上市银行董事会治理结构对高管薪酬激励影响研究

发布时间：2018-06-18 13:56

本文选题：上市银行 + 董事会治理结构　；参考：《西北农林科技大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：高管薪酬激励作为公司治理的特殊而又重要的一个组成部分，一直都是社会各界关注的焦点。尤其是金融业的高管薪酬屡居各行业榜首，如深发展银行董事长法兰克纽曼于2007年获得2285万元的高薪，这种“天价薪酬”不仅引起了社会各界的热切关注，更促使了专家学者开始对有关高管薪酬的问题进行研究。但是专家学者们只是针对银行的高管薪酬的影响因素和如何构建科学合理的薪酬激励制度进行研究，对于高管薪酬的制定机构——董事会的研究还比较少，而且研究结论也不相统一。所以本文将从董事会治理特征的角度出发，，从董事会规模、独立董事所占比例和董事长与行长是否两职兼任这三个方面分析董事会对高管薪酬及薪酬-绩效敏感性的影响。考虑到商业银行的特殊性，本文首先根据商业银行的盈利性、安全性、流动性和成长性这四个维度的财务指标，采用熵权法构建商业银行综合绩效测算模型，并测算出各银行的综合得分值，以此作为银行绩效变量，取代了传统的ROA或ROE指标变量，这样可以使分析出结果更加精确完善。最后，以高管薪酬作为因变量，以董事会规模、独立董事比例和董事长与行长两职分任作为自变量，以当期银行综合绩效、滞后一期银行综合绩效、银行规模和第一大股东所持比例作为控制变量，构建回归模型，对16家上市银行2006年-2011年的面板数据进行回归分析。实证结果表明：董事会的规模与高管薪酬水平呈显著正相关关系，与高管薪酬-绩效敏感性呈弱负相关关系；独立董事所占比例与高管薪酬呈弱负相关关系，与高管薪酬-绩效敏感性呈显著正相关关系；董事长与行长两职分任与高管薪酬呈显著的正相关关系，与高管薪酬-绩效敏感性呈弱正相关关系。针对以上分析结果，笔者最后提出了几点参考建议。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation incentive, as a special and important part of corporate governance, has always been the focus of all circles of society. Especially, the executive pay of the financial industry has been ranked first in all industries, such as the high salary of 22 million 850 thousand yuan in 2007 by Frank Newman, the chairman of the deep Development Bank, which has not only caused the society. The enthusiastic attention of all walks of life has prompted experts and scholars to begin to study the issue of executive compensation. However, experts and scholars only study the influencing factors of executive compensation and how to build a scientific and reasonable salary incentive system, and the research on executive compensation institutions - the board of directors is still less. And the conclusion of the study is not uniform. So from the perspective of the governance characteristics of the board of directors, this paper will analyze the influence of the board of directors on the executive compensation and pay performance sensitivity from the three aspects of the scale of the board of directors, the proportion of the independent directors and the two posts of the president and the president.
Considering the particularity of commercial banks, this paper first constructs a comprehensive performance measurement model of commercial banks based on the four dimensions of profitability, security, liquidity and growth of commercial banks, and calculates the comprehensive score value of each bank as a variable of bank performance, replacing the traditional ROA or ROE index. In the end, the scale of the board of directors, the proportion of independent directors and the two posts of the chairman and the president of the chairman are taken as independent variables, and the comprehensive performance of the current bank, the comprehensive performance of the first phase of the bank, the scale of the bank and the proportion of the first large shareholders are taken as the control changes. The regression model was used to conduct regression analysis on the panel data of 16 listed banks in 2006 -2011.
The empirical results show that the scale of the board of directors has a significant positive correlation with the executive compensation level, and has a weak negative correlation with the executive compensation performance sensitivity; the proportion of the independent directors has a weak negative correlation with the executive compensation, and has a significant positive correlation with the executive compensation performance sensitivity; the chairman and the president are two posts and executives. There is a significant positive correlation between remuneration and a weak positive correlation with executive compensation performance sensitivity. In the end, the author puts forward some suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：西北农林科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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