保荐制对IPO公司信息披露质量影响的研究

发布时间：2018-05-22 13:32

本文选题：保荐制度 + 信息披露质量　；参考：《南京师范大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来我国首发上市公司信息披露造假问题频出,每次造假事件曝光都造成市场剧烈波动,投资者由此遭受重大损失。事实上,信息披露质量不佳只是问题的表象,其根本原因在于我国证券市场发行审核制度的不完善,未能通过法制手段对IPO公司提高其信息披露质量提供有效激励。与发达证券市场采用的注册制不同,我国证券市场由于市场机制不够完善、投资者欠成熟等原因,在目前阶段仍采用核准制。由于拟上市公司与监管部门之间天然存在信息不对称现象,为尽力缓解这种信息不对称,于是推出了保荐制度,以期通过保荐人的声誉机制约束IPO公司的信息披露质量。尽管保荐制设立的初衷是良好的,但实施过程中仍出现一些IPO公司信息披露造假问题,保荐制遭到多方质疑。究竟保荐制能否有效提高IPO公司的信息披露质量?本文的主旨就在于此。本文借鉴机制设计理论的思想,运用信息不对称下委托代理关系的研究框架,研究拟上市公司、保荐人、监管部门三者的委托代理关系。通过求解含参与人激励相容约束的社会最优效率目标函数,得出指定机制下拟上市公司的均衡信息披露质量。再通过将不同机制下拟上市公司均衡信息披露质量进行比较,对各个机制的作用效果加以评价。而后运用实证分析检验在我国实际市场环境下保荐制对信息披露质量的影响程度,并进一步分析影响力的持续情况。文章发现保荐制对信息披露质量的影响程度在年度之间不甚稳定,因此随后对保荐人声誉机制的作用机理进行了实证检验。通过检验发现,保荐人声誉机制目前在我国尚未充分发挥作用,保荐人经营业绩仍主要受经营能力影响,声誉无法对保荐人的IPO项目信息披露质量形成有效约束。最后,本文根据理论结论及实证检验结果,提出了强化保荐制度对信息披露质量的影响力的有关建议,包括全面提高监管能力以及加强投资者培育等。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the problem of information disclosure and falsification of listed companies in our country is frequent. Every exposure of counterfeiting events causes the market to fluctuate violently, and the investors suffer great losses as a result. In fact, the poor quality of information disclosure is only the appearance of the problem. The fundamental reason lies in the imperfection of the issuing and auditing system in China's securities market, and the failure to provide an effective incentive for IPO Company to improve its information disclosure quality through legal means. Different from the registration system adopted in the developed securities market, the securities market in our country still adopts the approval system at the present stage because the market mechanism is not perfect and the investors are not mature. Because the information asymmetry exists naturally between the listed company and the regulatory department, in order to alleviate the information asymmetry, a recommendation system is put forward, which is expected to restrict the information disclosure quality of IPO Company through the reputation mechanism of sponsor. Although the original intention of setting up the recommendation system is good, there are still some problems of false information disclosure in IPO company during the implementation process, and the sponsor system has been questioned by many parties. Can the recommendation system effectively improve the quality of IPO information disclosure? This is the thrust of this paper. Based on the theory of mechanism design and the research framework of principal-agent relationship under asymmetric information, this paper studies the principal-agent relationship among listed companies, sponsors and regulators. By solving the objective function of social optimal efficiency with participant incentive compatibility constraints, the equilibrium information disclosure quality of listed companies is obtained under the specified mechanism. By comparing the quality of equilibrium information disclosure of listed companies under different mechanisms, the effect of each mechanism is evaluated. Then we use empirical analysis to test the impact of sponsorship system on the quality of information disclosure in China's actual market environment, and further analyze the impact of the continued situation. It is found that the degree of influence of sponsor system on the quality of information disclosure is not stable between years, so the mechanism of sponsor reputation mechanism is tested empirically. Through the test, it is found that the reputation mechanism of sponsor has not played a full role in our country at present, the sponsor's operating performance is still mainly affected by the management ability, and reputation can not form an effective constraint on the quality of the sponsor's IPO project information disclosure. Finally, according to the theoretical conclusions and empirical test results, this paper puts forward some suggestions to strengthen the influence of the recommendation system on the quality of information disclosure, including comprehensively improving the regulatory capacity and strengthening the investor cultivation.
【学位授予单位】：南京师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51

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