行业环境、资本结构与管理层激励
发布时间：2018-08-26 20:37
【摘要】：委托代理理论认为给予管理者一定的激励，能促进管理者的目标与股东目标的一致，有利于解决两权分离带来的委托代理问题，以有效的激励管理者努力工作，，以最大化公司价值。本文正是基于此对我国上市公司管理层激励问题进行研究。 本文的研究路径是:首先对管理层激励理论进行回顾，并在此基础上分析管理层激励影响因素;其次讨论行业环境，资本结构对管理层激励的影响;再次对我国上市公司管理层激励问题进行实证研究;最后根据研究结果提出建议。 针对我国上市公司管理层激励问题，本文在理论分析的基础上，对我国上市公司2008-2010年度管理层激励与资本结构关系进行实证研究，得到的主要结论是:资源丰度与资本结构的交互影响与激励强度负相关;复杂性与资本结构的交互影响与激励强度正相关;动态性与资本结构的交互影响与激励强度正相关。 本文的创新点，主要体现在用行业环境与资本结构的交互作用去解释管理层激励。本文通过理论分析和实证研究找出在不同环境下与资本结构相适应的管理层激励模式，试图为解决我国上市公司管理层激励问题提供帮助。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent theory holds that giving managers a certain incentive can promote the consistency between managers' goals and shareholders' goals, and help to solve the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of two rights, so as to effectively motivate managers to work hard. To maximize company value. This paper is based on this to study the management incentive of listed companies in China. The research path of this paper is as follows: firstly, review the theory of management incentive, and then analyze the influencing factors of management incentive, then discuss the influence of industry environment and capital structure on management incentive. Thirdly, the paper makes an empirical study on the management incentive problem of listed companies in China, and finally puts forward some suggestions according to the research results. On the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between management incentive and capital structure of Chinese listed companies in 2008-2010. The main conclusions are as follows: the interaction between resource abundance and capital structure is negatively related to incentive intensity, the interaction between complexity and capital structure is positively related to incentive intensity, and the interaction between resource abundance and capital structure is positively related to incentive intensity. The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the interaction between industry environment and capital structure to explain management incentives. Through theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper tries to find out the management incentive model which is suitable for capital structure under different circumstances, and tries to provide help to solve the problem of management incentive of listed companies in China.
【学位授予单位】：新疆财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51
本文编号：2206086
[Abstract]:The principal-agent theory holds that giving managers a certain incentive can promote the consistency between managers' goals and shareholders' goals, and help to solve the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of two rights, so as to effectively motivate managers to work hard. To maximize company value. This paper is based on this to study the management incentive of listed companies in China. The research path of this paper is as follows: firstly, review the theory of management incentive, and then analyze the influencing factors of management incentive, then discuss the influence of industry environment and capital structure on management incentive. Thirdly, the paper makes an empirical study on the management incentive problem of listed companies in China, and finally puts forward some suggestions according to the research results. On the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between management incentive and capital structure of Chinese listed companies in 2008-2010. The main conclusions are as follows: the interaction between resource abundance and capital structure is negatively related to incentive intensity, the interaction between complexity and capital structure is positively related to incentive intensity, and the interaction between resource abundance and capital structure is positively related to incentive intensity. The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the interaction between industry environment and capital structure to explain management incentives. Through theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper tries to find out the management incentive model which is suitable for capital structure under different circumstances, and tries to provide help to solve the problem of management incentive of listed companies in China.
【学位授予单位】：新疆财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51
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