我国上市公司定向增发对象与盈余管理关系研究

发布时间：2018-05-30 02:43

本文选题：定向增发 + 发行对象　；参考：《浙江工商大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国上市公司股权再融资中的盈余管理行为,一直是学术界所关注的热点问题。大股东“一股独大”的局面,使得上市公司表现出强烈的股权融资偏好。自2006年以来,在股权再融资过程中,定向增发获得越来越多的上市公司的青睐,成为股权再融资的主要方式。全流通时代的来临并没有伴随着完善的公司治理和相应约束大股东权利保护中小股东利益的机制。因此,定向增发有可能成为大股东进行盈余管理,获取控制权私利的新工具。本文的研究目的就是通过对上市公司实施定向增发前以及定向增发后解锁前不同增发对象的可操纵应计利润的变化、影响因素的研究,以探明不同定向增发对象与盈余管理行为之间的关系。本文介绍了我国定向增发的概况,用委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和契约理论分析了大股东在定向增发中实施盈余管理的动机和影响,认为大股东为了在定向增发发行时获取低价增发的私人利益或者为了在定向增发股票解锁前为减持做准备并实现对机构投资者的投资收益承诺,进行盈余管理的行为。本文以我国2006年、2007年已实施定向增发的上市公司为样本,按增发对象分为三类：仅对大股东及关联方增发、仅对机构投资者增发、同时对两者增发,通过修正的琼斯模型,用样本与控制样本可操纵应计利润差异来衡量其各自的盈余管理程度,并通过可操纵应计利润与其影响因素的回归,以检验对不同定向增发对象与盈余管理关系。研究结果表明：在定向增发前,定向增发对象为大股东及关联方时,上市公司会进行负的盈余管理；当定向增发对象为机构投资者时,上市公司会进行正的盈余管理；在锁定期结束前,当定向增发对象为大股东时,没有明显证据证明上市公司存在盈余管理行为；当定向增发对象为机构投资者时,上市公司有明显的正的盈余管理行为；大股东持股比例与盈余管理程度正相关。针对上述结论,本文最后一部分提出了相关启示和建议。本文的研究加深了对股权再融资的认识,从定向增发融资到解锁期研究盈余管理,具有一定的创新意义。为加强对中国上市公司定向增发再融资行为、完善上市公司治理结构提供了理论依据。
[Abstract]:Earnings management in equity refinancing of listed companies in China has always been a hot issue in academic circles. Large shareholders "one-share" situation, so that listed companies show a strong preference for equity financing. Since 2006, in the process of equity refinancing, more and more listed companies have received the favor of directional additional issuance, which has become the main way of equity refinancing. The coming of the whole circulation age is not accompanied by perfect corporate governance and the mechanism of restricting the rights of large shareholders to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, targeted placement may become a new tool for large shareholders to manage earnings and gain control rights. The purpose of this paper is to study the influence factors on the change of the manipulable accrual profit of different additional issuers before and after the issuance of the listed companies. The purpose of this paper is to find out the relationship between different directional placement objects and earnings management behavior. This paper introduces the general situation of directional placement in China, and analyzes the motivation and influence of earnings management of large shareholders in private placement by means of principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and contract theory. In order to obtain the private benefit of low price additional issue or to prepare for the reduction and realize the promise of investment income to institutional investors, the behavior of earnings management is considered by the major shareholders in order to obtain the private benefit of the low price additional issue or to prepare for the reduction of the stock before the release of the shares. This paper takes the listed companies that have implemented the directional additional issuance in 2006 and 2007 as the samples, and divides them into three categories according to the issuing objects: only for the large shareholders and related parties, only for the institutional investors, but also for both, through the modified Jones model. The differences between sample and control sample can be used to measure the degree of earnings management, and the relationship between the object of different directional additional issuance and earnings management can be tested by regression of maneuverable accrual profit and its influencing factors. The results show that the listed company will carry out negative earnings management when the main shareholder and related party is the object of the directional additional offering, and the listed company will carry out positive earnings management when the target is institutional investor. Before the end of the lock-up period, there is no obvious evidence to prove that the listed company has earnings management behavior, and when the targeted placement is institutional investor, the listed company has obvious positive earnings management behavior. The proportion of major shareholders holding shares is positively related to the degree of earnings management. In view of the above conclusion, the last part of this paper puts forward the relevant enlightenment and suggestion. The research of this paper deepens the understanding of equity refinancing, and it is of great significance to study earnings management from directional additional financing to unlocking period. It provides a theoretical basis for strengthening the refinancing behavior of China's listed companies and improving the governance structure of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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