“高送转”股利分配政策信号传递作用研究

发布时间：2018-06-09 12:48

本文选题：股票股利 + 高送转　；参考：《复旦大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：股利政策一直是广大投资者较为关注的问题。在西方发达资本市场中,学术界普遍认为股利政策具有信号传递作用,是公司管理层对于未来收益增长的预期。但是,学者们对于股利政策在中国证券市场,是否真的具有信号传递功能,还是仅仅是会计游戏,一直广为争议。尤其是在中国股票市场现状下,市场运作时间短,股权结构高度集中,相关法律法规仍有待健全,市场走势受政策影响较大,市场效率有待商榷,股利政策是否具有信号传递功能仍不确定。本文针对现有文献主要研究股票股利信号传递效应,以投资者的理论视角,对我国股票激励政策的股东财富效应进行了理论分析和实证研究,验证了股票股利的股东财富效应,检验了股利分配是否基于公司现阶段财务状况以及是否能满足公司可持续发展需要,对股权激励政策的效用做出深度探讨。区别于以往研究,在研究内容和方法上,本文主要有以下几点创新。首先,在以往的研究过程中,大部分学者都侧重于现金股利研究,或者是混合股利的研究。很少有人单独对股票股利做出研究。其次,很多学者仅仅是研究股票股利政策的短期窗口,得出超额收益的结论,而忽视了中期、长期效应。本文不仅仅研究了事件的短期窗口,更是把中期、长期的超额回报作为研究重点。再次,很多学者仅对窗口事件做出了研究,但是事件研究方法本身具有一定的缺陷性。本文在对事件研究的基础上,通过对我国高送转公司的财务数据进行分析,借以研究我国上市公司股票股利信号传递作用。以弥补事件研究方法的不足。通过实证研究我们发现,股票股利只在短期的时间窗口具有超额收益,而在股票高送转事件发生后的1月期的超额回报为负值,暗示着股票股利仅仅是上市公司为了迎合大投资者的会计游戏,帮助大投资者剥削中小投资者的炒作行为。基于财务可持续增长理论,发现股权激励政策与上市公司可持续发展相背离。上市公司分配股票股利应基于可持续增长的需求,但是实证结果表明每股股票股利高低与实现可持续增长对现金需求强烈程度不相关。此外,关于资产增长率的实证研究发现,上市公司分配股票股利与公司ROA的增长也不相关。进一步证明股权激励政策在中国并不具有信号传递作用,仅仅是公司的会计游戏以及市场的炒作行为。
[Abstract]:Dividend policy has been the majority of investors concerned about the issue. In the western developed capital market, the academic circles generally think that dividend policy has signalling effect, which is the expectation of the future income growth of the company management. However, scholars have been controversial about whether dividend policy in China's securities market, whether it is a signal transmission function, or just an accounting game. Especially in the current situation of China's stock market, the market operation time is short, the ownership structure is highly concentrated, the relevant laws and regulations still need to be improved, the market trend is greatly affected by the policy, and the market efficiency remains to be discussed. Whether dividend policy has signalling function is still uncertain. This paper mainly studies the effect of stock dividend signal transmission from the perspective of investors' theory. This paper makes a theoretical analysis and empirical study on the shareholder wealth effect of the stock incentive policy in China, and verifies the shareholder wealth effect of the stock dividend. This paper examines whether the dividend distribution is based on the current financial situation of the company and whether it can meet the needs of the company's sustainable development, and makes a deep discussion on the utility of the equity incentive policy. This article mainly has the following several innovation. First of all, in the past research process, most scholars focus on the research of cash dividend, or hybrid dividend. Few people study stock dividends alone. Secondly, many scholars only study the short-term window of stock dividend policy, draw the conclusion of excess return, but ignore the medium-term and long-term effects. This paper not only studies the short-term window of events, but also focuses on medium-term and long-term excess returns. Thirdly, many scholars only do research on window events, but the method of event research itself has some defects. Based on the study of events, this paper analyzes the financial data of high transmission companies in order to study the signal transmission of stock dividend of listed companies in China. In order to make up for the deficiency of the research method, we find that the stock dividend has excess return only in the short-term time window, but the excess return is negative in the January period after the high stock transfer event. It implies that stock dividend is only an accounting game for big investors to help big investors exploit the speculation of small and medium investors. Based on the theory of financial sustainable growth, it is found that the equity incentive policy deviates from the sustainable development of listed companies. The dividend allocation of listed companies should be based on the demand of sustainable growth, but the empirical results show that the level of dividend per share is not related to the intensity of cash demand to achieve sustainable growth. In addition, the empirical study on the growth rate of assets shows that there is no correlation between the increase of ROA and the dividend distribution of listed companies. It further proves that the equity incentive policy has no signalling effect in China, it is only the accounting game and the market speculation.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

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