股权分置改革是否降低了大股东对上市公司的掏空程度

发布时间：2018-05-18 09:12

本文选题：股权分置 + 掏空　；参考：《西南财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文研究的问题是,在股权分置改革之后,上市公司大股东所持有股票(在股改前一般为非流通股)可以进入二级市场交易的背景下,大股东对上市公司所做出的掏空行为是否有系统性的减少。大股东,被普遍认为是对公司具有控制权的股东,而此控制权是以控股权的方式来实现的。对控制权的界定,并没有一致的规范,但一般认为,超过20%甚至10%的控股权,即在一定程度上拥有了控制权。但在我们国内,这一阈值无疑过低。我们知道,几乎每家上市公司的第一大股东,其所持股份都超过50%,也就是说每家上市公司都是一股独大的态势。侵占,是大股东凭借自己对公司的控制权,通过关联交易,侵占上市公司资金,掠夺小股东的行为。毕竟上市公司在公开发行股票的时候,中小股东是出了真金白银购买了它们的股票,也就是说,上市公司也有他们的一些份额。但如果大股东通过关联交易,侵占了上市公司资金的话,相当于是把大股东和小股东所共有的资金,转移给了自己。这无疑是一种掠夺小股东的行为。我们通过研究上市公司所进行的关联交易对股价(即对中小投资者财富)和财务业绩(即对上市公司的后续发展能力)的影响情况,来判断在股改后大股东有没有减少其对公司的掏空、对小股东的侵占。通过对此进行研究,从对占股票市场人数最多的中小投资者保护的视角,和从公司长远发展的视角,判断股权分置改革的绩效。本文研究的意义在于,我们通过关联交易对中小投资者财富和对上市公司的发展能力,这两个视角来研究股权分置改革对上市公司治理的改善情况。通过这种研究,来分析股权分置改革这种基础制度的变化,有没有系统性的改善上市公司的生存环境,有没有为广大投资者带来切实的福利。同时,也能为政策制定者和政策解读者提供一定的资料来评判股权分置改革有没有达到所预想的期望。本文的贡献有三点。其一是在数据处理方面做到了精确。本文研究的一个内容,是关联交易与股价异常收益率的关系。前人虽然也有做这一方面的研究,但在数据处理方面,略显粗糙。比如,将一年内的股票收益率作为因变量(曹红辉等,2009),或者是将进行股权分置改革的那一段时期的股票收益率作为因变量(唐国正等,2005),或者是仅仅将关联交易发生日的“股票收益率-市场收益率”作为因变量(张海燕等,2010),等等。虽然他们都是采用了事件研究法的形式,但在具体的数据处理时,则过于从简。而我们在这一研究方面,则完全是严格按照事件研究法的要求,对每一笔纳入样本中的关联交易,都经过了估计窗口的估计,来对事件窗口进行计算,以求得CAR作为因变量。其二是我们的结论更加精细。以往关于股权分置改革对完善上市公司治理的研究,往往只取了一个侧面,比如只取了对财务业绩,或只取了股票收益率。即便有的文献是二者兼取,但往往只是单纯的互相加以印证,而没有互相补充的成分。我们的论文,不光是兼取了二者,同时,我们的结论具有独创性。此处的独创性并不是指我们推翻了前人的研究,相反,我们是对他们的研究加以强化。我们通过兼取股权分置改革对财务业绩和股票收益率的影响,发现了股权分置改革前后阶段,上市公司在进行关联交易后,财务业绩和股票收益率的不同表现。具体来讲,就是,我们发现股改前的关联交易,对于公司的净利润和其股票的超额收益率,具有不同的影响,这无疑是反常的。我们对这种股票市场和财务业绩的不同表现,加以了理论解释,并实证检验,发现确实符合我们的解释。其三是弥补了数据方面的不足。国内早期对大股东掏空上市公司侵占小股东利益方面的研究,主要是基于大股东的股票不能全流通,从而无法从二级市场获益,因此其可以对公司侵占而无需在意股票的二级市场价格。但是在股改完成之后,在大股东的股票可以自由交易,故而其侵占行为对自身的财富有了影响之后,还很少有关于此的研究。就算有相关方面的研究,也因为相距股改年份太近,而无法获得足够的数据,比如,汪昌云(2010)将2007和2008年的数据进行平均以作为2009年的数据来做分析。因此,前人的研究多受制于数据不足的困扰,而无法得出非流通股在真正解禁后的实际市场表现。因为股改是从2005年才开始试点,2005年沪深两市共有232家上市公司完成股改,2006年有896家(证券时报网)。而证监会要求,股改后的上市公司其原非流通股股东在获得流通权之后的1年内不得上市出售股票,而且在满1年后,于接下来的1年内在证券交易所出售的股份数额也不能超过公司总股本的5%,于2年内不能超过10%,也就是“锁一爬二”。因此,出于对样本容量的考虑,对股改后上市公司大股东的研究,应该以截止2006年完成股改的公司为研究对象,而对其2009年及以后的数据进行分析。而本文则完全是基于股改的背景,以充分的数据为基础,研究了上市公司大股东在其所持股票可以自由流通之后的侵占行为,弥补了前人在数据方面的缺失和不足。本文的不足有两点。其一是在对大股东的识别方面,并没有考虑金字塔控股、交叉持股的方式。不过此一不足并非特别严重,因为一般而言,上市公司的大股东所持股份数额普遍很大,大股东直接持股比例的均值(中位数)为54%(56%)(徐莉萍等,2006),因此即便不考虑金字塔控股和交叉持股,也不会对大股东的控股地位造成影响。其二是没有考虑控制变量,模型过简。对于上市公司和市场环境的控制因素,没有加以考虑,这是本文的一个很大不足。对于本文所研究的问题,我们借鉴了曹红辉等(2009)的模型,但对于模型的分析,我们与其略有区别。曹红辉等(2009)认为,大股东在股改时,对小股东支付对价,因此其持股比例有了一定程度了下降,这会影响股改后具备流通权时大股东的行为,因此其认为,股改的效应具有两面性。但是我们基于股改对价的支付比例和大股东具备流通权后的股票溢价的对比分析,指出,流通权的影响要显著强于持股比例下降的影响。因此我们认为,在股改后,大股东的掏空是会有明显的减少的。经过本文关于关联交易对股票异常收益率和净利润率的影响的研究,我们发现,股改前,关联交易与净利润率显著负相关,而股改后,则显著改善。因此我们认为,大股东在股改前普遍掏空,而在股改后则显著减少掏空。但是,我们发现,股改前关联交易对股票异常收益率的影响为0,而股改后关联交易对股票异常收益率为负。这表明,基于公司股票市场表现的视角,股改前大股东不存在掏空,而股改后大股东选择了掏空。但我们还是认为股改前大股东存在掏空,而股改后显著减少。这是因为,中国的股票市场还不健全,普通投资者还无法分别某一笔关联交易是掏空还是支持,所以他们无法根据上市公司公布的关联交易的公告来判断这是否为大股东的掏空,因此也就对此无法在股票市场上做出反应。但是,根据Winnie Qian Peng等(2011)的研究,我们认为,当上市公司财务稳健时,大股东是会存在显著的掏空的,我们预期这种程度的显著掏空会引起股票市场的注意,因此我们进一步缩小样本为平均净利润率大于10%的上市公司,发现股改前关联交易对股票异常收益率确实是负相关,但却并不显著。综合以上分析,我们得出结论,即：大股东在股改前普遍存在掏空上市公司的现象,在股改后有所缓解,但仍存在掏空；同时,股票市场中的普通投资者却无法识别大股东的掏空行为,从而导致股票市场作为经济晴雨表的作用,还有很长的路要走。我们认为,在上市公司发生一笔关联交易的时候,广大投资者是没有能力去识别它到底是否是掏空上市公司的,那么,这种识别的责任,就自然而然的落在了资本市场的中坚力量,媒体和机构投资者的身上。他们可以凭借他们的专业视角,来分析上市公司的每一项经营活动,并以此来指导小股东。基于股票市场中普通投资者不能充分反应关联交易是否掏空,我们建议,应加强媒体监管和机构投资者的作用,让他们充分挖掘市场中各上市公司的各项经营活动,来为广大投资者提供一个客观且专业的视角,来帮助他们进行股票市场操作。同样,我们发现,小股东在投资时,是盲目的。他们没有能力去进行基本分析,而仅靠技术分析却无法得知关于上市公司基本面的情况。所以当上市公司掏空或支持时,他们根本无法分辨,也无法做出相应的反应,因此他们往往成为了大股东鱼肉上市公司的牺牲品。我们对此感到痛惜。对于普通投资者,虽然我们建议其尽量避免盲目投资,在上市公司公布了一条新的信息的时候,如果不能确定这条信息背后含义,则不要在此时购买该公司的股票。同时,理性投资,尽量形成自己的一套投资理念,而并非人云亦云。
[Abstract]:The problem of this paper is that after the reform of the equity division , the shares held by the big shareholders of the listed company ( which are generally non - tradable shares before the stock reform ) can enter the second - level market transaction , and whether the large shareholders have a systematic reduction in the conduct of the listed companies .

Large shareholders are widely regarded as shareholders who have control over the company , and this control is realized in the way of controlling the equity . But in our country , it is no doubt that more than 20 % even 10 % of the shareholders have control right . But in our country , the minority shareholders have bought their shares , which means that each listed company has a certain share . After all , the listed companies have bought their shares through the related transactions , which means that each listed company has a certain share . After all , the listed company has made a study on the stock price ( i.e . , the wealth of small and medium investors ) and the financial performance ( i.e . , the subsequent development ability of the listed company ) .

The significance of this paper is that we study the improvement of the reform of the stock - share reform on the governance of listed companies by means of the correlation transaction . Through this research , we can analyze the change of the basic system of the share - share reform , have the systematic improvement of the existence environment of the listed companies , have the real benefits for the general investors . At the same time , we can provide certain information to the policy makers and the policy readers to judge whether the reform of the equity division has reached the desired expectations .

The contribution of this paper is three points .

One is the precision of the data processing . One of the contents of this paper is the relationship between the related transaction and the abnormal return of stock price . Although the former has been doing the research on this aspect , it is slightly rough in the data processing . For example , the stock yield in one year is used as the dependent variable ( Tang Guozheng et al . , 2009 ) , or only the stock yield - market rate of return on the associated transaction date is used as the dependent variable ( Zhang Haiyan et al . , 2010 ) , and so on .

Second , our conclusion is more elaborate . In previous research on improving governance of listed companies , we have only taken one side , such as only taking advantage of the financial performance , or only taking stock yield . In contrast , we have found that the related transaction before the stock reform has different effects on financial performance and stock yield .

The third is to make up for the shortage of data . In the early stage of China , the research on the shareholder ' s interest in the small shareholders , mainly based on the large shareholder ' s shares , could not benefit from the secondary market . However , after the completion of the stock reform , the stock of the listed company could not be able to get enough data .

There are two points in this paper . One is that in the recognition of the big shareholders , the way of pyramid holding and cross - holding is not taken into account . However , this deficiency is not particularly serious because , in general , the average value ( median ) of the large shareholder is 54 % ( 56 % ) ( Xu Liping et al . , 2006 ) . Therefore , even if the controlling variables are not taken into account , the model is too simple . For the listed companies and the market environment control factors , it is not considered . This is a big deficiency in this paper .

We draw lessons from the model of Cao Honghui et al . ( 2009 ) for the problems studied in this paper . But for the analysis of the model , we have a slight difference .

However , according to Winnie Yen Peng et al . ( 2011 ) , we find that the stock market is not perfect , and the stock reform is significantly reduced . However , according to the research of Winnie Yen Peng et al . ( 2011 ) , we think that the stock market is not perfect , and the stock reform is significantly reduced . However , according to Winnie Yen Peng et al . ( 2011 ) , we believe that the stock market is not a big shareholder and the stock reform is significantly reduced . However , according to Winnie Yen Peng et al . ( 2011 ) , we further reduce the sample to a listed company with an average net profit margin of more than 10 % , but it is not significant that the stock exchange rate before the stock reform is negative correlation to the stock abnormal return rate .

Based on the above analysis , we conclude that there is a common phenomenon of hollowed - out listed companies before the reform of the stock market , which is alleviated after the reform , but is still hollowed out ;
At the same time , ordinary investors in the stock market could not recognize the hollowed - out behavior of the big shareholders , which led to the role of the stock market as an economic barometer and a long way to go .

We believe that when a listed company is not able to identify whether it is an empty listed company when an associated transaction occurs in a listed company , the responsibility for such recognition will naturally fall on the firm , medium and institutional investors in the capital market .
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51

【参考文献】