股权分置改革后我国上市公司中小股东权益保护

发布时间：2018-07-13 08:30

【摘要】：股权分置改革之前,证券市场中出现了“一股独大”和“同股不同权”等问题,中小股东的利益经常受到损害。2005年,我国实行了股权分置改革,截止到2007年,股改基本完成。股改后,我国中小股东的权益侵害方式发生了哪些变化,本文通过实证分析加以说明,从理论上提出了我国的监管机构还要注意哪些问题。大小股东间的利益冲突已经成为股权集中公司的核心代理问题。本文从契约理论出发,引出中小股东权益受到严重损害这个问题。本文梳理了国内外中小股东权益保护问题的文献。国内外关于投资者权益保护问题的研究主要从两个方面进行：公司内部治理机制和外部治理机制。然后运用理论分析法,分析了大股东侵害中小股东权益的原因,发现上市公司大股东对上市公司付出的隐性监督服务没有得到补偿是大股东侵害中小股东的主要原因,同时从博弈论的角度分析了大股东对中小股东侵害的市场效应。接下来,建立数学模型,运用主成分分析和回归分析对大股东侵害中小股东权益进行了定量和定性研究,在本篇文章所研究的几个因素中,现金流量占总资产比例对控制权的溢价水平影响最大,随着期末现金流量占总资产比率的增大,控制权溢价水平增大。流通股自然对数和控制权溢价水平成正向变化关系。随着企业规模的扩大,大股东获得的控制权收益越少。股权转让比例和控制权溢价水平正相关。最后,以上市公司的现金流量占总资产的比例为起点,从宏观和微观分析上市公司所处的环境分析,建议有关部门进行有效地激励和监督,促进证券市场蓬勃发展。
[Abstract]:Before the reform of split share structure, there appeared some problems in the stock market, such as "one big share" and "different rights of the same stock", and the interests of the minority shareholders were often damaged. In 2005, China carried out the reform of the split share structure, and by 2007, the reform of the shares was basically completed. After the reform of shares, what changes have taken place in the way of infringing the rights and interests of minority shareholders in our country, this article through the empirical analysis to explain, from the theoretical point of view, the regulatory authorities in our country should pay attention to what problems. The conflict of interest between large and small shareholders has become the core agency problem of equity concentration companies. Starting from the contract theory, this paper leads to the serious damage to the rights and interests of minority shareholders. This article combs the domestic and foreign minority shareholder rights and interests protection question literature. The research on the protection of investors' rights and interests at home and abroad is mainly carried out from two aspects: the internal governance mechanism and the external governance mechanism. Then it analyzes the reason why the large shareholder infringes the rights and interests of the minority shareholders, and finds that the main reason why the majority shareholder infringes on the minority shareholder is that the hidden supervision service paid by the majority shareholder to the listed company has not been compensated. At the same time, this paper analyzes the market effect of large shareholders on minority shareholders from the perspective of game theory. Then, the mathematical model is established, and the principal component analysis and regression analysis are used to study quantitatively and qualitatively the infringement of minority shareholders' rights and interests by large shareholders, among the several factors studied in this paper, The ratio of cash flow to total assets has the greatest influence on the premium level of control right, and with the increase of the ratio of cash flow to total assets at the end of the period, the level of control premium increases. The natural logarithm of circulating shares and the level of control premium change positively. With the expansion of the size of the enterprise, large shareholders gain less income from control. The proportion of equity transfer and the level of control premium are positively related. Finally, starting from the proportion of cash flow to total assets of listed companies, this paper analyzes the environment of listed companies from the macro and micro aspects, and suggests that relevant departments should effectively encourage and supervise the securities market to promote the vigorous development of the securities market.
【学位授予单位】：郑州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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