高管内部薪酬差距对公司风险影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-11 04:04

本文选题：高管薪酬差距 + 晋升激励　；参考：《复旦大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：委托-代理问题一直是公司治理的一项重要课题,而围绕这一问题,企业家和学术界也设计了各种各样的管理层激励措施。而在管理层内部实行差别化的薪酬体系,在股权激励制度尚不健全的内地公司中,被认为是解决委托-代理问题的一种可行的方案。上市公司高层管理人员之间的薪酬差距该如何设定也成为普遍关注的问题。随着中国股票市场的不断成长和发展,已有不少学者从锦标赛理论和行为理论两个不同的角度,对中国上市公司高管薪酬差距与公司绩效之间的关系进行了深入研究,并通过实证分析验证上市公司高管薪酬差距对绩效的影响。上市公司高管薪酬差距是否能推动公司业绩增长已经成为衡量高管薪酬差距合理性的标准,也成为公司制定薪酬政策的重要参考。然而,业绩和收益往往与风险相伴,在考虑业绩增长维度的同时,公司风险将怎么变化?在经济环境恶化时关注这些风险显得尤为重要。随着薪酬差距的增加,公司高管人员在不断增强的激励之下很可能采取更加激进的公司政策和决策,提升自身业绩以期获得升职加薪,而这可能给公司带来更大的风险。另外,在高的薪酬差距也可能导致高管团队成员之间的不公平感增加,破坏公司高管团队之间的合作,也将增加公司经营的风险。本文将着重研究上市公司高管薪酬差距对公司风险的影响,从公司风险的角度为上市公司高管薪酬设定提供参考。本文选取了2002-2010年沪深两市上市公司作为研究样本,运用面板数据分析的方法,研究了上市公司高管薪酬差距对公司经营业绩波动性及股价波动性的相关关系。实证结果表明,上市公司高管薪酬差距与公司经营业绩波动性及股价波动性之间存在显著的正向相关关系,公司高管薪酬越大,公司风险也随之增加。同时,本文对国有企业与非国有企业高管薪酬差距对公司风险影响的差异性进行了检验,在控制公司特征变量之后,发现企业实际控制人性质对公司风险具有影响,国有企业风险水平要低于非国有企业。同时,国有企业高管薪酬差距对公司风险的影响程度要高于非国有企业。在上市公司薪酬设计过程中,公司应结合业绩维度和风险维度做出综合考量,以确定合理的高管薪酬差距。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent problem has always been an important subject of corporate governance, and around this problem, entrepreneurs and academia have also designed a variety of management incentives.But the implementation of differential compensation system within the management, in the stock incentive system is not perfect in the mainland companies, is considered to be a feasible solution to the principal-agent problem.How to set the pay gap between the top management of listed companies has become a common concern.With the continuous growth and development of China's stock market, many scholars have conducted in-depth research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and corporate performance of listed companies in China from two different angles: tournament theory and behavior theory.And through empirical analysis to verify the impact of executive pay gap on performance of listed companies.Whether the executive pay gap of listed companies can promote the growth of corporate performance has become the standard to measure the rationality of executive pay gap and an important reference for companies to formulate compensation policies.However, performance and earnings are often accompanied by risk. How will the risk change when considering the dimension of performance growth?It is particularly important to pay attention to these risks when the economic environment deteriorates.As the pay gap increases, executives are likely to take more aggressive corporate policies and decisions, with growing incentives, to improve their performance in the hope of getting a raise, which could put the company at greater risk.In addition, the high pay gap may lead to an increase in the sense of inequality among members of the executive team, undermining the cooperation between the executive team, will also increase the risk of operating the company.This paper will focus on the listed companies pay gap on corporate risk impact, from the perspective of corporate risk for listed companies to provide a reference for executive compensation setting.This paper selects the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2002 to 2010 as the research samples, using panel data analysis method to study the relationship between executive compensation gap and operating performance volatility and stock price volatility of listed companies.The empirical results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the executive compensation gap and the volatility of operating performance and stock price of listed companies, and the higher the executive compensation, the higher the corporate risk.At the same time, this paper tests the difference of executive compensation gap between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises on corporate risk. After controlling the characteristic variables of the company, it is found that the nature of the actual controller has an impact on corporate risk.The risk level of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of non-state-owned enterprises.At the same time, the effect of executive compensation gap on corporate risk is higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises.In the process of salary design of listed companies, the company should make a comprehensive consideration combining the performance dimension and the risk dimension to determine the reasonable executive pay gap.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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