董事会治理与信息披露质量关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-30 04:06

本文选题：董事会治理　切入点：信息披露　出处：《郑州大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：在证券市场上,外部投资者利用上市公司披露的信息进行投资决策,由于信息的不对称,上市公司的管理层占据着信息优势,而外部股东处于信息劣势,信息披露容易出现信息失真,财务舞弊,投机行为等弊端,这严重损害投资者利益,影响企业健康持久发展。所以人们迫切要求找到影响信息披露质量的因素,而完善的董事会治理是提高信息披露质量的关键因素,因此,如何加强董事会治理来提高信息披露质量是亟待解决的问题。目前,国内外现有文献多是研究公司治理与信息披露质量的关系,或者仅选取董事会特征中个别因素进行研究,而本文直接从董事会治理的角度出发,依据有效市场理论、信息不对称理论和委托代理理论,提出研究假设,实证检验董事会治理与信息披露质量之间的关系。本文的核心内容是对董事会治理与信息披露质量的关系进行实证研究。首先,选取深圳证券交易所343家非金融类上市公司的数据,设定自变量：董事会会议次数、董事成员持股比例、独立董事比例、两职合一、董事会规模；控制变量：资产负债率、公司规模、净资产收益率；对信息披露质量的衡量,采用深圳证券交易所对外公布的信息考评结果,设定考评结果为0和1,并对变量进行Pearson相关性检验,初步判断变量之间不存在多重共线性。其次,建立实证模型,采用二项logistic回归分析,检验董事会治理与信息披露质量的相关关系。最后,得出实证结果：董事成员持股比例与信息披露质量显著正相关,董事会会议次数与信息披露质量显著正相关,两职合一与信息披露质量显著负相关,而独立董事在董事会治理中发挥的作用有限,对信息披露质量影响不显著,董事会规模与信息披露之间无显著关系。在本文最后,根据实证研究的结果,提出以下改进措施：提高董事成员持股比例,加强对董事成员的股权激励；董事会领导结构上坚持“二元领导”；完善独立董事会制度,发挥独立董事监督作用；加强对信息披露工作的管理。
[Abstract]:In the stock market, investors use the information disclosure of listed companies to make investment decisions, because of the information asymmetry, the managers of listed companies dominate the information superiority, and the external shareholders in information disadvantage, information disclosure is prone to information distortion, financial fraud, speculation and other defects, which seriously damage the interests of investors, affect the enterprise lasting health development. There is an urgent requirement to find the factors affecting the quality of the information disclosure, and improve the governance of the board of directors is the key factor to improve the information disclosure quality, therefore, how to strengthen the governance of the board of directors to improve the quality of information disclosure is the problem to be solved.
At present, the domestic and foreign existing literature is to study the relationship between corporate governance and the quality of information disclosure, to study the characteristics of the board of directors or only selected individual factors, and this paper directly from the board governance perspective, based on the efficient market theory, information asymmetry theory and the principal-agent theory, put forward the research hypothesis, the empirical relationship between the board of directors governance and the quality of information disclosure.
The core content of this paper is on the board of directors and the quality of information disclosure of the relationship between empirical research. First, select the Shenzhen stock exchange 343 non-financial listed company data, set up the independent variable: the number of board meetings, the share ratio of directors, independent directors proportion, the two level one, the size of the board of directors; control variables asset liability ratio, company size, rate of return on net assets; on the quality of information disclosure measure, the information evaluation results of Shenzhen Stock Exchange announced, setting evaluation results for 0 and 1, and the Pearson correlation test of variables, preliminary judgment does not exist multicollinearity between variables. Secondly, establish an empirical model, using two logistic regression analysis, test related between board governance and the quality of information disclosure. Finally, the empirical results: Directors shareholding ratio and the quality of information disclosure. With a positive correlation, the board of directors is positively related to the number of meetings and the quality of information disclosure, the two level one and the quality of information disclosure is negatively related, and independent directors in the board of directors governance play a limited role, has no significant effect on the quality of information disclosure, the board of directors has no significant relation between scale and information disclosure.
At the end of this paper, according to the results of empirical research, put forward the following measures: to improve the share ratio of directors, strengthen the equity incentive for members of the board of directors; leadership structure adhere to the "two yuan leadership"; perfecting the independent system of board of directors, independent directors play a supervisory role; strengthen the management of information disclosure.

【学位授予单位】：郑州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.6;F233;F832.51;F224

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