公司治理、制度环境与中国上市公司大股东的“掏空”

发布时间：2018-08-28 15:45

【摘要】：本文研究了所有权结构、董事会和地区制度环境与大股东掏空的关系,并研究了大股东的性质对所有权结构、董事会和地区制度环境这些公司治理特征的治理效果的调节效应。研究发现,大股东的确对其他公司治理特征的治理效果起着调节效应。具体地,在民营企业中,第一大股东的持股比例和地区市场化指数都和大股东掏空显著负相关,董事会的财务背景和法律背景都和大股东掏空显著正相关,董事会的政治背景和大股东掏空不显著相关；在地方国有企业中,第一大股东的持股比例、地区市场化指数、董事会的财务背景和法律背景和大股东掏空不显著相关,董事长和总经理的政治背景和大股东掏空显著正相关。本文从理论和实践两个层面都做出了一定的贡献。理论层面上,第一,本文重点探讨了大股东性质在公司治理中的作用,发现大股东的性质对所有权比例、制度环境、董事会等其他公司治理特征的治理效果有调节效应。这不仅解释了以往文献对这三个公司治理特征的治理效果的结论的不一致性,而且说明了大股东的性质在了解公司治理效果时很重要,应该引起学者更多的关注。第二,本文采用了一种新的方法来衡量董事会的治理特征,发现董事会的职业背景和政治背景能够解释大股东掏空行为,这不仅有助于深入了解董事会的治理效果,而且扩展了研究方法。实践层面上,本文的实证分析有几个重要的发现。一是民营企业和地方国有企业有着不同的公司层面的治理机制,这种公司治理层面的不同验证了民营企业和地方政府激励机制的不同,二是外部环境约束对于民营企业和地方政府有着不同的约束力,因此,对于中央政府而言,既要坚持推动市场化发展,赋予证监会更多的行政监督权力,又要致力于政府体制的改革,从根源上抑制企业大股东的掏空。三是董事的执业能力由于董事的不独立性,不仅没有对大股东的掏空起到抑制作用,反而可能成为大股东掏空的“帮凶”。这点应该引起股民和监管层的高度注意。在聘用董事时,不能仅仅关注董事执业能力的光环,而是要重点考察董事的独立性。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the relationship between ownership structure, board of directors and regional institutional environment and the tunneling of large shareholders, and studies the regulatory effects of the nature of large shareholders on the governance effects of corporate governance characteristics such as ownership structure, board of directors and regional institutional environment. It is found that large shareholders do regulate the governance effects of other corporate governance characteristics. Specifically, in private enterprises, the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and the regional marketization index are negatively correlated with the large shareholder tunneling, and the financial background and legal background of the board of directors are significantly positively related to the large shareholder tunneling. There is no significant correlation between the political background of the board of directors and the tunneling of the major shareholders; in the local state-owned enterprises, the proportion of the largest shareholders, the regional marketization index, the financial background and the legal background of the board of directors are not significantly related to the tunneling of the major shareholders. The political background of the chairman and the general manager is significantly positively related to the hollowing of major shareholders. This article has made certain contribution from the theory and the practice two aspects. On the theoretical level, first, this paper focuses on the role of the nature of large shareholders in corporate governance, and finds that the nature of large shareholders has a regulatory effect on the governance effects of ownership ratio, institutional environment, board of directors and other corporate governance characteristics. This not only explains the inconsistency of the previous literature on the governance effect of these three corporate governance characteristics, but also shows that the nature of the large shareholders is very important in understanding the corporate governance effect, and should be paid more attention to by scholars. Secondly, this paper adopts a new method to measure the governance characteristics of the board of directors. It is found that the professional background and political background of the board of directors can explain the hollowing behavior of the major shareholders, which is not only helpful to understand the governance effect of the board of directors deeply. Moreover, the research method is expanded. On the practical level, the empirical analysis of this paper has several important findings. First, private enterprises and local state-owned enterprises have different corporate governance mechanisms, which verify the different incentive mechanisms between private enterprises and local governments. Second, external environmental constraints have different binding forces on private enterprises and local governments. Therefore, as far as the central government is concerned, it is necessary to persist in promoting market-oriented development and endow the CSRC with more administrative supervision powers. We should also devote ourselves to the reform of government system and restrain the emptying of large shareholders of enterprises from the root. Third, the director's practice ability, because of the director's independence, not only does not play a restraining role to the large shareholder's tunneling, but may become the "accomplice" of the large shareholder's tunneling. This should attract the attention of shareholders and regulators. When hiring directors, we should not only pay attention to the aura of directors' practicing ability, but also focus on the independence of directors.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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