我国民营上市企业经理股票期权激励的实证分析

发布时间：2018-07-03 03:55

本文选题：股票期权 + 民营上市公司　；参考：《首都经济贸易大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：上世纪三十年代中期，经营权与所有权慢慢分离；六十年代中后期，在信息不对称情况下，所有者与经营者的目标出现了不一致；踏入八十年代，随着经济全球化，许多跨国公司开始采用新的薪酬激励模式（即股票期权）以挽留和激励公司的中高层经理人，以统一所有者与经营者的目标；发展到九十年代，，经理股票期权激励制度已成为西方发达国家给予职业经理人的的主要报酬方式并被广泛采用，诸如英国、德国等老牌强国也开始使用股票期权激励这一新兴激励制度。但是，在上世纪末的后期，美国一些跨国公司所出现的财务丑闻让人们对这一制度产生怀疑。上世纪末，全国一些上市企业开始实施经理股票期权激励，限于宏观因素及法律法规的不完善，在实施形式及数量上均达不到预期设想，股票期权激励也无法发挥其应有的作用。相反，却带来诸多恶性事件并影响到了根本的诚信危机。再加上经理股票期权激励本身的设计方面还存在着缺陷，大多数民营上市公司只是将作为一种形式上的激励方案并没有深入惯彻到实际经营中。然而，应客观看待股票期权这一激励手段，将其比做一把“双刃剑”，既要关注其所带来的正面效应，也要重视其负面效应。2006年，我国市场在股权分置改革完成后迎来了转机，相关法律法规得到了健全和完善，正是基于这个原因，本文所选择的民营上市公司都是公布股改后实施股票期权的企业。本文通过对经理股票期权激励进行理论探讨，以我国民营上市公司为研究客体，对国内外文献进行梳理，之后对实施经理股票期权的部分民营上市公司进行实证分析，针对我国民营上市公司实施过程中遇到的一些问题提出相关建议以修正我国民营上市公司实施股票期权激励方面所存在的缺陷并积极推进其的健康发展。
[Abstract]:In the mid-thirties of the last century, the rights of management and ownership were slowly separated; in the mid-and late 1960s, when the information was asymmetrical, the objectives of the owners and the operators were inconsistent; and in the 1980s, with the globalization of the economy, Many multinationals began to adopt a new compensation incentive model (stock options) to retain and motivate the company's middle and senior managers, in order to unify the goals of owners and managers. Executive stock option incentive system has become the main way of reward to professional managers in western developed countries, and has been widely used, such as Britain, Germany and other old powerful countries also began to use stock option incentive this new incentive system. But in the late last century, financial scandals at some U.S. multinationals cast doubt on the system. At the end of last century, some listed enterprises in China began to implement executive stock option incentive, which was limited to macro factors and imperfect laws and regulations, and could not reach the expected expectation in the form and quantity of implementation. Stock option incentive can not play its due role. On the contrary, it has brought many vicious events and affected the fundamental integrity crisis. In addition, there are still some defects in the design of the executive stock option incentive itself. Most private listed companies just take it as a formal incentive scheme and do not get used to the actual operation. However, the stock option should be regarded objectively as a kind of incentive means, and it should be compared as a "double-edged sword". It is necessary to pay attention to both the positive and negative effects brought about by the stock option. In 2006, after the completion of the reform of the split share structure, the market of our country ushered in a turning point. The relevant laws and regulations have been perfected and perfected. For this reason, the private listed companies selected in this paper are the enterprises that implement the stock option after the announcement of the stock reform. This paper makes a theoretical discussion on the incentive of executive stock option, taking the private listed companies as the research object, combing the literature at home and abroad, and then carries on the empirical analysis to some private listed companies that implement the executive stock option. In view of some problems encountered in the implementation of private listed companies in China, this paper puts forward some relevant suggestions in order to correct the defects existing in the implementation of stock option incentives for private listed companies in China and actively promote their healthy development.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F276.6

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