内部控制、关联交易与投资者保护

发布时间：2018-04-18 05:03

本文选题：投资者保护 + 内部控制　；参考：《安徽工业大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：大股东侵占上市公司资源，进而侵占中小股东利益的一种非常典型的手段就是不规范的关联交易。鉴于投资者的利益可能被侵害，因此需要一系列制度安排来保障投资者得到合理的回报、保护投资者利益免受侵占，这一系列的制度安排即是内部控制制度。本文以对中小投资者保护研究为出发点，论证了内部控制如何影响中小投资者的利益，进而检验关联交易对内部控制与投资者利益保护的传导效应这一主线展开，研究内部控制、关联交易与投资者保护三者之间的内在关系。本文在财政部、证监会、审计署、银监会、保监会五部于2008年5月联合颁布了《企业内部控制基本规范》、2010年联合颁布的《企业内部控制配套指引》以及2006年初财政部颁布了《新企业会计准则》的制度背景下，，以2008年到2011年间2087家上市公司披露的数据为研究样本，在国内外相关理论分析的基础上，采用规范分析和实证研究相结合的方法，提出研究假设并构建模型，通过引入关联交易为中介变量，研究了内部控制、关联交易与投资者保护三者之间的关系，从而为中小投资者保护提供了经验证据。本文以关联交易为核心，以深圳迪博企业风险管理技术有限公司提供的《中国上市公司内部控制白皮书》中的内部控制指数衡量内部控制水平，通过构建投资者保护指标，尝试研究关联交易对内部控制与投资者保护的传导效应。研究结果表明：1）内部控制水平对投资者利益保护有显著的影响，内部控制的构建越完善，越有利于投资者利益的保护。2）内部控制水平对关联交易有显著的影响，完善内部控制的构建可以抑制输出型关联交易的发生。3）关联交易对内部控制与投资者保护有显著的传导效应，完善的内部控制可以通过抑制输出型关联交易的发生、规范输入型关联交易的发生，达到保护投资者利益的目的。本文最后对实证研究结果进行总结，并提出一些政策性建议，同时指出了本文研究的局限性和不足之处。
[Abstract]:One of the most typical ways for large shareholders to encroach on the resources of listed companies and then to encroach on the interests of minority shareholders is the non-standard related party transactions.Since the interests of investors may be infringed, a series of institutional arrangements are needed to ensure that investors get reasonable returns and to protect their interests from encroachment. This series of institutional arrangements is called internal control system.Based on the research on the protection of small and medium-sized investors, this paper demonstrates how internal control affects the interests of small and medium-sized investors, and then tests the transmission effect of related party transactions on internal control and investor's interest protection.The internal control, related party transaction and investor protection are studied.This article is in the Ministry of Finance, the Securities Regulatory Commission, the Audit Office, the Banking Regulatory Commission,In May 2008, the five departments of the CIRC jointly promulgated the basic Standards for Internal Control of Enterprises, the supporting guidelines for Internal Control of Enterprises jointly promulgated in 2010 and the New Accounting Standards for Enterprises promulgated by the Ministry of Finance at the beginning of 2006.Taking the data disclosed by 2087 listed companies from 2008 to 2011 as the research sample, and on the basis of theoretical analysis at home and abroad, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis and constructs the model by combining normative analysis with empirical research.By introducing affiliated transaction as intermediary variable, this paper studies the relationship among internal control, related party transaction and investor protection, thus providing empirical evidence for the protection of small and medium-sized investors.In this paper, the level of internal control is measured by the internal control index provided by Shenzhen Debo Enterprise risk Management Technology Co., Ltd. in the White Paper on Internal Control of listed companies in China, and the level of internal control is measured by constructing the index of investor protection.This paper attempts to study the conduction effect of related party transactions on internal control and investor protection.The results show that the level of internal control has a significant impact on the protection of investors' interests. The more perfect the internal control is, the more favorable the level of internal control is to the protection of investors' interests.Perfecting the construction of internal control can restrain the occurrence of output-related transactions. 3) related party transactions have significant conduction effect on internal control and investor protection, and perfect internal control can inhibit the occurrence of output-type related party transactions.Standardize the occurrence of input related party transactions to protect the interests of investors.Finally, this paper summarizes the empirical research results, puts forward some policy recommendations, and points out the limitations and shortcomings of this study.
【学位授予单位】：安徽工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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