银行债权治理对大股东利益侵占约束的研究

发布时间：2018-04-21 15:45

本文选题：银行债权 + 大股东　；参考：《哈尔滨工业大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国上市公司的股权结构仍以集中为主，特殊的股权结构决定了大股东与中小股东及债权人的利益冲突是公司治理的主要问题。近年来由于大股东利益侵占而破产的上市公司数量不断上升，大股东利益侵占问题已经得到广泛重视。现有研究大多从公司治理结构、股权结构等方面来探讨对大股东利益侵占行为的防范，专门研究银行债权治理对大股东利益侵占的文献很少。大股东的利益侵占行为不仅会掠夺中小股东的利益，还会威胁银行的利益，因此银行有足够的动力约束大股东的利益侵占行为。为了对我国银行债权治理对大股东利益侵占约束作用有一个全面的认识，本文在研究时结合了我国特殊的制度背景。研究银行债权治理对大股东利益侵占的约束作用既可以丰富已有的银行债权治理和大股东利益侵占的理论，又可以为解决大股东利益侵占问题及完善银行的治理功能提供参考，有助于完善银行经营的金融生态环境和上市公司的治理结构，因此此项研究具有重大的理论和现实意义。本文总结归纳了国内外有关大股东利益侵占及债权治理的相关理论研究，并在前人研究成果的基础上，研究了银行债权治理对大股东利益侵占的约束作用。围绕着银行债权治理和大股东利益侵占进行了理论分析，为后文的研究提供理论支持。以2008-2010年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本，，通过多元线性回归方法分别检验了银行贷款比例、银行贷款期限结构对大股东利益侵占的约束作用以及不同股权性质及市场化进程下该约束作用的区别。得出的结论是：（1）银行债权不能有效约束大股东的利益侵占行为，银行贷款的增加反而会加剧大股东的利益侵占行为；（2）当银行贷款率低于60%时，银行债权对大股东利益侵占行为没有约束作用，但当银行贷款率高于60%时，银行债权治理能够起到一定的约束大股东利益侵占行为的作用；（3）长短期银行贷款均对大股东利益侵占没有约束作用，但是短期银行贷款对大股东利益侵占的约束作用要强于长期银行贷款的约束作用；（4）在市场化程度较低的地区和国有企业中的银行贷款率与大股东利益侵占程度的显著正相关程度要高于市场化程度较高和非国有企业中的银行贷款率与大股东利益侵占程度的显著正相关程度。最后针对实证结论并结合我国上市公司的实际情况，提出了相关的政策建议，这些建议将有助于提高银行债权治理对大股东利益侵占的约束作用。
[Abstract]:The ownership structure of listed companies in our country is still concentrated, and the special ownership structure determines the conflict of interests between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders and creditors is the main problem of corporate governance. In recent years, the number of listed companies bankrupt due to the expropriation of the interests of major shareholders has been increasing, and the problem of encroachment of the interests of large shareholders has been paid more and more attention. Most of the existing studies from the corporate governance structure, equity structure and other aspects to explore the interests of large shareholders to prevent encroachment behavior, the special study of bank creditor's rights governance on the interests of large shareholders of the few documents. The interest encroachment of large shareholders will not only plunder the interests of minority shareholders, but also threaten the interests of banks, so banks have enough incentive to restrain the interests of large shareholders. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the effect of bank creditor's rights governance on the interests of major shareholders, this paper combines the special institutional background of our country in the study. The study of the binding effect of bank creditor's right governance on the major shareholder's interest encroachment can not only enrich the existing theories of bank creditor's right governance and large shareholder's interest encroachment, but also provide a reference for solving the problem of large shareholder's interest encroachment and perfecting the bank's governance function. It is helpful to perfect the financial ecological environment of bank management and the governance structure of listed companies, so this research has great theoretical and practical significance. This paper summarizes and summarizes the relevant theoretical studies on the expropriation of the interests of major shareholders and the governance of creditor's rights at home and abroad, and on the basis of the previous research results, studies the binding effect of bank creditor's rights governance on the encroachment on the interests of large shareholders. The theoretical analysis is carried out around the governance of bank creditor's rights and the encroachment of major shareholders' interests, which provides theoretical support for the later research. Taking the A-share listed companies of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2010 as the research samples, the paper tests the ratio of bank loans by using multiple linear regression method. The term structure of bank loans restricts the interests of major shareholders and the difference between them under the different equity nature and marketization process. The conclusion is that: 1) the bank creditor's rights can't effectively restrain the interest encroachment behavior of the major shareholders, but the increase in bank loans will aggravate the interest encroachment behavior of the major shareholders.) when the bank loan ratio is lower than 60%, The bank's creditor's rights have no binding effect on the behavior of major shareholders' interest encroachment, but when the bank loan ratio is higher than 60%, The governance of bank creditor's rights can restrain the behavior of major shareholders' interest encroachment to a certain extent. (3) both long-term and short-term bank loans have no binding effect on the encroachment of large shareholders' interests. However, the constraint of short-term bank loans on the interests of major shareholders is stronger than that of long-term bank loans. The degree of significant positive correlation is higher than that of high degree of marketization and the degree of significant positive correlation between the ratio of bank loan in non-state-owned enterprises and the degree of major shareholder's interest encroachment. Finally, according to the empirical conclusions and the actual situation of listed companies in China, this paper puts forward some relevant policy recommendations, which will help to improve the binding effect of bank creditor's rights governance on the interests of large shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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