中国上市公司控制权结构与公司现金持有水平的关系研究

发布时间：2018-07-16 23:05

【摘要】：作为一种资本，现金的流动性很强，资本成本很低，往往是经营者面临投资机会时的首选；作为一种资产，现金的收益率很低，而且当公司持有过量现金时，易出现管理层过度投资或利用现金剩余控制权谋取私利的代理风险。因此，保持合理的现金持有水平不仅是一项重要的财务决策，更是提高公司治理效率、改善公司绩效的关键。当最佳的持有水平出现时，企业保留的现金不仅可以满足正常经营需要，更能带来较高的收益水平，经营和投资的综合收益将达到最大。过低的现金持有水平将不能满足企业经营和投资需要，企业将承担较高的交易和融资成本；过高的现金持有水平则会导致较高的代理成本，出现管理层滥用风险。目前，我国现金持有水平总体上过高，远高于欧美等发达国家的现金持有水平，存在着较高的代理成本，因此，有必要对影响我国现金持有的各项因素加以深入研究，以寻求降低现金持有水平的途径，构建最佳的现金持有量模型。目前关于公司现金持有的理论假说主要有四种：动机理论、融资优序理论、交易权衡理论和代理理论，前三者主要是基于经济学的视角，代理理论则是从公司治理的行为方面考虑现金持有水平。现金持有水平的主要影响因素包括财务特征、股权制衡、董事会制衡、经理层制衡、外部治理环境和外部竞争环境等。从公司治理的角度来讲，财务特征、外部治理环境、外部竞争环境等都是不可控因素，而股权制衡、董事会制衡和经理层制衡等控制权结构因素是可控因素，因此，本文将基于现金持有的代理理论，研究股权制衡、董事会制衡、经理层制衡等控制权结构因素与现金持有水平之间的相关关系。通过对2008～2010三年间深市A股上市公司现金持有水平样本数据的研究，本文力图解决三个问题：第一，，不同的公司控制权结构对现金持有水平有何影响;第二，在不同的行业中，公司控制权结构对现金持有水平的影响有何不同；第三，在不同的现金持有水平下，公司控制权结构与现金持有水平的影响有何不同。通过对样本数据的实证研究，笔者得出以下结论：第一，在影响现金持有的控制权结构因素中，前五大股东持股比例、经理层持股比例、董事长与总经理两职合一与现金持有水平呈正相关关系，股权属性、独立董事占比、董事会规模与现金持有水平呈负相关关系。第二，不同行业中，各控制权结构因素与现金持有水平的相关关系与样本总体不完全一致：在制造业中，独立董事占比与现金持有水平之间呈正相关关系，与样本总体不一致；在信息技术、批发零售和房地产业中，各控制权结构因素与现金持有水平之间的相关关系方向与样本总体完全一致；而在其他行业中，股权属性、两职合一与现金持有水平之间的相关关系方向与样本总体不一致。第三，不同现金持有水平下，决定现金持有量的关键控制权结构因素是不相同的：当现金持有水平50%时，前五大股东持股比例和独立董事占比是影响现金持有的最主要因素；当24%现金持有水平50%时，经理层持股比例和独立董事占比是影响现金持有的最主要的因素；当现金持有水平24%时，前五大股东持股比例和股权属性是影响现金持有的最主要因素。最后，笔者提出了完善股权制衡、董事会制衡等控制权结构和确立目标现金流量的建议。
[Abstract]:As a kind of capital, the liquidity of cash is very strong and the cost of capital is very low, which is often the first choice when the operator faces the opportunity of investment. As an asset, the yield of cash is very low. And when the company holds excess cash, it is easy to have the agency risk of overinvestment in management or use the residual control of cash to seek private interest. The level of cash holding is not only an important financial decision, but also the key to improve the efficiency of corporate governance and improve the performance of the company. When the best holding level appears, the cash retained by the enterprise can not only meet the normal operation needs, but also bring a higher income level, and the comprehensive income of management and investment will reach the maximum. The level of cash holding will not meet the business and investment needs of the enterprise, and the enterprise will bear higher transaction and financing costs; high cash holding level will lead to higher agency cost and risk of abuse of management. At present, the level of cash holding in China is generally high, far higher than the level of cash holding in developed countries such as Europe and the United States and Europe. There is a high agency cost, so it is necessary to study all the factors that affect our cash holdings in order to find the way to reduce the level of cash holding and to build the best model of cash holdings.
There are four main theoretical hypotheses about corporate cash holding: motivation theory, optimal financing order theory, trade trade-offs theory and agency theory. The first three are mainly based on the economic perspective, and the agency theory considers the level of cash holding from the behavior of corporate governance. The main factors affecting the level of cash holding include financial special factors. In terms of corporate governance, the financial characteristics, external governance environment and external competitive environment are all uncontrollable factors, and the control power structure factors such as the balance of equity, the balance of the board of directors and the balance of the management and balance are the controllable factors. Based on the agency theory of cash holding, the paper will study the relationship between control power structure factors and cash holding level, such as equity balance, balance of board of directors, and balance of managers.
Through the study of the sample data of the cash holding level of A shares listed companies in Shenzhen in 2008~2010 and three years, this paper tries to solve three problems: first, how does different corporate control structure affect the level of cash holding; second, in different industries, the influence of corporate control structure on the level of cash holdings is different; third, Under different cash holding levels, what is the difference between the structure of corporate control and the level of cash holdings?
Through the empirical study of sample data, the author draws the following conclusions: first, among the factors that affect the control structure of cash holdings, the proportion of the top five shareholders, the ratio of the managers and the chairman and the general manager two are positively related to the level of cash holdings, the ownership property, the independent board ratio, the board scale and the cash. Second, in different industries, the relationship between the structure factors of control rights and the level of cash holding is not exactly the same as the sample. In the manufacturing industry, there is a positive correlation between the proportion of independent directors and the level of cash holding, which is not consistent with the sample. In information technology, wholesale and retail and real estate industry, The relationship between the structural factors of control rights and the level of cash holding is in full agreement with the sample. In other industries, the relationship between the ownership property, the two position one and the cash holding level is not consistent with the sample. Third, the key control of cash holdings is determined under different cash holding levels. The weight structure factor is different: when the cash holding level is 50%, the top five shareholders' shareholding ratio and the independent director's ratio are the most important factors affecting cash holdings; when the 24% cash holding level is 50%, the ratio of managerial ownership and the proportion of independent directors is the most important factor affecting cash holding; when the level of cash holding is 24%, The proportion of the top five shareholders and the ownership property are the most important factors that affect the cash holdings. Finally, the author puts forward some suggestions on the control structure of the balance of equity, the balance of the board of directors and the establishment of the cash flow of the target.
【学位授予单位】：天津商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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