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股权分置改革后家族上市公司终极所有权结构对公司价值影响的实证研究

发布时间:2018-05-03 21:19

  本文选题:家族上市公司 + 终极所有权结构 ; 参考:《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文


【摘要】:家族企业是一种古老却又广泛存在于当今世界的组织形式,近年来多位学者通过追溯股权控制链,发现北美、西欧、东亚的大部分上市公司都由控制性家族掌控。改革开放为民营经济的发展创造了良好的契机,家族企业作为民营经济的重要组成部分,在21世纪的中国展现出强劲的生机和活力。但是,中国的家族上市公司大多处于金字塔的结构之下,控制性家族侵占中小股东利益,掏空上市公司的事件频频见诸报端,人们不禁思考家族企业的核心代理问题所在。 La Porta等(1999)发现世界上的大多数公司的股权结构并不是如Berle和Means所说的高度分散,而是高度集中的,并且存在一个终极控制人,其中最为典型的就是家族上市公司。国外研究者通过研究家族上市公司终极所有权结构与公司价值的关系,发现家族上市公司的核心代理问题是控制性家族与中小股东的代理冲突。我国有着转轨经济体和新兴市场的制度背景,并未被纳入国际研究的范畴,并且由于长期的历史原因,我国上市公司的股权被割裂为流通股和非流通股。国内学者对家族上市公司终极所有权结构与公司价值的关系的研究多基于股权分置改革前的数据,得出的结论也莫衷一是。2005年开始的股权分置改革是一场重大的制度变革,改变了长期阻碍我国资本市场健康发展的“二元股权结构”,深刻地影响了资本市场的宏观环境和公司内部的微观治理环境,在此重大的制度变迁下,家族上市公司的终极所有权结构是否发生了实质性的变化?家族上市公司终极所有权结构与公司价值呈现出怎样全新的关系?都是本文所要探讨的问题。 全文主要分为5个部分,以下简单概述各部分的内容安排: 第一部分:导论。 本部分主要介绍了本文的研究背景及意义、研究内容和框架以及本文所采用的研究方法。 第二部分:文献综述。 本部分首先回顾了理论界关于家族企业概念的演进以及实证研究中关于家族企业的界定标准。理论界对于家族企业的定义主要从所有权、经营管理权和代际传承三个维度去考虑,其中又以前两个维度为主。但是在实证研究中,考虑到家族管理和代际传承资料不易得到以及家族管理与家族控制的伴生关系,主要以家族控制来界定家族上市公司。另外,本部分还对终极所有权结构及其与公司价值关系的文献进行了梳理。终极所有权广泛存在于世界各国的上市公司中,但是由于研究样本的差异和变量选择的不同,关于终极所有权结构与公司价值的关系未能达成一致结论。国内外的研究普遍认为现金流权与控制权分离显示出侵害效应,除国内的谷祺(2006)等人外,现金流权具有激励效应,而控制权对公司价值的影响是复杂的,利益趋同与利益侵占效应同时存在,存在负相关或非线性的关系。 第三部分:理论分析。 本部分首先明确了家族上市公司、终极所有权结构及公司价值等重要概念,其次对相关的基础理论——不完全契约理论、委托代理理论做了简要的介绍。接下来运用家族企业的三环结构,主要从委托代理关系出发,具体分析了家族上市公司中存在的两类代理问题:管理者与所有者的第一类代理问题以及家族控股股东与中小股东的第二类代理问题,其中第二类代理问题占据主要地位。另外,本文分析了股权分置对家族控股股东控制权私有收益的影响,股权分置破坏了非流通股股东与流通股股东利益一致性基础,加剧了两者的利益差距,并使得内外部制衡机制失效,激发了主要持有非流通股的家族控股股东对控制权私有收益的攫取。 第四章:研究设计及实证结果分析 本部分在理论分析的基础上提出了5个研究假设,分别是:现金流权与公司价值正相关、控制权与公司价值正相关、两权分离与公司价值负相关、流通股比例与公司价值正相关、机构投资者持股与公司价值正相关。 本文以2005年前上市并于06年底完成股权分置改革的173家家族上市公司为样本,选取其2007-2010共692个观测值。由于目前我国不具备Tobin'sQ的适用条件,本文选取不易进行会计操纵的主营业务资产收益率CROA作为公司价值的代理变量。解释变量为现金流权、控制权、两权分离、流通股比例和机构持股占流通股比例,分别对应5个假设。控制变量为资产规模、负债水平、成长性、风险水平和年度。运用所选用的数据,首先对样本进行了描述性统计,着重分析股改后家族控股股东的现金流权、控制权以及两权分离度年度均值的变化和区间分布。接下来运用相关性分析和多元回归分析对前文提出的5个假设进行了验证,发现现金流权、控制权、机构投资者持股占流通股比例与CROA在1%的水平下显著正相关;两权分离度与CROA在5%的水平下显著负相关,但回归系数较小,仅为-0.005;流通股比例与CROA正相关,但统计上不够显著。 第五部分:研究结论、建议及局限。 本部分通过对前文各部分内容的总结,得到本研究的最终结论,根据结论提出改善家族上市公司终极所有权结构和提高公司价值的建议,最后指出本研究的局限所在。 本文的主要结论有: (1)股改后,家族控股股东的控制权和两权分离度有不同程度的下降,股权分置改革确实影响了家族企业的终极所有权结构。然而,家族控股股东以平均31.87%的控制权掌控着上市公司,家族控股股东“一股独大”的局面仍然存在;现金流权与控制权分离仍然较为普遍,家族上市公司两权分离度的4年均值为1.92,但是分离度高的样本逐渐进入低分离度区间,两权分离状况有所缓解。 (2)和以往大多数研究一样,现金流权对公司价值表现出强烈的激励作用;而不同于以往的研究,控制权也对公司价值具有正向作用,股改完成后,家族控股股东更多地发挥控制权对管理层的监督,而非将控制权用于攫取控制权私有收益,损害公司价值,控制权的利益协同效应占主导作用;另外,股改后两权分离与公司价值负相关,但相关关系比较微弱,显著水平不高。 (3)由于我国的股票市场还未完全进入“全流通”时代,且流通股股东“机会主义”投资倾向短期内未能转变,流通股比例与公司价值不存在显著的正相关关系。 (4)机构投资者注重企业的长期价值,并且具有强大的资金实力和专业背景,有动力也有能力积极监督控股股东的行为,参与公司治理,提升公司价值。 针对研究结论,本文对全流通时代家族上市公司的股权结构和外部监管提出了以下建议:(1)保持合理控制权比例,降低两权分离度;(2)积极培育社会公众投资者;(3)大力发展机构投资者;(4)深化股权分置改革,加强外部监管。 本文的主要贡献: (1)在我国经济转型的特殊时期,国有企业占据了我国资本市场上市公司的大部分席位,往往吸引了学者们更多的关注。而近年来焕发出全新生机的古老的家族企业模式却受到较少的关注,且以往的研究往往将家族企业与民营企业等同,家族企业这一特定领域的研究结果较少,并且可能与实际情况存在出入。本文明确以家族上市公司为研究对象,对其内部的利益冲突和代理问题进行了详细的理论阐述。 (2)以往关于家族上市公司终极所有权与公司价值关系的研究多在股权分置的背景下展开,而股权分置改革作为我国资本市场基础性的制度变迁,会对家族控股股东的价值取向和行为模式产生重要影响,本文考察了股改后家族控股股东终极控制权的现状及其与公司价值的关系,丰富了此领域的研究。
[Abstract]:Family business is an old but widely distributed form of organization in today's world. In recent years, many scholars have found that most of the listed companies in North America, Western Europe and East Asia have been controlled by the control family through tracing the control chain of equity, and the reform and opening up has created a good opportunity for the development of private economy, and family enterprises are private economy. The important part of China has shown strong vitality and vitality in twenty-first Century. However, most of the listed companies in China are under the structure of Pyramid, the control family invades the interests of small and medium shareholders, and the events of emptying the listed companies are frequently seen in the newspapers.
La Porta and so on (1999) found that the ownership structure of most of the companies in the world is not as highly dispersed as Berle and Means, but highly centralized, and there is a ultimate controller, the most typical of which is the family listed company. Foreign researchers have studied the ultimate ownership structure of the family listed companies and the value of the company. It is found that the core agency problem of the listed companies of the family is the agency conflict between the control family and the small and medium shareholders. China has the institutional background of the transition economy and the emerging market, and has not been included in the category of international research. And because of the long historical reasons, the shares of our listed companies are separated into the circulation and non circulation stocks. The research on the relationship between the ultimate ownership structure of the listed companies and the value of the company is mostly based on the data before the split share reform, and the conclusion is not agreed that the split share reform started in.2005 years is a major institutional change, which has changed the "two dollar equity structure" which has hindered the healthy development of the capital market of our country. It has a profound influence on the macro environment of the capital market and the micro governance environment within the company. Is the ultimate ownership structure of the family listed company changed substantially under this major institutional change? What is the new relationship between the ultimate ownership structure of the family listed companies and the value of the company? The problem.
The full text is divided into 5 parts. The following is a brief overview of the contents of the various parts:
Part one: introduction.
This part mainly introduces the research background and significance, the research content and framework, and the research methods adopted in this article.
The second part: literature review.
This section first reviews the evolution of the concept of family business and the definition standard of family business in the theoretical circle. The definition of family business is mainly from three dimensions of ownership, management and intergenerational inheritance, including the previous two dimensions. The relationship between family management and intergenerational inheritance is not easy to get and the associated relationship between family management and family control. The family listed companies are defined mainly by family control. In addition, this part also combs the literature of the ultimate ownership structure and its relationship with the value of the company. The ultimate ownership is widely existed in the listed companies in the world, but Because of the difference of the study sample and the difference of variable selection, the relationship between the ultimate ownership structure and the value of the company has not reached a consistent conclusion. The research at home and abroad generally believes that the separation of cash flow rights and control rights shows the infringement effect. In addition to the domestic Valley Qi (2006) and others, the cash flow rights have incentive effect, and the control right is to the company. The influence of value is complex, and there is a negative correlation or a nonlinear relationship between the convergence of interests and the effect of embezzlement.
The third part: theoretical analysis.
This part first clarifies the important concepts of the family listed companies, the ultimate ownership structure and the value of the company. Secondly, it gives a brief introduction to the related basic theory, the incomplete contract theory and the principal-agent theory. Then, the three ring structure of the family business is used to analyze the family listing, mainly from the principal agent relationship. Two kinds of agency problems exist in the company: the first class agent problem of the manager and the owner and the second kinds of agent problems of the family holding shareholders and the small and medium shareholders, of which second kinds of agency problems occupy the main position. In addition, this paper analyzes the influence of the share Division on the control right of the controlling shareholders of the family holding shareholders, and the split share destruction. The consistency between the non tradable shareholders and the shareholders of the circulation shares has intensified the interest gap between the two and made the internal and external balance mechanism invalidation, and stimulated the grabbing of the private income of the control right by the family holding shareholders, which mainly held non circulation shares.
The fourth chapter: research design and analysis of empirical results
On the basis of theoretical analysis, this part puts forward 5 research hypotheses: the right of cash flow is positively related to the value of the company. The right of control is positively related to the value of the company. The separation of the two rights is negatively related to the value of the company. The proportion of the circulation shares is positively related to the value of the company, and the shareholding of institutional investors is positively related to the value of the company.
In this paper, 173 family listed companies which were listed before 2005 and completed the split share reform at the end of 06 were selected to select 2007-2010 of the 692 observation values. Because of the current conditions that China does not have the applicable conditions of Tobin'sQ, this paper selects CROA as the proxy variable of the company's value. The variables are cash flow rights, control rights, separation of two rights, the proportion of circulation shares and the proportion of institutional shareholding, which correspond to 5 hypotheses respectively. The control variables are asset scale, debt level, growth, risk level and year. Cash flow right, control right and the annual mean change of two right separation degree and interval distribution. Next, we use correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis to verify the 5 hypotheses proposed in the previous article, and find that cash flow rights, control rights, institutional investors' shareholding account for the proportion of circulating shares and CROA at the level of 1%; two rights separation The degree of CROA is significantly negatively correlated with the level of 5%, but the regression coefficient is only -0.005, and the proportion of tradable shares is positively related to CROA, but it is not statistically significant.
The fifth part: research conclusions, suggestions and limitations.
In this part, the final conclusion of this study is obtained by summarizing the contents of various parts of the previous article, and the suggestions for improving the ultimate ownership structure of the family listed companies and improving the value of the company are proposed. Finally, the limitations of this study are pointed out.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) after the stock reform, the control rights of the family holding shareholders and the separation of the two rights have decreased in varying degrees. The split share reform does affect the ultimate ownership structure of the family business. However, the family holding shareholders control the listed companies with an average of 31.87% control, and the "one share" situation of the family holding shareholders still exists; the cash flow is still present. The separation of right and control is still more common. The 4 year average of two rights separation of family listed companies is 1.92, but the samples with high separation degree are gradually entering the low separation range, and the separation of two rights is relieved.
(2) like most previous studies, cash flow rights have a strong incentive effect on the value of the company. Unlike previous studies, the right of control also has a positive effect on the value of the company. After the completion of the stock reform, the family controlling shareholders play more control over the management, rather than use the control right to seize the private benefits of control. In addition, the separation of the two rights after the stock reform is negatively related to the value of the company, but the correlation is weak and the significant level is not high.
(3) because the stock market in China has not yet fully entered the "full circulation" era, and the "opportunist" investment tendency of the shareholders of the circulation shares has not changed in the short term, there is no significant positive correlation between the proportion of the circulation stock and the value of the company.
(4) institutional investors pay attention to the long-term value of the enterprise, and have strong financial strength and professional background, and have the power and ability to actively supervise the behavior of the controlling shareholders, participate in corporate governance and improve the value of the company.
In view of the conclusions of the study, the following suggestions are put forward on the ownership structure and external supervision of the listed companies in the full circulation era: (1) to maintain a reasonable proportion of the right to control and to reduce the separation of two rights; (2) to actively cultivate social public investors; (3) to vigorously develop institutional investors; (4) deepen the reform of the share division and strengthen external supervision.
The main contributions of this article are:
(1) in the special period of China's economic transformation, the state-owned enterprises occupy most of the seats of the listed companies in China's capital market, which often attract more attention of the scholars. But in recent years, the old family business model, which has radiated new vitality, has received less attention, and the research often equates the family business with the private enterprise. The research results of family business in this particular field are few and may differ from the actual situation. In this paper, the family listed companies are studied in detail, and the internal conflicts of interest and agency problems are expounded in detail.
(2) the previous studies on the relationship between the ultimate ownership of the family listed companies and the value of the company are mostly carried out under the background of the share division, and the reform of the share splitting reform, as the basic institutional change of the capital market in China, will have an important influence on the value orientation and behavior pattern of the family holding shareholders. This article examines the family holding shares after the stock reform. The status of East ultimate control and its relationship with company value enrich the research in this field.

【学位授予单位】:西南财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F272.92;F832.51;F224

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