上市公司机构持股对资本支出影响研究

发布时间：2018-05-17 13:44

本文选题：机构投资者 + 持股比例　；参考：《安徽大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：在二十年的发展历程中,中国资本市场一直深受公司治理问题的困扰。虽然从90年代开始,我国在转变政府职能、完善法律和监管等方面取得了很大的进步,但是仍然存在很多的问题,比如控股股东为获取控制权私有收益而干涉上市公司包括资本支出决策在内的投资决策的问题等。这些问题的存在必然会影响到上市公司的资本支出。同时,随着我国市场经济的发展和资本市场改革的不断推进,机构投资者的发展非常迅速,已成为资本市场上的重要参与者。机构投资者作为介于控股股东和中小股东之间的第三方力量,在规模、信息获取、信息分析以及人员结构等方面相对于中小股东有其独特优势。这些优势使机构投资者完全有能力有效的监督控股股东为获取控制权私有收益而对上市公司投资决策进行干涉的行为,有利于提高上市公司的资本支出的合理性。另外,随着持股数量增加,出于对成本和收益以及避免流动性损失的考虑,机构投资者也有动力积极地履行监督职能。因此,从理论上讲,机构投资者确实有能力且有动力对控股股东及公司管理层进行监管,提升上市公司的资本支出,但是考虑到我国资本市场上行政干预和业务联系等情况的存在,我国机构投资者是否能够起到改善上市公司资本支出的作用还有待考证。本文总共分为五个部分,第一部分为引言,主要介绍本文的研究背景、研究意义和研究方法,概括总结国内外学者的主要研究观点。第二部分为相关基础理论和概念界定,该部分在对委托代理理论、信息不对称理论及现代产权理论进行阐述的基础上对机构投资者及资本支出等相关概念进行了界定,并对机构投资者特征及分类进行详细论述,然后分析了我国上市公司机构持股及资本支出的现状。第三部分首先论述了机构持股的股份性质,其次分析了上市公司机构持股对资本支出的影响,最后又从机构持股对公司治理的影响机理出发,详细分析了机构持股影响资本支出的机理。第四部分是实证分析部分,通过样本数据的选择和变量指标的选取,构建两个方面的多元回归模型,运用SPSS软件对模型进行了相关性研究。实证研究结果表明,独立机构持股比例与上市公司资本支出存在显著的正相关关系,而非独立机构持股比例与上市公司资本支出之间不存在明显的相关性。第五部分概括了研究结论,提出政策建议,并展望了未来研究方向。本文的创新及特色之处在于,在以前理论研究的基础上,结合我国机构投资者的异质性,运用委托代理理论、现代产权理论及信息不对称理论等系统研究不同类型机构持股对资本支出的影响。目前国内少有的关于机构持股对资本支出影响的研究多是从机构投资者整体或“一方独大”的证券投资基金出发研究其对资本支出的影响,几乎没有文献在系统分析机构投资者异质性的基础上做这方面的研究。本文在理论分析的基础上通过设计相关变量,并建立关系模型对样本公司机构持股比例对资本支出的影响进行实证研究,有针对性地提出了有利于优化我国上市公司资本支出决策的政策建议。
[Abstract]:In the course of the development of twenty years, China's capital market has been plagued by the problem of corporate governance. Although since 90s, China has made great progress in transforming government functions and perfecting law and supervision, but there are still a lot of problems, such as the holding stock East is interfering with the listed companies in order to obtain the private income of control rights. The existence of these problems will inevitably affect the capital expenditure of the listed companies. At the same time, with the development of the market economy and the continuous advance of the reform of capital market, the development of institutional investors is very rapid and has become an important participant in the capital market. As the third party force between the controlling shareholders and the small and medium shareholders, it has its unique advantages over the size, information acquisition, information analysis and personnel structure. These advantages make the institutional investors fully capable of supervising the investment decision of the listed companies to obtain the control private income. The behavior of interference is beneficial to the rationality of capital expenditure of listed companies. In addition, as the number of stocks increases, institutional investors are also motivated to perform supervisory functions in terms of cost and income and avoid liquidity loss. Therefore, institutional investors are theoretically capable and motivated to control the holding. The shareholders and the management of the company are supervised to improve the capital expenditure of the listed companies. However, considering the existence of administrative intervention and business connection in the capital market of China, it is still to be tested whether the institutional investors in our country can play a role in improving the capital expenditure of the listed companies.
This article is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction, which mainly introduces the research background, research significance and research methods, summarizes the main research views of scholars at home and abroad. The second part is the related basic theory and concept definition, and this part expounds the theory of principal-agent, the theory of information asymmetry and the modern property right theory. On the basis of this, the related concepts of institutional investors and capital expenditure are defined, and the characteristics and classification of institutional investors are discussed in detail. Then the status of institutional shareholding and capital expenditure of Listed Companies in China is analyzed. The third part first discusses the share property of institutional ownership and then analyzes the institutional shareholding of listed companies. On the basis of the influence of capital expenditure, the mechanism of institutional holding on corporate governance is finally analyzed in detail. The fourth part is the empirical analysis part. Through the selection of sample data and the selection of variable index, the multiple regression model of two aspects is constructed, and the model is carried out by using SPSS software. The results of the empirical study show that there is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of independent institutions and the capital expenditure of listed companies, and there is no obvious correlation between the proportion of the independent institutions and the capital expenditure of the listed companies. The fifth part summarizes the conclusions of the research, puts forward the policy suggestions, and looks forward to the future research parties. Direction.
The innovation and characteristic of this paper is that, on the basis of previous theoretical research, combining with the heterogeneity of institutional investors in China, the influence of different types of institutional Shareholding on capital expenditure is studied by using principal-agent theory, modern property theory and information asymmetry theory. Most of the research is about the impact on capital expenditure from the institutional investors or the "one party independent" securities investment fund. There is almost no literature on the basis of systematic analysis of institutional investors' heterogeneity. Based on the theoretical analysis, the design related variables are passed and the relationship model is established. The impact of the shareholding ratio of the Sample Firms on capital expenditure is empirically studied, and the policy suggestions are put forward to optimize the capital expenditure decision of the listed companies in China.
【学位授予单位】：安徽大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】