我国上市公司债权治理效应的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-09 21:00

本文选题：债权治理效应 + 公司绩效　；参考：《山东大学》2008年硕士论文

【摘要】： 在我国理论界,关于公司治理方面,研究的较多是关于股权的治理,就债权治理方面的研究有些成果,但是相对于股权治理的研究则比较单薄。为此,借鉴西方发达国家关于债权治理的理论研究成果和实践经验,探讨我国上市公司的债权治理功效是本文的研究目的。全文以新企业理论与融资理论为基础,以债权治理效应作为研究视角,利用理论归纳与实证检验的研究方法,对我国上市公司债权治理四大效应即对经理层控制权的瓜分效应、破产威胁效应、杠杆效应及债权人直接介入公司治理效应进行研究,以便发现我国上市公司债权治理效应是否发挥应有的作用,为进一步完善上市公司的债权治理提供指引。本文理论部分首先对西方发达国家债权治理理论进行回顾,归纳总结出西方发达国家关于债权治理理论发展的三个阶段:第一阶段债权融资的选择论、第二阶段企业融资的代理论与第三阶段债权治理的功效论。其次,对国内债权治理理论进行了简要归纳,主要侧重于债权治理作用与效率、债权治理弱效应根源研究。最后进行了债权治理效应的理论分析。本文重点部分是对我国上市公司债权治理的效应进行分析。首先分析了我国的上市公司债权治理现状,在此基础上对我国上市公司债权治理的效应进行实证检验。自变量选择为资产负债率、流动资产负债率、长期资产负债率,并进一步将流动负债细分,建立各组成部分对公司业绩指标—净资产收益率的线型关系。选择了规模、销售收入增长率、管理层是否持股以及行业虚拟变量为控制变量。回归结果显示,资产负债率、流动资产负债率和长期资产负债率都与净资产收益率呈负相关关系;商业信用与固定负债等无成本负债与净资产收益率呈正相关关系,其他成分还是负相关。这些检验结果都表明,目前我国上市公司债权治理是缺乏效应的。在实证研究的基础上,对我国债权治理无效原因进行进一步的分析。总结为企业融资结构不合理,上市公司融资行为异化和债权保护的缺失。文章的第五部分,针对研究的结果提出建议和对策:完善我国企业的债权结构、加强银行治理能力建设和健全法律制度。本文的创新之处:一是在以往的债权治理研究中大多是以规范研究为主,实证研究为辅,本文首次对上市公司债权治理效应进行了系统的实证研究。二是首次以在深沪市发行A股的全部上市公司(剔除了被ST、PT的公司)为研究对象,样本齐全,结论较有说服力。
[Abstract]:In the theoretical circle of our country, on the aspect of corporate governance, the research is mostly on the governance of equity, the research on governance of creditor's rights has some achievements, but the research on governance of equity is relatively weak. For this reason, it is the purpose of this paper to study the effect of creditor's rights governance of listed companies in our country by referring to the theoretical research and practical experience of western developed countries on the governance of creditor's rights. Based on the new enterprise theory and financing theory, the thesis takes the governance effect of creditor's rights as the research angle, and makes use of the research methods of theoretical induction and empirical test to divide the four effects of creditor's right governance of listed companies in our country, that is, the division effect on the control right of managers. The effects of bankruptcy threat, leverage and direct involvement of creditors in corporate governance are studied in order to find out whether the governance effect of creditor's rights of listed companies in China plays its due role, and to provide guidance for further improving the governance of creditor's rights of listed companies. In the theoretical part of this paper, the author reviews the theory of creditor's rights governance in western developed countries, and summarizes the three stages of the development of creditor's rights governance theory in western developed countries: the selection theory of creditor's rights financing in the first stage. The second stage of enterprise financing generation theory and the third stage of creditor's rights governance efficacy theory. Secondly, the theory of creditor's rights governance in China is summarized briefly, mainly focusing on the function and efficiency of creditor's rights governance, and the research on the root of weak effect of creditor's rights governance. Finally, the paper analyzes the governance effect of creditor's rights. The main part of this paper is to analyze the effect of creditor's rights governance of listed companies in China. Firstly, this paper analyzes the current situation of creditor's rights governance of listed companies in China, and then makes an empirical test on the effect of creditor's rights governance of listed companies in China. The independent variables are asset-liability ratio, current asset-liability ratio and long-term asset-liability ratio. The scale, the growth rate of sales income, the ownership of management and the virtual variables of industry are selected as control variables. The regression results show that asset-liability ratio, current asset-liability ratio and long-term asset-liability ratio are all negatively related to net asset return, and non-cost liabilities such as commercial credit and fixed liabilities are positively correlated with net asset return. Other components are still negatively correlated. These results show that the governance of creditor's rights of listed companies in China is lack of effect. On the basis of empirical research, this paper makes a further analysis on the causes of invalid governance of creditor's rights in China. The conclusion is that the financing structure of enterprises is unreasonable, the dissimilation of financing behavior of listed companies and the lack of creditor's rights protection. The fifth part of the article, according to the results of the study, put forward suggestions and countermeasures: improve the structure of the creditor's rights of enterprises in China, strengthen the construction of bank governance capacity and improve the legal system. The innovations of this paper are as follows: first, most of the previous research on creditor's rights governance is based on normative research, supplemented by empirical research, and this paper makes a systematic empirical study on the governance effect of creditor's rights of listed companies for the first time. The second is the first time that all the listed companies issued in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange (excluding those listed by STPT-listed companies) as the research object, the sample is complete, and the conclusion is more persuasive.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F275;F276.6;F224

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