A股上市公司高送转动因及时机选择研究

发布时间：2018-06-21 22:42

本文选题：高送转 + 时机选择　；参考：《上海交通大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：高送转是我国A股市场的独有现象。本文就该现象研究中国A股高送转的时机选择的决定因素。本文首先以1999年到2012年的所有A股为样本研究市场驱动假设。通过Probit回归得出市场条件并不能对上市公司的高送转决策产生影响，并推出我国上市公司实行高送转的主要目的并非是为了获取更多的超额收益。本文继而研究了事件驱动假设，发现高送转在时间上与限售股解禁相近，并且通过Probit模型验证了限售股解禁日接近送转政策宣告日的A股更容易推行高送转，继而推出上市公司管理者通过实施高送转拉高股价，以迎合限售股股东套现的假设。本文用盈余管理指标代表管理者操纵股价的动机，发现盈余操纵越严重的公司，，越容易实施高送转，并且实施了高送转的解禁股的长期收益少于未实施了高送转的解禁股。这些印证了高送转作为管理者的操纵股价的工具来迎合限售股股东的假设，也就是事件驱动假设。本文在高送转的时机研究中作出了贡献，并提醒中小投资者注意管理者的操纵行为以保护自己的利益，同时建议监管者对公司管理者的操纵行为进行监管。
[Abstract]:High send turn is the unique phenomenon of A-share market in China. This paper studies the determinants of the timing of A-share turnover in China. In this paper, we first take all A shares from 1999 to 2012 as samples to study market driven hypothesis. Through probit regression, it is concluded that market conditions can not affect the decision of high transmission of listed companies, and the main purpose of implementing high transmission of listed companies in China is not to obtain more excess returns. This paper then studies the event-driven hypothesis, and finds that the transfer of high transmission is close to the release of restricted shares in time, and the probit model verifies that A shares whose release date is close to the date of announcement of the transfer policy are easier to carry out high transfer. Then introduce the listed company managers through the implementation of high transfer to raise the share price, in order to meet the restriction of shareholders to cash hypothesis. In this paper, the earnings management index is used to represent the motives of managers manipulating stock prices. It is found that the more serious the earnings manipulation is, the easier it is to carry out a high turnover. These confirmed that the transfer as a manager's tool to manipulate the stock price to cater to the restricted stock shareholders hypothesis, or event-driven hypothesis. This paper makes a contribution to the research on the timing of high turnover, and reminds the small and medium-sized investors to pay attention to the manipulation of managers to protect their own interests, and suggests that the regulators should supervise the manipulation of corporate managers.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51

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