股权分置改革影响控股股东持现偏好吗？

发布时间：2018-07-13 21:51

【摘要】：现有关于现金持有水平影响因素的研究主要集中在公司特征、行业特征、宏观经济因素等方面,关于决策者特征因素还存在很多研究空间。尤其是在股权分置改革对主要决策者(控股股东)的行为产生深刻影响的情况下,这种影响是否改变了控股股东在现金持有行为上的特点?目前尚没有学者研究这个问题,本文试图对这一问题进行回答。本文从表层股权结构角度,以股权分置改革事件为起因,以上市公司现金持有行为作为观察媒介,研究了控股股东现金积累偏好在股权分置改革前后的差异,研究结论同时为股权分置改革成效的研究和代理问题在现金持有行为中的作用研究提供了新的实证证据支持。本文采用实证研究方法,以第一大股东作为控股股东的代表,以第一大股东持股比例、第一大股东是否控股为第一大股东的特征变量,以股改事件的发生与否与发生时间为股权分置改革的特征变量,考察了第一大股东对现金持有水平的影响在股改前后的变化。研究结论表明,非国有企业控股股东的现金积累偏好在股改后明显减弱,而国有企业前后没有明显变化。在样本构建上,本文以截至2011年底完成股权分置改革的(以对价股票上市为标识)、满足一定条件的788家上市公司为研究样本,以2004年到2011年作为时间窗口,得到6304个观察值,构建了一个对特定研究对象的持续观察实验。开展实证研究的主要思路是分组对比研究,包括按照股权性质分组(各组通过设置交叉变量来实现对股改前后差异的考察),按照股改批次分组,分别采用组间比较分析、多元线型回归分析进行研究,并设计了多角度的稳健性检验验证结论的可靠性。本文结构安排如下。第一部分是绪论。首先介绍本文研究的理论和制度背景、提出本文所要回答的问题；继而对已有理论基础与实证研究成果进行回顾；最后在此基础上提出本文的研究思路及创新点。第二部分是理论分析和假设推导。该部分首先对相关理论进行分析,随后按照股权性质、股改批次分组分别进行了本文主要观点的推导,由此得到本文的五个假设。第三部分是实证研究设计过程,包括模型雏形构建、模型中各类变量的选取及定义、样本的选取及分析所用数据来源的说明。第四部分是实证检验主体部分。首先按照股权性质将全部观察值分成国有样本和非国有样本,分别检验股权分置改革对第一大股东作用的效果；再按照股改批次将全部观察值分成7个处在不同股改阶段的子样本,构建模型对不区分股权性质的混合样本进行回归分析,检验股改前后控股股东现金偏好的变化。第五部分是稳健性检验。首先改变对股改事件的计量方法,结论保持不变,证明主体部分的检验方法是稳健的；其次改变判定第一大股东是否达到控制的标准,结果发现,在设置不同标准的情况下,结论有差异,由此指出,我们可以说第一大股东持股比例是否达到某种程度,公司现金持有水平将产生显著区别,但是无法绝对地说当第一大股东是否达到控制,公司现金持有水平会显著不同,因为单凭第一大股东持股比例无法严格推导出其是否控股；再次改变现金持有比率的计量方法,重新检验全部假设,结果表明上述结论是稳健的。第六部分是对全文的总结与反思,指出本文可以重新以大股东解禁为标志性事件,继续研究其对控股股东现金偏好的影响。同时,本文虽然研究了控股股东代理问题对现金持有的影响,但是仅仅在表层股权结构层面,并没有涉及终极控制人。
[Abstract]:The existing research on the factors affecting the level of cash holdings is mainly focused on the characteristics of the company, the industry characteristics and the macroeconomic factors. There are still many research spaces on the characteristic factors of the decision-makers, especially if the reform of the share ownership reform has a profound influence on the main decision-makers (controlling shareholders). The characteristics of controlling shareholders in cash holding behavior have changed. At present, no scholar has studied this problem. This paper attempts to answer this question.
This paper, from the angle of the surface ownership structure, takes the split share reform event as the cause, and takes the cash holding behavior of the listed company as the observation medium, and studies the difference between the cash accumulation preference of the controlling shareholders before and after the reform of the share share, and the research conclusions are also the research on the effectiveness of the split share reform and the agency problem in the cash holding behavior. The research provides new empirical evidence support.
Taking the first big shareholder as the representative of the controlling shareholder, this paper takes the first big shareholder as the shareholding ratio, and whether the first big shareholder is the characteristic variable of the first large shareholder or not, taking the occurrence and the occurrence time of the stock reform as the characteristic variable of the split share reform, inspects the level of the first big shareholder to the cash holding level. The results show that the cash accumulation preference of the controlling shareholders of non-state-owned enterprises is obviously weakened after the stock reform, and there is no obvious change in the state-owned enterprises before and after the stock reform.
On the basis of the sample construction, this paper, by the end of 2011, completed the split share reform (which is marked by the listed stock market), and 788 listed companies that meet certain conditions as the research samples, and get 6304 observation values from 2004 to 2011 as the time window, and build a continuous observation experiment on the specific research object.
The main idea of carrying out the empirical study is group comparison research, including the grouping of stock ownership in accordance with the ownership nature (each group sets cross variables to study the difference before and after the stock reform). According to the group of stock reform batch, the intergroup comparison analysis, multiple linear regression analysis are used respectively, and the multi angle robustness test verification node is designed. The reliability of the theory.
The structure of this article is arranged as follows.
The first part is the introduction. First, it introduces the theoretical and institutional background of this study, puts forward the questions to be answered in this paper, and then reviews the existing theoretical basis and empirical research results, and finally puts forward the research ideas and innovation points on this basis.
The second part is the theoretical analysis and hypothesis derivation. This part first analyzes the relevant theories, and then according to the nature of the stock right, the main points of this paper are derived from the group of stock reform batches, thus the five hypotheses of this paper are obtained.
The third part is the design process of the empirical research, including the prototype of the model, the selection and definition of various variables in the model, the selection of samples and the explanation of the data sources used in the analysis.
The fourth part is the main part of the empirical test. First, the whole observation value is divided into state-owned and non-state-owned samples according to the nature of equity, and the effect of the split share reform on the role of the first major shareholders is examined respectively. Then the whole observation value is divided into 7 sub samples in different stages of the stock reform in accordance with the stock reform batch. The mixed sample of the right nature is used to conduct regression analysis to test the change of cash preference of controlling shareholders before and after the reform.
The fifth part is the robustness test. First, change the measurement method of the stock reform event, the conclusion remains the same, it proves that the test method of the main part is robust; secondly, it changes the standard of deciding whether the first big shareholder can reach the control, and the result is that the conclusion is different under the circumstances of setting different standards, so we can say that we can say the first. If the share ratio of large shareholders reaches a certain degree, the level of corporate cash holding will have a significant difference, but it is impossible to say that the level of cash holding will be significantly different when the first largest shareholder is controlled or not, because the holding ratio of the first largest shareholder can not be strictly deduced, and the cash holding ratio will be changed again. The method of measuring the rate and re testing all the hypotheses show that the above conclusion is robust.
The sixth part is the summary and reflection of the full text. It is pointed out that this article can continue to study the influence on the cash preference of the controlling shareholders by taking the big shareholders' ban as the landmark event again. At the same time, this paper has studied the influence of the controlling shareholder's agency problem on the cash holdings, but only on the surface ownership structure, it does not involve the ultimate control. Make people.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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