经理管理防御与信息披露质量的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-06 08:08

本文选题：管理防御 + 信息披露质量　；参考：《新疆财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：自从20世纪90年代上海、深圳两个证券交易所相继成立之后，我国上市公司就开始对外正式披露会计信息。上市公司会计信息质量的披露，在很大程度上影响着证券市场的运行效率，而当前阻碍我国证券市场发展的一个重要因素就是我国上市公司会计信息披露中存在的质量问题。它已严重影响到我国证券市场功能的发挥，导致投资者信心不足，甚至是资源配置低效和不合理。在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下，管理者固守职位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行为由自利管理者与股东之间的利益冲突引起。管理防御作为一种假说,最初起源于有关内部人所有权与公司业绩之间关系的研究。这一假说认为,经理人为了满足个人利益并防止被更换，经理人持股会使其追求非公司价值最大化决策。由于管理防御的存在，经理人可能会做出与股东利益不一致的决策与行为。公司内部人--以管理者和掌握控制权的大股东为代表--具有隐瞒其剥夺行为的动机和能力，内部人掩盖其利益侵占的主要方式是对信息及其披露的管理和操纵。虽然与以往代理文献所强调的动机有很大差别,但影响却一样广泛,同样会造成经理人与股东之间的冲突,产生代理成本。近年来，信息披露问题也日益受到关注。国内外学者从公司治理、外部监管和治理环境等方面对信息披露质量进行了研究，虽然许多学者从公司治理角度分析影响信息披露质量的因素，但是鲜有人将管理防御与信息披露质量联系起来进行分析。本研究从这些理论基础出发，选取2008--2010年深市A股上市公司的2285个数据为样本，运用spss19.0统计软件进行实证分析，结果发现：经理管理防御水平逐年递增，，表明管理者为了使自己的职位更稳固，采取了防御措施。管理防御水平与信息披露质量负相关，这表明管理防御水平越高，信息披露质量越低。管理层持股比例与信息披露质量正相关，说明公司允许管理者持有一定数量的股票可以缓解股东与管理者的利益冲突，提高信息披露质量，进一步说明了管理者持股作为一种激励手段能发挥较好的作用。
[Abstract]:Since the establishment of two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990's, listed companies in China have begun to disclose accounting information. The disclosure of accounting information quality of listed companies, to a large extent, affects the efficiency of the securities market. However, the quality problems existing in the disclosure of accounting information of listed companies in China are an important factor that hinders the development of the securities market in China at present. It has seriously affected the exertion of the function of the securities market in our country, resulting in the lack of investor confidence, and even the inefficient and unreasonable allocation of resources. In the case of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, the defensive behavior of managers who cling to their positions and maximize their own utility is caused by the conflict of interests between self-interested managers and shareholders. As a hypothesis, management defense originates from the study of the relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. The hypothesis is that managers' shareholding in order to satisfy their personal interests and prevent them from being replaced will enable them to pursue non-corporate value maximization decisions. Because of the existence of management defense, managers may make decisions and behaviors inconsistent with shareholders' interests. Corporate insiders-represented by managers and major shareholders in control-have the motive and ability to conceal their deprivation. The main way for insiders to conceal their interests is to manage and manipulate information and its disclosure. Although there is a great difference from the motivation emphasized in the previous agency literature, the influence is as extensive as that between managers and shareholders, which will cause the conflict between managers and shareholders and lead to agency costs. In recent years, the problem of information disclosure has been paid more and more attention. Scholars at home and abroad have studied the quality of information disclosure from the aspects of corporate governance, external supervision and governance environment, although many scholars have analyzed the factors affecting the quality of information disclosure from the perspective of corporate governance. But few people analyze the relationship between defense management and the quality of information disclosure. On the basis of these theories, this study selects 2285 data of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Market from 2008 to 2010 as samples, and carries out empirical analysis by using spss19.0 statistical software. The results show that the level of management defense is increasing year by year. Shows that managers have taken defensive measures to make their positions more secure. The level of management defense is negatively related to the quality of information disclosure, which indicates that the higher the level of management defense, the lower the quality of information disclosure. The proportion of management holding shares is positively related to the quality of information disclosure, which indicates that allowing managers to hold a certain number of shares can alleviate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, and improve the quality of information disclosure. Further explained that the manager holding as an incentive means can play a better role.
【学位授予单位】：新疆财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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