代理冲突与上市公司高管薪酬信息披露质量研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 18:18

本文选题：高管薪酬 + 信息披露　；参考：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：2007年美国次贷危机引发全球金融海啸,导致诸多金融企业纷纷倒闭,众多跨国公司也受到沉重打击,各国失业率激增。然而,与此形成鲜明对比的是,这些企业的高管们仍然可以获得十分可观的薪酬。这一异常现象引发了全球热议,我国也针对这一问题展开广泛讨论。高管薪酬信息的披露意义重大,但目前我国已出台文件大多针对国有及国有控股企业和金融行业,而对上市公司的通用准则并不多,目前可查的最新正式披露准则是证监会颁布的《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号年度报告的内容与格式》(2007年修订),其中分别在第二章第五节第二十五条和第二章第八节第三十六条对上市公司高管薪酬信息披露内容提出了要求。为了进一步规范上市公司年度报告编制及信息披露行为,提高上市公司年度报告信息披露的针对性和有用性,2011年12月30日中国证监会又再次发布了《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号年度报告的内容与格式》(2011年修订)的征求意见稿,对薪酬相关部分也做了重要调整。高管薪酬问题日益成为学者关注的焦点,高管薪酬信息披露的监管日益受到政府部门重视,对于高管薪酬信息披露的研究十分必要。目前看来,证监会的披露准则还在不断完善,我国上市公司对于高管薪酬信息的披露也存在一些差异。对于高管薪酬的强制性披露项目,上市公司是详细披露还是简要披露,而对于高管薪酬的自愿性披露项目,上市公司是选择披露还是不披露,这些都与上市公司自身特征,尤其是代理冲突问题有关。我国上市公司高管薪酬的披露存在怎样的差异?影响上市公司信息披露质量的因素也同样影响上市公司高管薪酬信息的披露吗?这些影响因素对我国上市公司高管薪酬信息的披露的质量又会产生怎样的影响?对上市公司高管薪酬信启、披露的监管具有怎样的必要性?回答上述问题正是本文选题动机所在。根据本文提出的高管薪酬信息披露质量评价体系,本文对样本上市公司高管薪酬信息披露质量现状进行统计。统计发现：第一,样本上市公司高管薪酬信息披露各项目得分呈现逐年上升的趋势,但各年具体得分均较低,披露质量仍有待提升；第二,样本公司薪酬信息披露质量的改进速度在样本期间内有所放缓;第三,样本公司高管薪酬信息披露质量优劣差异明显,分值相差较大；第四,中位数显示,样本总体及强制性项目分值存在差异的主要原因是部分上市公司对于高管薪酬信息披露明显不够重视。同时,本文从上市公司代理冲突问题入手,从代理成本、激励水平和管理层权力三个角度解读代理冲突与上市公司高管薪酬信启、披露质量的关系。以往学者对于上市公司信息披露的研究已经证实,代理成本、薪酬激励水平会影响上市公司信息披露质量,而管理层权力会影响上市公司高管薪酬的考核和发放,间接影响着上市公司高管薪酬信息的披露。作为上市公司披露信息的组成部分,高管薪酬信息的披露很可能会受到这些因素的影响。本文选取2008年至2010年深圳证券交易所355家合计1065组数据作为分析样本,并采用多元回归和Logistic回归两种方法对样本进行多层次多角度的综合回归分析。分析结果显示,对上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的监管确实有助于改善公司内部的代理冲突问题：代理成本对于上市公司高管薪酬信息披露质量的影响表现出显著的负相关关系,通过加强对上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的监管,特别是对上市公司高管薪酬强制性信息披露的监管,将有助于降低上市公司的代理成本；激励水平对于上市公司高管薪酬信息披露质量的影响表现出正相关关系,通过加强对上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的监管,特别是对上市公司高管薪酬强制性信息披露的监管,将有助于促进激励策略效用的充分发挥；管理层权力对于上市公司高管薪酬各项目披露质量的影响虽未通过显著性检验,但基本都表现出负相关关系,加强上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的监管确实在一定程度上有助于约束管理层的权力。本文认为,由于我国大部分上市公司在薪酬信息披露上不够积极,且披露质量有待提高,引导上市公司,特别是房地产等行业的上市公司主动披露高管薪酬信息十分必要。这需要各届的共同努力：一方面,监管部门应尽快修订并完善相关制度,为高管薪酬信息的披露提供政策性指引；另一方面,行业协会等相关部门应当积极引导我国上市公司的高管薪酬信息披露行为,提高披露的积极性。此外,上市公司所有者也应根据公司自身实际情况,主动参与完善公司高管薪酬信息、披露的工作中来,鼓励管理层对高管薪酬的积极披露,以改善公司治理环境,提高公司价值和股东财富。这将有助于促进我国上市公司的成长,推进我国资本市场的不断发展和完善。本文研究意义和贡献主要体现在理论和监管两个层面。理论层面：信息披露可以有效缓解信息不对称问题,对资本市场的有效运行具有促进作用。然而现有学术研究基于上市公司信息披露质量影响因素的研究很多,但对高管薪酬信息披露的研究不足,有效的高管薪酬信息披露质量评价方法仍需不断摸索,影响上市公司信息、披露质量的因素是否同样影响着高管薪酬信息的披露尚未被证实。本文基于我国深圳证券交易所A股上市公司的高管薪酬信息披露信息展开探讨。通过研究,本文提出一种较为有效的高管薪酬信息披露质量评价方法,揭示出上市公司代理冲突对我国上市公司高管薪酬信息披露质量的影响,进一步丰富上市公司信息披露行为的研究,并为以后的研究提供结论支持和方向参考。监管层面：目前我国对于上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的要求仍在不断完善,但由于对影响上市公司高管薪酬信息披露质量的各类因素尚需求证,使得对高管薪酬信息披露的监管缺少针对性。虽然2011年底,证监会再次公布了修订后披露准则的征求意见稿,对于高管薪酬相关信息披露的要求做了调整,但这些调整是否有助于改善上市公司治理结构并缓解信息不对称的情况也不甚明了。通过本文的研究,将目前影响我国上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的因素予以揭示,并指出了薪酬监管的必要性和现实意义,从而为进一步完善我国上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的监管提供可行性建议。本文研究的局限性主要体现在样本构成和高管薪酬信息、披露质量的评价方法两个方面。样本方面：由于受客观因素制约,本文研究仅限于深圳证券交易所中A股主板公司,未涉及上海证券交易所的相关公司,也未涉及深圳证券交易所B股、中小板、创业板等特殊板块,本文所获得的研究结论对于上述上市公司是否同样适用仍需探讨。高管薪酬信息披露质量评价方法方面：虽然本文在赋分过程中尽可能保持中立,并通过仔细辨认对上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的诸多项目进行整理,但赋分方式可能仍需进一步改进。一方面,披露信息、质量考核项目分类的合理性有待进一步检验;另一方面,本文采用的“0-1”式赋分方法无法体现上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的具体细节。
[Abstract]:In 2007, the United States subprime crisis triggered the global financial tsunami, which led to the collapse of many financial enterprises, and many multinational companies were also heavily hit by a large number of countries. The disclosure of executive compensation information is of great significance. But at present, most of the documents have been published in China for state-owned and state-owned holding enterprises and the financial industry, but the general guidelines for listed companies are not much. The latest official disclosure criteria are the corporate letter of the securities issued by the SFC. Content and format of information disclosure content and format guidelines second annual report (revised in 2007), of which twenty-fifth and second chapters and eighth sections of the second chapter and eighth section of the listed company's executive compensation information disclosure requirements are put forward. In order to further regulate the annual report of listed companies and information disclosure line In order to improve the pertinence and usefulness of the information disclosure of the annual report of the listed companies, the CSRC reissued the draft of the content and format of the second annual report of the disclosure content and format of the publicly issued securities company in December 30, 2011, and also made important adjustments to the remuneration related parts.
The issue of executive compensation has increasingly become the focus of attention of scholars. The supervision of executive compensation information disclosure has been paid more and more attention by the government departments. It is necessary to study the disclosure of executive compensation information. At present, the disclosure standards of the CSRC are still constantly improved, and there are some differences in the disclosure of executive compensation information in China's listed companies. For the Mandatory Disclosure Project of executive compensation, the listed companies are detailed disclosure or brief disclosure, and for the Voluntary Disclosure Project of executive compensation, the listed companies are selected to disclose or not disclose them. These are all related to the characteristics of the listed companies, especially the problem of agency conflict. How does the disclosure of executive compensation of the listed companies in China exist The factors that affect the quality of the listed companies' information disclosure also affect the disclosure of the executive compensation information of the listed companies? What are the effects of these factors on the quality of the disclosure of the executive compensation information in the listed companies? The above question is the motive of this article.
According to the quality evaluation system of executive compensation information disclosure proposed in this paper, this paper makes a statistical analysis on the quality status of the executive compensation information disclosure of the listed companies in the sample listed companies. First, the scores of the listed companies' executive compensation information disclosure are increasing year by year, but the specific scores are low in each year, and the quality of disclosure remains to be found. Promotion; second, the improvement rate of the quality of the Sample Firms compensation information disclosure slowed down in the sample period; third, the difference of the quality of the Sample Firms executives' compensation information disclosure quality is obvious and the difference is large; fourth, the median shows that the main reasons for the difference between the total and the compulsory items of the sample are some listed companies. The disclosure of executive compensation information is obviously not paid enough attention.
At the same time, starting with the problem of agency conflict in listed companies, this paper analyzes the relationship between agency conflict and the quality of disclosure and disclosure of listed company executives from three angles of agency cost, incentive level and management power. As a part of the listed company's disclosure information, the disclosure of executive compensation information is likely to be affected by these factors. This paper selects the Shenzhen certificate from 2008 to 2010. 355 total 1065 groups of data from the voucher stock exchange were used as analysis samples, and multiple regression and multiple regression analysis were carried out by multiple regression and Logistic regression methods.
The results show that the supervision of the executive compensation information disclosure of the listed company does help to improve the agency conflict in the company: the agency cost has a significant negative correlation with the influence of the quality of the executive compensation information disclosure of the listed companies, and the supervision of the disclosure of the compensation information of the listed companies is strengthened, especially The supervision of the mandatory disclosure of executive compensation information of the listed companies will help to reduce the agency cost of listed companies, and the incentive level has a positive correlation with the influence of the quality of the executive compensation information disclosure of the listed companies, and the supervision of the disclosure of the executive compensation information of the listed companies, especially the executive compensation of the listed companies, is strengthened. The supervision of mandatory information disclosure will help to promote the full play of the effectiveness of the incentive strategy. Although the management authority has not passed the significant test on the quality of the disclosure quality of the executive compensation projects of the listed companies, the negative correlation is basically shown, and the supervision of the executive compensation information disclosure of the listed companies is indeed to a certain extent. It helps to constrain the power of the management.
Because most listed companies in our country are not active in the disclosure of compensation information and the quality of disclosure needs to be improved, it is necessary to guide the listed companies of listed companies, especially in real estate industry, to disclose the executive compensation information actively. On the other hand, the industry association and other related departments should actively guide the disclosure behavior of the executive compensation of the listed companies in China, and improve the enthusiasm of the disclosure. In addition, the owners of the listed companies should also take the initiative to improve the salary of the company's executives according to the actual situation of the company. It will help to improve the corporate governance environment, improve the value of the company and the wealth of shareholders. This will help to promote the growth of our listed companies and promote the continuous development and improvement of the capital market in China.
The significance and contribution of this study are mainly embodied in two aspects: Theory and supervision.
Theoretical level: information disclosure can effectively alleviate the problem of information asymmetry and promote the effective operation of the capital market. However, there are many studies based on the factors affecting the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, but the research on the disclosure of executive compensation information is insufficient, and the effective quality evaluation of executive compensation information disclosure is effective. The law still needs to be explored continuously. Whether the factors that affect the information of the listed companies and the factors that disclose the quality of the company have not yet been confirmed. This paper is based on the information disclosure information of the executive compensation of the A stock listed companies of the Shenzhen stock exchange in China. The disclosure of quality evaluation method reveals the influence of the agency conflict on the quality of executive compensation information disclosure of Listed Companies in China, further enriches the research on information disclosure behavior of listed companies, and provides conclusion support and direction reference for future research.
Regulatory level: at present, the requirements for the disclosure of executive compensation information in listed companies are still being perfected. However, because of the various factors that affect the quality of the disclosure of executive compensation information of the listed companies, the supervision of the executive compensation information disclosure is lack of pertinence. Although the Securities Regulatory Commission published the revised disclosure again at the end of 2011 The draft of the guidelines has been adjusted to the requirements of executive compensation related information disclosure, but it is not clear whether these adjustments help to improve the governance structure of the listed companies and alleviate the information asymmetry. The necessity and practical significance of salary supervision are put forward, so as to provide feasible suggestions for further improving the supervision of information disclosure of executive pay in China's listed companies.
The limitations of this study are mainly reflected in two aspects: sample composition and executive compensation information, and the evaluation method of disclosure quality.
As for the sample, the study is restricted by the objective factors. This study is limited to the A shares of the Shenzhen stock exchange, not related to the related companies of the Shanghai stock exchange, nor on the special plates of the Shenzhen stock exchange B shares, small and medium board, and the GEM board. The conclusions obtained in this paper are still applicable to the listed companies. It needs to be discussed.
The quality evaluation method of executive compensation information disclosure: Although this article maintains the neutrality as much as possible in the process of assigning, and through carefully identifying many items of the listed company executives' compensation information disclosure, it may still need to be further improved. On the one hand, the rationality of the classification of the quality assessment items is needed. Further examination; on the other hand, the "0-1" method used in this paper can not reflect the details of the disclosure of executive pay information of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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