国有控股与非国有控股上市公司高管薪酬的差异性分析

发布时间：2018-06-15 14:11

本文选题：高管薪酬 + 产权基础　；参考：《重庆工商大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：高管薪酬是公司治理研究中的一个重要课题。高管薪酬问题的研究，有助于公司治理理论和实践的完善。随着现代企业制度的建立以及高管薪酬的披露，管理层薪酬一直是社会各方关注的话题，尤其近年来中国上市公司高管薪酬数字的不断飙升，引发了社会各界的争议。薪酬作为劳动报酬也是一种重要的激励手段，特别是在两权分离的情况下，薪酬的设置更是搭建了所有者与经营者合作的桥梁。从代理理论角度来看，对于作为委托人的公司股东而言，设计管理人员薪酬就是为了解决代理问题，，激励管理者努力提高公司的绩效和价值。高管薪酬一直以来被认为是解决股东与管理层之间委托代理问题的关键。薪酬的标准设计的得当，能够降低股东与管理层之间的委托代理成本，高管也有动力通过努力提高公司的价值，增加股东的财富，若设计不当，便会导致对高管的激励作用失效，进而引发高管只为追求个人利益而牺牲股东的利益。合理的高管薪酬是建立有效的公司治理的核心内容，也是我国企业改革和发展成败的关键问题，因此高管薪酬的研究不仅具有理论意义也有很强的现实意义。目前对于高管层薪酬的研究主要存在的焦点问题主要有：薪酬水平和薪酬结构。中国对于高管薪酬水平进行了大量的研究，比如高管薪酬和公司业绩的相关研究，高管层持股与公司绩效的研究等等。并在此基础上取得了一定的研究成果。但是对于另一个焦点问题——薪酬结构研究的相对不是太多。高管薪酬的差距是高管人员薪酬设计中非常重要的部分，产权基础不同、行业不同、区域不同等都会造成高管薪酬的巨大差距。因此结构不同造成的差距有待于我们做更多的研究。本文立足产权基础不同这一研究视角把研究对象分为国有控股上市公司和非国有控股上市公司，研究其薪酬的差异性，为我国企业进一步改革和健康发展做出贡献，同时推动公司治理课题的研究，也为我们今后的薪酬制度改革朝着更加合理，更加公平的方向去发展提供可借鉴的思路。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation is an important subject in the study of corporate governance. The study of executive compensation is helpful to the perfection of corporate governance theory and practice. With the establishment of modern enterprise system and the disclosure of executive compensation, management compensation has always been a topic of concern, especially in recent years, the number of executive compensation of listed companies in China has been soaring, which has aroused controversy from all walks of life. Compensation is also an important incentive means as labor compensation, especially in the case of separation of the two rights, the establishment of compensation is to build a bridge between the owner and the operator. From the perspective of agency theory, for the shareholders of the company as the principal, the compensation of the design manager is to solve the agency problem and encourage managers to improve the performance and value of the company. Executive compensation has long been seen as the key to solving the problem of agency between shareholders and management. Pay standards are properly designed to reduce principal-agent costs between shareholders and management, and executives have the incentive to increase the value of the company and the wealth of shareholders, if not properly designed, This will lead to the failure of the incentive role of the executive, and then lead to the personal interests of the executive only to sacrifice the interests of shareholders. Reasonable executive compensation is the core content of establishing effective corporate governance, and is also the key issue of the success or failure of enterprise reform and development in China. Therefore, the study of executive compensation is not only of theoretical significance but also of great practical significance. At present, the main focus of the research on executive compensation are: salary level and salary structure. China has carried out a lot of research on executive compensation level, such as executive compensation and corporate performance related research, executive ownership and corporate performance research and so on. On this basis, some research results have been obtained. But for another focus-pay structure research is relatively not too much. Executive compensation gap is a very important part of executive compensation design. Different property rights, different industries, different regions will cause a huge gap in executive compensation. Therefore, the gap caused by different structures needs more research. From the perspective of different property right basis, this paper divides the research object into state-owned holding listed company and non-state-owned holding listed company, and studies the difference of their salary, and contributes to the further reform and healthy development of our country's enterprises. At the same time, to promote the research of the subject of corporate governance, it also provides us with a more reasonable and fair way to develop the salary system in the future.
【学位授予单位】：重庆工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】