代理成本视角的A股上市公司现金股利发放效果分析

发布时间：2018-06-08 00:37

本文选题：现金股利 + 代理成本　；参考：《上海交通大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文从我国股权分置改革之后的A股上市公司代理成本问题出发，，以代理成本理论作为理论基础，研究了我国A股上市公司发放现金股利作为一种降低代理成本手段的治理效果。在实证部分，本文通过选取支出和产出两个角度的代理变量对我国A股上市公司的机会成本进行了描摹。并利用OLS模型检验了股权分置改革之后，我国A股上市公司发放现金股利的效果。通过实证分析，本文发现，通过现金股利支付率这一指标来控制公司代理成本的效果较差。在此基础上，本文揭示了过度发放股利和公司再融资成本之间内在联系的可能原因，并针对“通过股利支付率控制A股上市公司再融资”这一政策提出了批评和相应的政策改进，这在国内研究成果中尚属首次。
[Abstract]:Based on the theory of agency cost, this paper starts from the problem of agency cost of A share listed companies after the reform of split share structure in our country, and takes the theory of agency cost as the theoretical basis. This paper studies the governance effect of cash dividend issued by A share listed companies as a means of reducing agency cost. This paper describes the opportunity cost of A-share listed companies in China by selecting agency variables from the perspectives of expenditure and output. The OLS model is used to test the effect of cash dividend issued by A-share listed companies after the reform of split share structure. Through the empirical analysis, this paper finds that the efficiency of controlling the agency cost through the cash dividend payment rate is poor. On this basis, this paper reveals the possible reasons for the internal relationship between the overpayment of dividend and the refinancing cost of the company. This paper also puts forward the criticism and corresponding policy improvement on the policy of "controlling the refinancing of A-share listed companies through dividend payment rate", which is the first time in domestic research.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

【共引文献】