机构投资者、高管薪酬与公司业绩的关系研究

发布时间：2018-07-23 16:34

【摘要】：自20世纪80年代末,西方国家开始兴起机构投资者股东积极主义,机构投资者开始放弃华尔街准则,他们不再采取“逃离劣质公司”的方式,简单地把股票卖掉,,而是逐渐转变为积极地参与和改进公司治理。2004年,《国务院关于推进资本市场改革开放和稳定发展的若干意见》将“鼓励合规资金入市,大力发展机构投资者”作为促进资本市场稳定发展的一项重要政策,随后,机构投资者不断发展壮大。机构投资者作为上市公司控股股东和个人股东之间的第三方力量,相对于个人投资者具备规模、信息和人员优势,能够克服个人投资者在公司治理上的“搭便车”问题,从而改善公司治理水平。积极参与管理层业绩的评价和薪酬制度设计,是机构投资者参与公司治理的主要方式,因此机构投资者的介入,必将对上市公司高管薪酬和公司业绩产生影响。基于此,本文在前人研究的基础上,提出机构投资者、高管薪酬与公司业绩三者相互关系的问题。本文采用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方式,以2008-2010年机构投资者重仓持股的316家上市公司为研究样本,利用面板数据模型,对机构投资者、高管薪酬与公司业绩三者关系进行了研究,结论发现机构投资者持股与上市公司业绩正相关,与高管薪酬正相关,机构投资者能够参与制定上市公司薪酬计划,通过合理的薪酬激励,提高公司业绩。在不同类型机构投资者的作用下,其薪酬激励的有效性不同。通过对机构投资者、高管薪酬与公司业绩三者关系的研究,发现机构投资者有助于解决上市公司委托代理问题,降低代理成本,提高薪酬激励有效性,进而提高公司业绩,改善公司治理水平。因此,扩大机构投资者规模,优化机构投资者结构,对于完善上市公司治理状况有积极的促进作用。
[Abstract]:Since the late 1980s, institutional investor shareholder activism has emerged in the West, institutional investors have abandoned Wall Street norms and have stopped "running away from inferior companies". In 2004, the State Council's views on promoting the reform and opening up of the capital market and the stable development of the capital market will "encourage compliance funds to enter the market." As an important policy to promote the stable development of capital market, institutional investors continue to develop. As a third party force between controlling shareholders and individual shareholders of listed companies, institutional investors have the advantages of scale, information and personnel to overcome the problem of "hitchhiking" in the corporate governance of individual investors. To improve the level of corporate governance. Active participation in the evaluation of management performance and the design of compensation system is the main way for institutional investors to participate in corporate governance. Therefore, the involvement of institutional investors will definitely have an impact on executive compensation and corporate performance of listed companies. Based on this, this paper puts forward the relationship among institutional investors, executive compensation and corporate performance on the basis of previous studies. In this paper, by combining normative research with empirical research, 316 listed companies with heavy positions held by institutional investors from 2008 to 2010 are used as research samples, and panel data model is used to analyze institutional investors. The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance is studied. It is found that institutional investors' shareholding is positively related to listed companies' performance and executive compensation is positively correlated. Institutional investors can participate in making compensation plans of listed companies. Improve the performance of the company through reasonable salary incentive. Under the action of different types of institutional investors, the effectiveness of compensation incentive is different. Through the study of the relationship among institutional investors, executive compensation and corporate performance, it is found that institutional investors can help to solve the principal-agent problem of listed companies, reduce agency costs, improve the effectiveness of compensation incentives, and then improve corporate performance. Improve corporate governance. Therefore, expanding the scale of institutional investors and optimizing the structure of institutional investors have a positive role in improving the governance of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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