控制权配置视角下上市公司股权激励偏好的财富效应研究

发布时间：2018-07-14 18:42

【摘要】：在现代企业制度中，股权激励作为一种有效的长期激励机制，受到越来越多的关注。然而，在我国上市公司的实践中，实施股权激励的公司，实施效果不尽相同，其中包含很多公司中途取消股权激励方案及实施后导致公司业绩下滑的案例。那么，现阶段股权激励偏好是否能为公司带来正的财富效应？上市公司对股权激励计划存在选择性，是否与公司的控制权配置有关？本文围绕上述两个问题，以2006-2011年深沪两市主板市场及中小企业板的上市公司作为研究对象，并剔除ST、SST、*ST公司、同时发行A股和B股的公司、金融类和数据残缺的公司的上市公司，首先对公告股权激励方案的样本公司采用事件研究法，，通过选取不同的事件窗口，检验了股权激励偏好的财富效应；其次，对筛选后的所有上市公司作为研究样本，运用实证研究法检验了控制权配置和股权激励偏好之间的关系。研究结果表明：(1)股权激励偏好能够产生显著为正的短期财富效应，即能够提高公司的价值；(2)控制权配置会显著影响股权激励偏好。其中，实际控制人性质是民企的上市公司股权激励偏好高；第一大股东控制力强的上市公司股权激励偏好低；两职合一的上市公司股权激励偏好高；股权集中度、高管持股比例高的上市公司股权激励偏好高。因此，从本文的研究结果看出，不同的控制权配置形式导致了公司对股权激励的偏好不同，我国需建立健全与股权激励相关的法律法规，规范资本市场；上市公司需完善公司内部治理结构，结合自身实际情况制定科学合理的股权激励计划。
[Abstract]:In modern enterprise system, equity incentive, as an effective long-term incentive mechanism, has received more and more attention. However, in the practice of listed companies in China, the implementation effect of equity incentive companies is not the same. So, can equity incentive preference bring positive wealth effect to the company at this stage? The listed company has the selectivity to the stock right incentive plan, whether has to do with the company's control right disposition? This paper focuses on the above two problems, taking the listed companies of the main board market and the SME board of Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2011 as the research objects, and excluding the St companies, the companies that issue A shares and B shares at the same time, the listed companies of financial and data incomplete companies, and the listed companies of the listed companies, which are listed in the main board market and the SME board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2011. First of all, we use the event research method to test the wealth effect of equity incentive preference by selecting different event windows. Secondly, we select all the listed companies as the research samples. The relationship between control allocation and equity incentive preference is tested by empirical research. The results show that: (1) equity incentive preference can produce a significantly positive short-term wealth effect, that is, it can improve the value of the company; (2) the allocation of control rights will significantly affect the equity incentive preference. Among them, the nature of the actual controller is the high preference for equity incentive of listed companies in private enterprises; the low preference for equity incentives of listed companies with strong controlling power of the first largest shareholder; the high preference for equity incentives of listed companies with two positions in one; the degree of equity concentration. The stock incentive preference of listed companies with high proportion of senior managers is high. Therefore, from the research results of this paper, it can be seen that different forms of control rights allocation lead to different preference for equity incentive. China needs to establish and perfect the laws and regulations related to equity incentive and standardize the capital market. Listed companies need to perfect their internal governance structure and formulate a scientific and reasonable equity incentive plan according to their own actual situation.
【学位授予单位】：燕山大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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