我国上市公司定向增发发行对象与发行折价研究

发布时间：2018-06-05 00:27

本文选题：定向增发 + 发行对象　；参考：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：2006年以来,定向增发这一股权再融资方式在我国逐渐受到青睐,仅2006-2007年我国A股上市公司中就有近200次的定向增发,2006年至今,共有近700次的定向增发。定向增发在我国的运用,为上市公司筹集资金、引入战略投资者及注入优质资产等提供了便利。但是,实践当中也看到了不少问题的存在。其中投资者所关注的就是定向增发发行定价问题,理论研究及实践均发现,上市公司在定向增发时发行对象不同,折价存在很大差异,并且当发行方原大股东及关联方认购时的折价普遍高于外部投资者认购时的折价。有关定向增发折价的解释有不同的理论假说,如：利益输送假说、流动性补偿假说、信息不对称假说、监督效应假说等等。这些理论假说从不同角度对定向增发折价进行了解释。国内学者在研究定向增发折价时大多以2006-2007年的公司为样本,很少有人单独研究2008年之后完成增发的上市公司。2007年底之后,我国股市开始了一轮较大幅度的下跌,即所谓的“熊”市,至今股市仍处于低迷状态。2007年9月,我国证监会出台了《非公开发行股票实施细则》,对定向增发做了更细致的规范,其中比较大的变化是定价机制的细化,上市公司需要依据不同的发行对象和发行目的,按照不同的方式制定发行价格。鉴于2008年后的上述变化,考虑到股市波动的影响,本文从分析定向增发折价成因的角度出发,选择2009年10月-2011年完成增发的上市公司,作为研究样本。不同的认购对象在参与定向增发时考虑的因素不同,认购时价格的影响因素也不大一样,因此,本文将样本按认购对象的不同做了分类,分为大股东组和外部投资者组。主要围绕三个问题做了研究：大股东参与认购时的折价是否显著高于只有外部投资者认购时的折价,大股东参与认购时的折价成因及外部投资者认购时折价成因。本文采用了规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,在理论部分,对我国定向增发机制作了简要概括,并分析了定向增发定价的特点,通过数据分析,发现认购对象不同,定向增发折价存在差异；然后本文对定向增发折价的理论假说做了归纳,分别是：利益输送假说、流动性补偿假说、信息不对称假说、风险补偿假说和监督效应假说。本文对这些理论假说做了分析,认为已有的理论主要是针对不同的认购对象做的解释,利益输送假说和信息不对称假说可以很好的解释目前我国定向增发折价现象。大股东参与认购时的折价与其利益输送动机有关,只有外部投资者认购时的折价,是由于信息不对称的存在,对其评估发行方时所产生成本的补偿；流动性补偿假说则存在较大的争议,本文未对此作深入分析；风险补偿假说实际上是信息不对称假说的一个延伸；监督效应假说则不适合解释我国定向增发折价现象。实证结果表明,大股东参与认购时的折价和外部投资者认购时的折价差异并不显著,这和前人的研究结论并不一样。大股东参与认购时的折价与其利益输送动机有关,动机越大,越会趁机压低增发价格,以低价获得新股,达到财富转移之目的,这损害了发行方未参与认购的中小股东利益。只有外部投资者认购时产生的折价与信息不对称有关,外部投资者处于信息劣势,对发行方信息掌握不充分,这需要其在评估发行方时付出一定的成本,增发时的折价就是对其收集信息产生成本的一种补偿。本文的研究结论是：本文所选的2009年10月-2011年完成定向增发的上市企业中,大股东参与认购时的折价与只有外部投资者认购时的折价差异不显著,这和前人的研究结论不一样。本文认为由于我国定向增发定价机制的特殊性,计算出的折价率受股市波动影响很大,股市繁荣期的发行折价会普遍大于股市低迷期的发行折价。前人的研究大多选择牛市时期的样本,本文选择的是股市较为平稳时期的样本,这对折价的计算产生了影响,使得不同时期的样本得出的结论不同；并且2007年底《实施细则》的出台一定程度上减小了大股东认购时折价与只有外部投资者认购时折价的差异。本文研究结果还表明,由于目前我国公司治理机制不健全,给大股东财富转移提供了条件,大股东参与认购时的折价受其利益输送动机的影响,并且动机越大,折价越高；外部投资者认购时的折价与信息不对称有关,信息不对称程度越大,投资者评估发行方时越困难,折价越高。本文的主要贡献： (1)以往的研究大多以2006-2007年上市公司为样本,较少研究2007年之后的样本。考虑到2007年之后的股市与2007年之前相比股市波动差异较大,并且2007年《实施细则》的出台对定向增发定价机制的影响,本文选取了2009年10月-2011年底完成定向增发的公司作为研究对象。实证结果发现,本文样本公司的大股东参与认购时的折价率与只有外部投资者认购时的折价率并无显著差异,这与大多数学者研究2007年之前的样本公司时得出的结论并不一致。本文研究结论表明,股市的波动和《实施细则》的出台对不同认购对象参与认购时的折价差异产生了影响。 (2)本文为研究定向增发折价成因提供了实证经验,大股东参与认购时,其利益输送动机会影响到发行折价,验证了利益输送假说；外部投资者认购时的折价与信息不对称有关,验证了信息不对称假说。
[Abstract]:In 2006 - 2007 , China ' s A - share listed company has been increasingly popular . In 2006 - 2007 , China ' s A - share listed company has nearly 200 oriented growth . In 2006 - to - date , there are nearly 700 directional additions . However , there are many problems in the practice .

In September 2007 , China ' s securities regulatory commission issued a detailed rules on the implementation of non - public issuance of shares . In September 2007 , China ' s securities regulatory commission issued a detailed rules on the implementation of non - public issuance of shares . In September 2007 , China ' s securities regulatory commission issued a detailed rules on the implementation of non - public issuance of shares , which is the refinement of the pricing mechanism , and the listed companies need to formulate the issue price in different ways according to different issue objects and issue purposes .

In view of the above - mentioned changes after 2008 , considering the effect of stock market volatility , this paper selects the listed company which has completed the increase in October 2009 to 2011 as the research sample from the point of view of the reasons of market fluctuation .

In this paper , a method combining normative research and empirical research is used in this paper . In the theoretical part , a brief summary is made on the mechanism of oriented increase and development , and the characteristics of directional increase pricing are analyzed .
In this paper , the theory hypothesis of directional increment discount is summarized , which are : benefit transfer hypothesis , liquidity compensation hypothesis , information asymmetry hypothesis , risk compensation hypothesis and supervision effect hypothesis .
The hypothesis of liquidity compensation is controversial , which is not deeply analyzed in this paper .
The hypothesis of risk compensation is actually an extension of information asymmetry hypothesis ;
The hypothesis of supervision effect is not suitable for explaining China ' s orientation increase discount .

The empirical results show that the difference between the discount of the large shareholder in the subscription and the discount of the external investor is not significant , which is not the same as the previous research conclusion . The bigger the incentive is , the greater the incentive is , the greater the incentive is , the higher the price is obtained at a lower price . The greater the incentive is , the greater the discount and the information asymmetry that the issuer does not participate in the subscription . The external investor is at the information disadvantage . It needs to pay a certain cost when evaluating the issuer , which is a compensation for the cost of collecting the information .

The conclusion of this paper is that the discount rate of the large shareholders participating in the subscription at the time of October 2009 - 2011 is not significant , which is not the same as the previous research conclusion .
The results of this paper also show that the higher the incentive is , the higher the incentive is , the higher the incentive is , the higher the incentive for the large shareholders to participate in the subscription .
The higher the discount and the information asymmetry when the external investor subscribes , the greater the degree of asymmetry of the information , the more difficult the investor to assess the issuer , the higher the discount .

The main contributions of this paper are as follows :

( 1 ) Most of the past researches have been taken as samples in 2006 - 2007 , and the sample after 2007 has been studied .

( 2 ) In this paper , we provide empirical experience for the study of the origin of directional increase and increase , and when the large shareholders participate in the subscription , the interest transfer opportunity affects the issuance discount and validates the hypothesis of interest delivery ;
The discount rate at the time of subscription of the external investor is related to the asymmetry of the information , and the information asymmetry hypothesis is verified .
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51

【参考文献】