风险投资退出策略选择及股权拍卖机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-05 17:28

本文选题：风险投资退出 + 策略选择　；参考：《武汉大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：风险投资的蓬勃发展与风险资本的良性循环对高新技术的发展及其向商品的转化具有极大的推动作用,因此,风险投资是经济发展的重要助推器并引起了世界各国政府与企业的高度重视。风险投资退出是风险投资的最后一个阶段,一方面,风险投资退出困难使得风险投资机构难以将其持有的风险企业股权转化为资本形态,风险资本的积淀将严重挫伤投资主体参与风险投资的积极性,长此以往将不利于风险投资市场的整体发展；另一方面,风险投资退出困难成为风险企业高新技术成果转化为商品的障碍,这造成了社会资本的极大浪费,也不利于社会整体资源的优化配置。所以风险投资能否顺利退出对于风险投资的成败具有举足轻重的影响,是风险投资最重要的一个环节。由于退出成本高昂以及信息不对称的客观存在,我国的风险投资业面临着难以退出的突出问题,若这一问题得不到妥善解决,将会严重制约我国风险投资业的发展,甚至将会影响我国整体经济的发展。在上述市场环境下,解决这一问题的关键在于能否找到一种合理有效的风险投资退出方式并使其同时满足退出成本较低、能够有效地规避由信息不对称造成的损失这两个条件。拍卖本质上作为一种资源配置方式与价格揭示机制,具有揭示物品的真实价值、实现资源高效配置、降低交易成本、提高交易效率等显著优势,它不但能够以较低的成本达成交易,还能够有效地规避由信息不对称导致的损失,因此对于风险投资退出领域的理论研究与实践操作具有一定的指导意义。鉴于此,考虑到我国风险投资退出市场中的实际情况与现实困难,本文将风险企业股权视为一种特殊的拍卖物品,并尝试运用股权拍卖的方式来实现风险投资的顺利退出。本文的研究目的正是在这一研究背景之下,分析风险投资家在风险投资退出市场中的策略选择规律,并据此设计合理的股权拍卖交易机制来实现风险企业股权的高效配置与风险投资家的收益最大化。全文分为八章,形成了各成体系又相互联系的整体,各章的研究内容如下所示：第一章主要介绍了本文的研究背景与研究意义,简要地回顾了风险投资的发展历程与重要作用、风险投资难以退出的现状,并明确了本文的研究思路与研究框架。第二章阐述了风险投资退出、拍卖理论与博弈论等相关理论的文献综述,这些理论是全文展开研究的主要理论基础。第三章主要考虑在风险投资退出市场中存在着多个风险投资家和多个外部投资者的情形,并将其中发生的股权交易活动视为多个买方和多个卖方在宏观市场环境中的双边匹配问题。本章运用双边匹配理论探讨了风险投资家的策略选择规律,分别从股权价格单一属性以及多属性这两个角度展开了研究,并通过多主体仿真技术直观地展示了股权拍卖双边匹配的全过程,仿真结果表明风险投资家群体和外部投资者群体在相应的双边匹配机制下能够达到理想的稳定匹配结果,双边匹配过程不但具有很高的收敛速度,而且能够极大地优化整体匹配效果。第四章进一步考虑在某一具体的风险投资退出实践活动当中存在着一个风险投资家和多个外部投资者的情形,这和宏观风险投资退出市场中参与主体的人数有所不同,此外,风险企业家虽然不是股权交易的直接参与主体,却对风险投资家具有一定的约束,此时风险投资家的策略选择规律也将呈现出一定的差异,鉴于此,本章探讨了风险投资家和风险企业家对不同类型外部投资者的选择问题,证明两者的策略选择可能形成博弈困境,并运用量子博弈的相关研究思路来展开研究。第五章主要考虑到风险企业股权和一般商品有所不同，，由于风险投资具有高风险、高收益的特性,因此股权是一类特殊的拍卖物品。风险投资机构与风险企业家之间通过相互合作、资源共享来共同扶植风险企业发展,这为风险企业股权的未来增值提供了强有力的保障,因此,本章运用风险投资机构与风险企业家之间的协同效应来量化风险企业股权质量属性的价值,并在跨时偏好、关联价值等现实条件下探讨了风险投资退出股权拍卖模型。第六章主要借鉴随机微分博弈的研究思路,同时考虑了环境不确定以及竞买人的报价策略连续动态变化这两个现实情况对风险投资退出股权拍卖的出清价格、风险投资家收益期望上确界的影响,风险投资家若要实现自身利益最大化,需要对竞买人有一定的了解,并透露适量的风险企业信息给竞买人。第七章主要运用社会网络理论研究外部投资者之间的关系,并据此探讨了外部投资者在社会网络中进行信息传递、交互学习的规律,仿真结果显示,外部投资者在社会网络中的重要性系数处于动态变化过程中,随着社会网络的不断演进与扩张,社会网络体将呈出一定程度的自相似性,同时,在外部投资者的相互作用下,风险投资家能够以非常低的激励成本诱导外部投资者报出其真实估价,最终实现风险投资退出股权拍卖收益最大化。第八章对全文的研究内容进行了总结,并对未来的研究工作提出了进一步的展望与规划。
[Abstract]:The development of venture capital and the virtuous circle of venture capital have great impetus to the development of high and new technology and the transformation of venture capital . Therefore , venture capital is an important booster of economic development and has caused great importance to the governments and enterprises of the world . Venture capital withdraw is the last stage of venture capital . On the one hand , venture capital withdraw is the last stage of venture capital .
On the other hand , the exit difficulty of venture capital has become an obstacle to the transformation of high - tech achievements of venture enterprises into commodities , which has caused great waste of social capital and is not conducive to the optimal allocation of the whole resources of society .

As a kind of resource collocation method and price revelation mechanism , the auction has the obvious advantages of revealing the real value of goods , realizing efficient allocation of resources , reducing transaction cost and improving transaction efficiency .

The full text is divided into eight chapters , which form the whole system which is in contact with each other . The contents of each chapter are as follows :

The first chapter mainly introduces the research background and research significance of this paper , briefly reviews the development course and the important role of venture capital , the difficult withdrawal of venture capital , and makes clear the research thinking and research framework in this paper .

The second chapter describes the literature review of the theories of venture capital withdrawal , auction theory and game theory , which are the main theoretical bases for the full - text research .

The third chapter mainly considers the existence of a plurality of venture capitalists and a plurality of external investors in the venture capital exit market , and regards the equity trading activity as a plurality of bilateral matching problems in the macro - market environment of the plurality of buyers and the plurality of sellers .

In the fourth chapter , it is further considered that there is a venture capitalist and a plurality of external investors in a specific venture capital exit practice activity , which is different from the number of participants participating in the macro - venture exit market . In addition , the risk entrepreneurs have certain constraints on venture capitalists , though they are not directly involved in the stock exchange . In view of this , this chapter discusses the choice of venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs for different types of external investors .

The fifth chapter mainly takes into account the different stock rights and the general merchandise of the venture capital , because the venture capital has the characteristics of high risk and high yield , the equity is a special auction item . The venture capital institution and the venture entrepreneur jointly support the development of the venture enterprise through mutual cooperation and resource sharing . Therefore , this chapter applies the cooperative effect between venture capital institution and venture entrepreneur to quantify the value of the equity quality attribute of the venture enterprise , and discusses the venture capital withdrawal equity auction model under the realistic conditions of cross - time preference and related value .

The sixth chapter mainly refers to the research thinking of the random differential game , taking into consideration the uncertainty of the environment and the continuous dynamic change of the bidding strategies of the bidders .

The seventh chapter mainly uses the social network theory to study the relationship between the external investors and discusses the law of information transfer and interactive learning in the social network . The simulation results show that the importance coefficient of the external investor in the social network is in the dynamic change process . With the development and expansion of the social network , the social network will have a certain degree of self - similarity . At the same time , under the interaction of the external investor , the venture capitalist can induce the external investor to report its true valuation with very low incentive cost , and finally realize the maximization of the return of the venture capital from the equity auction .

Chapter 8 summarizes the research contents of the whole text , and puts forward further prospects and plans for the future research work .
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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