labor, ownership and management separation. Small and medium-sized investor funds by institutional investors agency financial management, through portfolio investment, diversify investment, can effectively avoid the risk and maximize return on investment; at the same time, the development of enterprises to provide long-term stable funding. Support to meet the financing needs of enterprises. Due to institutional investors with capital advantage, information advantage, in the absence of effective institutional arrangements, there may be institutional investors abuse behavior. Because the system of China's capital market inherent structural defects, the requirements of the capital market open, fair, fair market environment and not really establishment of information transmission is not smooth, the regulation is not in place, lack of incentive and disciplinary system, the main body of the market function failed to restrict each other and give full play to, Leading to the phenomenon of lack of investor credit agencies seriously. Construction of institutional investors credit system, effectively preventing and regulating institutional investors dishonesty anomie behavior, the stability of capital market order, improve the capital market credit environment, to promote the healthy development of the capital market plays an important role.
The article is divided into three parts:
The first chapter introduces the significance of institutional investors, the capital market of our country construction related concepts of the credit system and credit system. Institutional investors, institutional investors are with capital and information, the medium and small investors financial legal organization, pointed out that at present our national type of institutional investors is the securities investment fund. Credit is the cornerstone of the market economy. Credit establishment is the requirement of market economy. The orderly operation of the capital market to institutional credit guarantee, credit system is the institutional arrangement of credit and credit activities, is bound by people credit activities and the rules of conduct. The dishonest behavior of institutional investors in China are typical, build institutional investors of the credit system the regulation of institutional investors can effectively reduce dishonesty, dishonest behavior of institutional investors, the protection of small investors. It is an important guarantee for the healthy development of the capital market to provide financial support for the development of enterprises and to improve the credit environment of the capital market.
The second chapter analyzes the current situation and causes of dishonest behavior of institutional investors in China. Dishonesty Behavior of institutional investors in the capital market of China: the manipulation of stock prices, short-term operation caused by the fluctuation of stock price, the benefit from it; the "rat" behavior, is dishonest behavior refers to the institutional investors of its employees of the enterprise, the use of insider information and client funds through the manipulation of stock prices to seek private interests, damage the interests of small investors; the herding behavior and short-sighted behavior, pointed out that China's institutional investors are herd behavior, relative to the individual investors are more likely to cause price fluctuations, did not play a guiding role. The medium and small investors rational investment reason dishonest behavior of institutional investors mainly lies in the lack of the system, including the internal restriction system of the main issues, institutional investors, information disclosure obligations Imperfect, institutional investors' supervision is insufficient, institutional investors' credit regulations are not enough, institutional investors' legal liability is not enough, and institutional investors' credit system's external environment is missing.
The third chapter by referring to relevant regulations of the institutional investors, try to put forward a proposal on the construction of credit system's institutional investors in China. The investment fund is the main investors in our country, therefore by referring to the American system of mutual fund supervision arrangements, combined with China's current situation is the fund contract fund, put forward from the strengthening of internal constraints, strengthen institutional investors to disclose relevant information, coordination and supervision, strengthen institutional investors and improve the external environment of credit provisions on the regulation of dishonest behavior of institutional investors, so as to construct the stock market's institutional investors in China's credit system.
【学位授予单位】:河北经贸大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F832.51;D922.28
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