证券市场虚假信息股价操纵及应对机制研究

发布时间：2018-05-03 23:33

本文选题：虚假信息 + 股价操纵　；参考：《浙江财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：自证券市场产生以来，虚假信息问题一直是各方关注和研究的重点。前人多从上市公司信息披露的角度，去研究如何防范其虚假信息披露的问题，并从法律法规和监管制度上给出了建议措施，且取得了一定的成效。但对于上市公司之外，来自于证券市场上的信息，由于其来源的多样性、背后动机的复杂性、影响力度的不可控性、消息真伪的不易辨别性，特别是市场上那些有实力的投资者，比如庄家、持股较多的股东等，基于自身利益需求，试图操纵股价而编制和散播的虚假信息，难以做到更为有效的监管和治理。就中国现在的证券市场而言，虚假信息在一些主流报刊和网络媒体上广为传播，而且虚假信息量、传播速度、影响范围和影响力度等都有增强的趋势，特别是那些能对股票价格产生重大影响的新闻字眼，如“重组”、“资金注入”、“业绩大增”、“借壳上市”等在虚假信息中大行其道。这些现象直接表明了当今对虚假信息问题的监管和治理还不到位，编制和发布虚假信息能让背后的利益主体获取超额收益，上市公司的澄清公告对这些虚假信息的澄清效果还有一定的不足，而其他投资者特别是处于信息劣势和喜欢跟风炒作的中小投资者深受其害。因此，本文正是基于以上现实问题出发，，运用多种方法去研究我国证券市场上的虚假信息问题。首先，利用事件研究法对来自于市场本身的数据进行实证分析，研究虚假信息对证券市场价格的影响，揭示虚假信息背后的股价操纵行为；其次，我们运用现阶段较为流行的行为金融学，分析虚假信息股价操纵行为的产生及作用机理，找出深层次的原因；再次，我们研究虚假信息的应对机制，借用博弈论的模型，探讨社会监督机构、政府监管机构和上市公司澄清机制等应对证券市场虚假信息的最佳策略；最后，我们得出结论并给出政策建议。
[Abstract]:Since the emergence of the securities market, the issue of false information has been the focus of attention and research. From the perspective of information disclosure of listed companies, predecessors have studied how to prevent their false information disclosure, and proposed measures from the laws, regulations and regulatory system, and achieved certain results. But for listed companies, information from the securities market, due to its diversity of sources, complexity of motive behind it, uncontrollability of influence intensity, difficulty in distinguishing true and false information, Especially those powerful investors in the market, such as makers, shareholders holding more shares, based on their own interests, trying to manipulate the stock price and disseminate false information, it is difficult to achieve more effective regulation and governance. As far as China's current securities market is concerned, false information is widely disseminated in some mainstream newspapers and online media, and the amount of false information, the speed of transmission, the scope of influence and the intensity of influence are all increasing. In particular, news words that can have a significant impact on stock prices, such as "restructuring", "capital injection", "performance gain", "backdoor listing", and so on, are popular in false information. These phenomena directly indicate that the supervision and management of the problem of false information are still not in place, and the compilation and publication of false information can make the stakeholders behind the false information obtain excess profits. The clarification announcement of listed companies still has some deficiencies in clarifying the false information, but other investors, especially the small and medium-sized investors who are in the information disadvantage and like to follow the trend of speculation, suffer greatly. Therefore, this paper is based on the above practical problems, using a variety of methods to study the problem of false information in China's securities market. Firstly, the empirical analysis of the data from the market itself is carried out by using the event research method to study the influence of false information on the stock market price and reveal the manipulation behavior of stock price behind the false information. We use behavioral finance, which is popular at the present stage, to analyze the production and mechanism of manipulation of stock price of false information, and find out the deep reasons. Thirdly, we study the coping mechanism of false information and borrow the model of game theory. This paper probes into the best strategies to deal with false information in the securities market such as social supervision agencies, government regulatory bodies and clarifying mechanisms of listed companies. Finally, we draw a conclusion and give some policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51

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