风险投资（家）声誉与上市企业业绩的相关性分析

发布时间：2018-06-29 12:47

本文选题：风险投资声誉 + 首次公开发行　；参考：《上海师范大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文以“资本市场是否需要风险投资的参与”这样一个问题为切入点，从交易费用理论、信息经济学和声誉的作用角度结合我国中小企业板发行的公司的表现探讨了风险投资在上市公司的业绩中的作用，研究了声誉对风险投资“信息鉴证”职能的重要性，分析了声誉机制对风险投资产业的重要意义。本文运用中国证券市场的数据资料，实证分析了风险投资的声誉与上市企业的业绩的相互关系，并从中探讨了我国风险投资产业在对上市公司的中长期业绩方面缺乏显著影响的原因。本文认为，风险投资的存在的重要性不仅仅是体现在加快产业升级和科技生产力转化，更为重要的是风险投资为资本市场提供了重要的“信息鉴证”功能。企业对自身的情况最为了解，而作为二级市场上的投资者由于缺乏专业的知识和足够的资源去了解企业，往往很难获得关于企业完备的信息而进行理性的投资。正是基于这种风险的存在，风险投资的这种功能大大缓解了证券市场中投资者与上市企业之间的信息不对称以及由此而导致逆向选择。从理论上来说，在一个证券市场中，如果声誉机制能够发挥充分的作用，则可以内生如下关系：首先，拥有风投背景的企业将比没有风投背景的企业拥有更高的初始回报和中长期回报。只有在这种情况下，风险投资家才能在整个证券市场中起到正向的作用和声誉机制才能发挥作用。其次，风险投资家声誉等级与上市企业质量正相关，即高声誉的风险投资家所投的企业表现要优于中等声誉的企业的表现。这是因为，在声誉机制有效的情况下，风险投资家的声誉代表了风险投资家的能力，优秀的风险投资家往往能证明其对企业的未来发展的预测的正确性，，能更好的监督和促进企业的良性发展。因此风险投资家的声誉与发行企业的质量应该正相关，也只有存在这种关系时，才能降低企业和投资者之间的信息不对称的程度。基于以上的观点，本文对我国风险投资的声誉进行了实证分析，分析的结果表明有无风投的上市企业在初始回报方面有显著的差别，但在长期业绩方面却没有表现出不同，而高声誉的风投所支持的企业相对于低声誉的风投支持的企业，在初始回报方面并没有显著差别，但在中长期业绩方面拥有更优的表现。那么，导致我国风险投资中声誉机制弱化的原因是什么呢？本文认为原因是多方面的，有市场结构上的调整问题，监管方面证券发行制度缺乏市场化，政府引导基金的过多参与，监管当局监管不力和监管过度并存等原因。
[Abstract]:Based on the question of whether the capital market needs the participation of venture capital investment, this paper takes the transaction cost theory as the starting point. From the perspective of information economics and reputation, this paper discusses the role of venture capital in the performance of listed companies, and studies the importance of reputation to the function of "information verification" of venture capital. The importance of reputation mechanism to venture capital industry is analyzed. This paper analyzes the relationship between the reputation of venture capital and the performance of listed enterprises by using the data of Chinese securities market. The paper also discusses the reasons why the venture capital industry has no significant influence on the medium and long term performance of listed companies. This paper holds that the existence of venture capital is not only reflected in accelerating the upgrading of industry and the transformation of scientific and technological productive forces, but also in providing an important function of "information verification" for the capital market. Enterprises know their own situation the most, and as investors in the secondary market lack of professional knowledge and sufficient resources to understand the enterprise, it is often difficult to obtain complete information about the enterprise and make rational investment. Based on the existence of this kind of risk, the function of venture capital greatly alleviates the asymmetry of information between investors and listed enterprises in the stock market, and thus leads to adverse selection. In theory, in a securities market, if the reputation mechanism can play a full role, it can be endogenous as follows: first, Companies with VC background will have higher initial and medium-term returns than those with no VC background. Only in this case, venture capitalists can play a positive role in the entire securities market and reputation mechanism can play a role. Secondly, the reputation level of venture capitalists is positively related to the quality of listed enterprises, that is, the performance of venture capitalists with high reputation is better than that of those with medium reputation. This is because, when the reputation mechanism is effective, the reputation of the venture capitalist represents the ability of the venture capitalist, and good venture capitalists are often able to prove the correctness of their predictions of the future development of the enterprise. Can better supervise and promote the healthy development of enterprises. Therefore, the reputation of venture capitalists should be positively related to the quality of issuing enterprises, and only when there is such a relationship, can the degree of information asymmetry between enterprises and investors be reduced. Based on the above views, this paper makes an empirical analysis of the reputation of venture capital in China. The results show that there are significant differences in initial returns of listed companies with or without venture capital, but there is no difference in long-term performance. There is no significant difference in initial returns between firms backed by high-reputation VCs and those supported by low-reputable VCs, but they have better performance in the medium and long term. So, what are the reasons that lead to the weakening of reputation mechanism in venture capital in our country? This paper holds that there are many reasons, such as the adjustment of market structure, the lack of marketization of securities issuance system in supervision, the excessive participation of government-guided funds, the weak supervision and excessive supervision of regulatory authorities, and so on.
【学位授予单位】：上海师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F276.6;F224

【引证文献】