次大股东对公司治理的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-31 22:20

本文选题：次大股东　切入点：投资过度　出处：《西南交通大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：公司治理一直是近些年来学者们研究的重点问题,其中股权结构又是公司治理的重点问题,合理的股权结构有利于公司治理的完善和中小投资者利益的保护。随着我国股权分置改革的完成,我国上市公司的股权结构逐渐趋于合理,并且随着终极控股股东控制权的减少和次大股东控制权的增加,次大股东在公司治理中的地位逐渐显现出来,其在加强对控股股东的监督与制衡和保护投资者利益方面已经开始发挥着重要作用。特别是在我国2008年发生的国美控制权之争,使人们再次认识到了次大股东在公司治理中的重要作用。本文按照终极控制人的性质将我国的上市公司分为国有、家族和其他三种类型,同时按照能够追索到的次大股东终极控制人类型将次大股东分为国有、家族、机构投资者和其他四种类型,分别研究了在不同的股权结构下,不同类型的上市公司里次大股东对公司投资、代理成本、公司透明度和公司价值的影响。本文的主要研究内容如下： (1)在绝对控股股权结构下,次大股东不能对控股股东的投资行为发挥有效的监督作用；当控股股东与次大股东性质相同时,次大股东能够影响公司的投资过度；当次大股东为机构投资者时,不能够减缓公司的投资不足与投资过度现象；当负债水平低时,次大股东会促进公司的投资过度行为。 (2)多个大股东股权结构下,次大股东没有发挥降低经理层和公司股东之间的代理成本,而且有可能增加经理层的机会主义倾向,尤其是次大股东控制权增加时,对股权代理成本具有显著的影响；大股东之间控制权制衡度和现金流量权制衡度均对股权代理成本有显著的正向影响,控制权制衡度的变化对股权代理成本的影响更大。 (3)次大股东不能够提高我国上市公司的信息透明度,相反,随着次大股东持股比例的增加,公司的透明度反而会降低；当次大股东为机构投资者时,公司的透明度较高；当次大股东与控股股东类型相同时公司的透明度会较低；当上市公司类型为国有时或者是股权结构为控制性股东股权结构时,次大股东此时由于自己的能力有限更多的选择是不作为,此时不能够影响公司的透明度。 (4)绝对控股的股权结构下的次大股东对公司价值的影响较小。在多个大股东股权结构和股权分散的情况下,Z指数越小,越有利于提高公司价值。另外,当次大股东类型不同时,其对公司价值的影响也不相同,并且他们之间存在着显著的区别。次大股东控制权与公司价值显著的负相关,次大股东控制权越高,公司价值也就越低。前两大股东性质的异同也会对公司价值造成影响,当控股股东与次大股东性质相同时,次大股东控制权与公司价值显著负相关。公司规模对公司的价值也会造成影响,当控股股东与次大股东性质相同时,公司规模越大,越有利于公司价值提高,当控股股东与次大股东性质不相同时,公司规模越大,越不利于公司价值的提高。
[Abstract]:Corporate governance has been the focus of scholars in recent years, the ownership structure is the key problem of corporate governance, ownership structure and reasonable protection to improve corporate governance and the interests of small investors in China. With the completion of the equity division reform, the ownership structure of listed companies is becoming more and more reasonable, and with the increase and reduce the time of large shareholder control right of ultimate controlling shareholders control the status of large shareholders in corporate governance will emerge gradually, the strengthening of the controlling shareholders of supervision and balance and protecting the interests of investors has played an important role. Especially in China's 2008 battle for control of Gome again, make people aware of the important role of large shareholders in corporate governance.
In this paper, China's listed companies into the state in accordance with the nature of the ultimate controller of the family, and the other three types, and according to the ultimate recourse to the control of major shareholders, major shareholders of the human type is divided into state-owned, family, institutional investors and other four types were studied in different ownership structure. Different types of Listed Companies in the big shareholders of the company investment, agency cost, affect the company's transparency and the value of the company. The main research contents of this paper are as follows:
(1) in absolute control of ownership structure, large shareholders can not the investment behavior of the controlling shareholders play an effective supervisory role; when the controlling shareholders and shareholders at the same time, large shareholders can affect the company's over investment; when the second largest shareholder for institutional investors, are not able to slow down the company's investment and insufficient the phenomenon of excessive investment; when the debt level is low, large shareholders will promote the excessive investment behavior of the company.
(2) multiple large shareholder equity structure, major shareholders did not play to reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders of the company, and may increase the manager's opportunism, particularly the control rights of large shareholders increases, has a significant impact on the equity agency cost; major shareholders control balance degree and the cash flow rights restriction of equity agency cost has a significant positive effect, control balance changes impact on the equity agency cost more.
(3) big shareholders can not improve the information transparency of listed company in China, on the contrary, with the increase of the proportion of large shareholders, corporate transparency will reduce; when the second largest shareholder for institutional investors, corporate transparency is higher; when the big shareholders and the controlling shareholder of the company will be the same type of transparency low; when the types of listed companies for the country or sometimes the ownership structure controlling shareholder ownership structure, large shareholders because of their limited ability to more choice is not as at this time can not affect the transparency of the company.
(4) the ownership structure under the absolute control of the second largest shareholder has little effect on the value of the company. Scattered in a number of large shareholder equity structure and equity under the condition that the Z index is smaller, more conducive to enhance the value of the company. In addition, the types of large shareholders and its influence on the value of the company is not the same, and between them there is a significant difference. Large shareholder control and corporate value significantly negative correlation, big shareholder control is higher, the value of the company is lower. The similarities and differences of the top two shareholders properties will also affect the value of the company, the controlling shareholder and the second largest shareholder property. At the same time, large shareholder control and corporate value is significantly negatively related to firm size. The value of the company will be affected, when the controlling shareholders and shareholders at the same time, the company scale is larger, more conducive to improve the value of the company, when the controlling shareholders and major shareholders At the same time, the larger the scale of the company, the less the value of the company.

【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

【参考文献】