创业板上市公司股权结构与公司绩效关系的研究
发布时间：2018-09-07 08:21
【摘要】：经过十年的孕育,我国的创业板市场终于于2009年10月诞生,截止到2012年3月1日,有291家企业先后在创业板上市,开始成为中国资本市场上的一支新生力量,创业板的快速发展使得创业板上市公司成为多方关注的焦点。企业在创业板上市以后,股权会逐渐分散,所有权与经营权开始分离,股东与管理层的代理关系也突显,代理问题也随之产生,因此对企业的经营绩效进行合理的评价就显得越来越为重要。了解到这些上市公司经营绩效的同时,也有越来越多的人也开始关注哪些因素对这些创业板上市公司绩效产生影响,根据以往的研究经验,企业的股权结构是研究公司绩效影响因素的一个热点研究问题。 关于股权结构与公司绩效的关系的研究,国内学者主要针对的是主板市场上市公司或者中小板上市公司,专门针对我国创业板上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的关系进行研究的文章非常地少。相对于主板市场的上公司,创业板上市公司的股权结构有其特殊性,创业板上市公司在股权结构上和主板市场的最大区别就是企业高级管理人员的持股比例很高,第一大股东都是自然人股东或者最终由自然人控股的法人股东,且这些自然人均在企业担任高级管理人员,企业的大股东与企业的高级管理人员的利益是一致的。 本文将选取深圳证券交易所创业板块2010年底前上市的153家公司作为研究样本。整篇文章分为两大部分：文章的前半部分,首先对股权结构问题的理论基础-委托代理理论以及利益相关者理论进行了阐述,阐明了股权结构如何通过企业的治理结构对企业的经营绩效发挥影响作用,并找到国外和国内相关的文献,从股权的性质和股权集中度的角度分别评述了这些已有的研究文献。接着,介绍了创业板及其创业板上市公司股权结构的特点,以及与主板和中小板企业的股权结构的异同；文章的后半部分采用实证分析的方法,选取股权结构的替代指标作为自变量,选取公司经营绩效的替代变量作为因变量,收集样本公司的数据,通过构建模型进行描述性分析、相关性分析和回归分析,指出了创业板上市公司的股权结构特点与创业板上市公司经营绩效之间有着怎么样的因果关系,并在文章最后提出相关的政策建议,指出本文存在的不足之处。 本文通过实证研究得出以下的研究结论： 1.国有股与创业板公司的经营绩效成微弱的负相关关系,但是系数并没有通过显著性检验：理论上国有股参与公司治理的低效率使国有股的持股比例与公司绩效成负相关关系,在创业板上市公司中,由于国有股本身所占的比重非常少,并不对创业板上市公司的公司绩效构成显著的影响。 2.法人股与创业板公司的经营绩效的关系不明显：一方面,与国有股相比,法人股使用的是自己的资本,这些法人股东为了谋求自己所投资资本的增值,有动力去监督企业的管理者的行为,与自然人股东进行比较,法人股股东更为理性,这些法人股东自身具有丰富的管理经验,会帮助所投资的公司进行更好的运作；另一方面,这些法人股东仍然谋求的是自身利益的最大化而非上市公司利益的最大化,所以法人股东可能从事有利于自己但损害上市公司利益的活动,从而会给上市公司带来负面效应,冲抵法人股东对公司绩效的正面效应,由于法人股东正反两个方面的作用,从而导致检验结果不显著。 3.高管股与创业板公司的经营绩效成显著的正相关关系：企业的高级管理人员是企业发展的重要力量,高级管理人员是否努力工作关系到企业业绩效益的好坏,上市公司让高级管理人员持股就把高管的个人利益同企业的整体利益、与股东的利益捆绑到了一起,采取这种股权激励机制的方法能够促使他们关注企业的长期发展,有利于企业的业绩的提高；再者,创业板上市公司的股权控制人很多都担任着企业的高级管理人员,这些控股股东的利益是与企业的利益一致的,当然愿意尽自己最大的努力提高公司的经营绩效。 4.流通股与创业板公司的经营绩效成显著的负相关关系： 流通股的持有者多为个人股东,分布极为零散,这些流通股东存在“搭便车”的现象,他们既没有积极性也没有能力参与企业的治理,企业的流通股比例的提高,意味着企业的股权的分散程度变得越大,而分散的股权结构安排下会产生两种问题：一是股东对企业的管理者的监督能力就会减弱,二是股东对企业的管理者的监督的积极性也很弱,因此对企业的经营绩效产生负面的影响。 5.股权集中度与创业板公司的经营绩效成正相关关系： 一方面当大股东持股比例上升时,大股东自身的利益与公司的利益结合的紧密度就增加,公司经营的好与不好会对公司的大股东发挥很大的作用,这个时候由于大股东利益与公司利益的趋同,大股东就更有动力去监督管理层,有效解决委托代理问题,尽自己最大的努力来提升公司的经营绩效；另一方面,在我国创业板企业中,第一大股东往往会自己担当起企业的经营管理者的角色,主持企业的日常事务,由于自己亲自担当管理者会大大地降低因为股东和管理者分离而带来的委托代理链的长度,避免了委托代理的问题,由于此时的管理者就是企业的所有者,两者在本质上是统一的,因此两者此时此刻追求的目标是一致的,这种情况下,企业的股东不需要刻意去监督管理者的各种行为,因为在共同利益的驱使下管理者都会自觉地追求股东利益的最大化,从而有利于提高企业的绩效。 纵观上述研究,本文主要在以下几个方面具有自己的特点： 1.文章选择的视角比较新颖,由于创业板刚刚在我国资本市场成立不久时间,是我国的资本市场的新兴板块,截止到现在,对于股权结构与公司绩效两者关系的研究,国内很多学者还没有研究到创业板块来,大多数学者都是针对沪深主板和深圳中小板上市公司来进行研究(王燕和许小年(1997),张红军(2000),陈晓、江东(2000),陈小悦和徐晓东(2001)等),本文的研究是在国内外很多已有文献的基础上,选择创业板上市公司作为研究的视角,研究创业板上市公司的股权结构,研究创业板上市公司的股权结构与企业经营效率和业绩之间关系,一方面作为以往研究的补充,另一方面也为创业板上市公司的股权结构的优化提供一定的经验数据。2.在实证研究部分,本文没有采用托宾Q值作为考察公司绩效的衡量指标,因为托宾Q值的使用必须具备一个前提条件,即资本市场是有效的,资产的价格能够完全反映各种信息,所以使用托宾Q值作为企业经营绩效的衡量指标的外国文献居多,如：Morek、shleifer和Vishmy(1988)、McConnell和Servae (1990)等。国内有些学者也使用了托宾Q值作为研究的变量(孙永祥、黄祖辉(1999)、张红军(2000)、俞晓明(2003)),但是本文认为我国的资本市场发展还不健全,使用托宾Q值来衡量企业的绩效显得有些不合适,本文采用的是财务会计指标,国内很多学者使用都是财务会计指标,陈晓、江东(2000)使用了净资产收益率和主营业务利润率来代表企业的经营绩效,吴淑琨(2002)使用总资产利润率来衡量企业的经营绩效,魏乐(2010年)使用的是主营业务利润率指标,王玲(2010)使用的是净资产收益率(ROE)、核心业务资产收益率(CROA)和每股收益(EPS)三个指标综合考虑中小板企业的经营绩效。本文的研究立足于创业板这个视角,在用反映企业整体盈利能力的每股收益(EPS)作为公司经营绩效的基础上,从财务管理的角度出发,用企业的每股经营活动净现金流量(CPPS)来作为公司绩效的另外一个替代指标,至于为什么要选择这个指标很大程度上是因为每股经营净现金流能够反映企业赚取现金流的能力,同时在模型中适度引入资产负债率、公司规模等作为控制变变量。 3.在股权性质的划分上本文考虑到创业板上上市公司股权结构的特殊性,并没有像以往学者(陈晓、江东(2000)等)一样将股权性质直接划分为国有股、法人股和流通股,由后面的统计分析我们可以看出主板市场高管持股比例仅为0.74%,中小板上市公司的高管持股比例为12.83%,但是创业板上市公司的高管持股比例却高达32.07%,高管持股比例对公司的绩效有非常显著的相关性关系,因此特意加入了高管持持股比例这一指标,和其他三个指标一起作为股权结构的替代变量,更具全面性。在股权集中度的指标选择上,本文也并没有像以往学者一样把Z指数单独做为股权制衡度的指标(樊丽红(2007),陈德萍、陈永圣(2011)等),而是和CR1指标和H5指一起作为股权集中度的替代变量,并且得出Z指数与创业板上市公司的绩效成微弱的正相关关系。
[Abstract]:After ten years of gestation, China's GEM market was finally born in October 2009. By March 1, 2012, 291 enterprises had listed on the GEM, and began to become a new force in China's capital market. The rapid development of GEM has made the listed companies on GEM become the focus of attention. After that, the ownership will be gradually dispersed, the ownership and management rights will begin to separate, the agency relationship between shareholders and management will be highlighted, and the agency problem will also arise. Therefore, it is more and more important to evaluate the performance of the enterprise rationally. Note which factors have an impact on the performance of these GEM listed companies. According to previous research experience, the ownership structure of enterprises is a hot issue in the study of influencing factors of corporate performance.
Domestic scholars mainly study the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance of Listed Companies in the main board market or listed companies on the small and medium-sized board. The biggest difference between GEM listed companies and the main board market is that the proportion of senior managers is very high. The first largest shareholders are natural shareholders or legal shareholders ultimately controlled by natural persons, and these natural individuals are senior managers in the enterprise, enterprises. The interests of large shareholders are consistent with those of senior managers.
This article will select 153 companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange before the end of 2010 as the research sample. The whole article is divided into two parts: the first half of the article, first of all, the theoretical basis of the ownership structure - principal-agent theory and stakeholder theory are expounded, expounding how the ownership structure through the enterprise. The governance structure plays an important role in the performance of enterprises, and finds relevant literature both at home and abroad. This paper reviews the existing research literature from the perspective of equity nature and equity concentration. Then, it introduces the characteristics of equity structure of GEM and listed companies on GEM, as well as the stocks of main board and small and medium-sized board enterprises. In the second half of the article, we use the empirical analysis method, select the substitution index of the ownership structure as the independent variable, select the substitution variable of the company's operating performance as the dependent variable, collect the data of the sample companies, and through the construction of a model for descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and regression analysis, point out the listing of GEM. What is the causal relationship between the characteristics of the equity structure and the operating performance of the listed companies on the GEM? At the end of the paper, the author puts forward relevant policy recommendations and points out the shortcomings of this paper.
This paper draws the following conclusions through empirical study.
1. There is a weak negative correlation between state-owned shares and the performance of GEM companies, but the coefficient has not passed the significant test: theoretically, the inefficiency of state-owned shares participating in corporate governance makes the proportion of state-owned shares negatively correlated with corporate performance. In GEM listed companies, because the proportion of state-owned shares is very small, the proportion of state-owned shares is very small. It does not have a significant impact on the company performance of the GEM listed companies.
2. The relationship between corporate shares and the performance of GEM is not obvious. On the one hand, compared with state-owned shares, corporate shares use their own capital. In order to increase the value of their investment capital, these corporate shareholders have the motivation to supervise the behavior of managers of enterprises. Compared with natural shareholders, corporate shareholders are more rational. On the other hand, these corporate shareholders still seek to maximize their own interests rather than the interests of listed companies, so corporate shareholders may engage in activities beneficial to themselves but harmful to the interests of listed companies. However, it will bring negative effects to listed companies and offset the positive effects of corporate shareholders on corporate performance. Because of the positive and negative effects of corporate shareholders, the test results are not significant.
3. There is a significant positive correlation between the executive stock and the performance of GEM: the senior managers are an important force for the development of the enterprise, whether the senior managers work hard or not is related to the performance of the enterprise. Shareholders'interests are bundled together, and the adoption of this equity incentive mechanism can make them pay attention to the long-term development of the enterprise, which is conducive to the improvement of the performance of the enterprise; moreover, many of the shareholders of the listed companies on the GEM are senior managers of the enterprise, and the interests of these controlling shareholders are one of the interests of the enterprise. Of course, of course, we are willing to do our best to improve the company's performance.
4. there is a significant negative correlation between circulating shares and operating performance of GEM companies.
Most of the holders of tradable shares are individual shareholders, and their distribution is extremely scattered. These tradable shareholders have the phenomenon of "hitchhiking". They have neither enthusiasm nor ability to participate in the governance of enterprises. The increase of the proportion of tradable shares in enterprises means that the degree of decentralization of the enterprise's equity becomes greater, and the decentralized ownership structure arrangement will produce. There are two problems: one is that the shareholders'supervisory ability to the managers of the enterprise will be weakened, the other is that the shareholders' enthusiasm to supervise the managers of the enterprise is also weak, so it has a negative impact on the business performance of the enterprise.
5. ownership concentration is positively related to the operating performance of GEM companies.
On the one hand, when the proportion of major shareholders increases, the tightness of the combination of the interests of the major shareholders and the interests of the company will increase, and the good and bad management of the company will play a great role to the major shareholders of the company. At this time, because of the convergence of the interests of the major shareholders and the interests of the company, the major shareholders will have more incentive to supervise and manage and effectively solve the problem. On the other hand, in our GEM enterprises, the first largest shareholder often plays the role of manager and presides over the daily affairs of the enterprise, because he personally assumes the role of manager will be greatly reduced because of the separation of shareholders and managers. And the length of the principal-agent chain avoids the problem of principal-agent. Because the manager is the owner of the enterprise at this time, the two are essentially unified, so the goal they are pursuing at this moment is the same. In this case, the shareholders of the enterprise do not need to deliberately supervise the various acts of the supervisor, because of common interests. Driven by profit, managers will consciously pursue the maximization of shareholders'interests, which is conducive to improving the performance of enterprises.
Looking at the above research, this article has its own characteristics in the following aspects:
1. The paper chooses a new angle of view. As the GEM has just been established in China's capital market for a short time, it is an emerging sector of China's capital market. Up to now, many domestic scholars have not studied the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance, and most of them have focused on the Shanghai and Shenzhen main board. This study is based on many existing literatures at home and abroad, choosing the listed companies on the GEM as the research perspective, studying the ownership structure of the listed companies on the GEM. The relationship between ownership structure and operating efficiency and performance of GEM listed companies, on the one hand, is a supplement to previous studies, on the other hand, it also provides some empirical data for the optimization of ownership structure of GEM listed companies. Because the use of Tobin Q must have a prerequisite, that is, the capital market is effective, the price of assets can fully reflect all kinds of information, so the use of Tobin Q as a business performance measurement index of foreign literature, such as: Morek, Shleifer and Vishmy (1988), McConnell and Servae (1990), and so on. Some domestic scholars are also Tobin Q value is used as the research variable (Sun Yongxiang, Huang Zuhui (1999), Zhang Hongjun (2000), Yu Xiaoming (2003). However, this paper argues that the development of China's capital market is not sound, the use of Tobin Q value to measure the performance of enterprises seems inappropriate, this paper uses financial accounting indicators, many domestic scholars are using financial accounting. Chen Xiao, Jiangdong (2000) used the return on net assets and the profit margin of the main business to represent the business performance of enterprises, Wu Shukun (2002) used the total asset profit margin to measure the business performance of enterprises, Wei Le (2010) used the main business profit margin index, Wang Ling (2010) used the return on net assets (ROE), core business assets. Based on the GEM perspective, this paper uses the earnings per share (EPS), which reflects the overall profitability of the enterprise, as the company's operating performance, and from the perspective of financial management, uses the net cash per share of the enterprise's operating activities. Flow (CPPS) is another alternative indicator of company performance. The reason why we choose this indicator is that the net operating cash flow per share can reflect the ability of enterprise to earn cash flow. At the same time, asset-liability ratio and company size are moderately introduced into the model as control variables.
3. Considering the particularity of the ownership structure of the listed companies on the GEM, this paper does not divide the ownership into state-owned shares, legal person shares and circulating shares directly as previous scholars (Chen Xiao, Jiangdong (2000)). From the latter statistical analysis, we can see that the proportion of senior executives in the main board market is only 0.74%, small and medium-sized. The proportion of senior managers holding shares is 12.83% in the listed companies on the board, but the proportion of senior managers holding shares in the listed companies on the GEM is as high as 32.07%. The proportion of senior managers holding shares has a very significant correlation with the company's performance. Therefore, the index of senior managers holding shares is added to the board, and the other three indicators are used as an alternative variable of ownership structure. As for the index selection of ownership concentration degree, this paper does not regard Z index as the index of ownership checks and balances (Fan Lihong (2007), Chen Deping, Chen Yongsheng (2011), but as the substitute variable of ownership concentration degree together with CR1 index and H5 index, and draws the conclusion that Z index and GEM listed companies. Performance has a weak positive correlation.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F276.6;F224
本文编号：2227726
[Abstract]:After ten years of gestation, China's GEM market was finally born in October 2009. By March 1, 2012, 291 enterprises had listed on the GEM, and began to become a new force in China's capital market. The rapid development of GEM has made the listed companies on GEM become the focus of attention. After that, the ownership will be gradually dispersed, the ownership and management rights will begin to separate, the agency relationship between shareholders and management will be highlighted, and the agency problem will also arise. Therefore, it is more and more important to evaluate the performance of the enterprise rationally. Note which factors have an impact on the performance of these GEM listed companies. According to previous research experience, the ownership structure of enterprises is a hot issue in the study of influencing factors of corporate performance.
Domestic scholars mainly study the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance of Listed Companies in the main board market or listed companies on the small and medium-sized board. The biggest difference between GEM listed companies and the main board market is that the proportion of senior managers is very high. The first largest shareholders are natural shareholders or legal shareholders ultimately controlled by natural persons, and these natural individuals are senior managers in the enterprise, enterprises. The interests of large shareholders are consistent with those of senior managers.
This article will select 153 companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange before the end of 2010 as the research sample. The whole article is divided into two parts: the first half of the article, first of all, the theoretical basis of the ownership structure - principal-agent theory and stakeholder theory are expounded, expounding how the ownership structure through the enterprise. The governance structure plays an important role in the performance of enterprises, and finds relevant literature both at home and abroad. This paper reviews the existing research literature from the perspective of equity nature and equity concentration. Then, it introduces the characteristics of equity structure of GEM and listed companies on GEM, as well as the stocks of main board and small and medium-sized board enterprises. In the second half of the article, we use the empirical analysis method, select the substitution index of the ownership structure as the independent variable, select the substitution variable of the company's operating performance as the dependent variable, collect the data of the sample companies, and through the construction of a model for descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and regression analysis, point out the listing of GEM. What is the causal relationship between the characteristics of the equity structure and the operating performance of the listed companies on the GEM? At the end of the paper, the author puts forward relevant policy recommendations and points out the shortcomings of this paper.
This paper draws the following conclusions through empirical study.
1. There is a weak negative correlation between state-owned shares and the performance of GEM companies, but the coefficient has not passed the significant test: theoretically, the inefficiency of state-owned shares participating in corporate governance makes the proportion of state-owned shares negatively correlated with corporate performance. In GEM listed companies, because the proportion of state-owned shares is very small, the proportion of state-owned shares is very small. It does not have a significant impact on the company performance of the GEM listed companies.
2. The relationship between corporate shares and the performance of GEM is not obvious. On the one hand, compared with state-owned shares, corporate shares use their own capital. In order to increase the value of their investment capital, these corporate shareholders have the motivation to supervise the behavior of managers of enterprises. Compared with natural shareholders, corporate shareholders are more rational. On the other hand, these corporate shareholders still seek to maximize their own interests rather than the interests of listed companies, so corporate shareholders may engage in activities beneficial to themselves but harmful to the interests of listed companies. However, it will bring negative effects to listed companies and offset the positive effects of corporate shareholders on corporate performance. Because of the positive and negative effects of corporate shareholders, the test results are not significant.
3. There is a significant positive correlation between the executive stock and the performance of GEM: the senior managers are an important force for the development of the enterprise, whether the senior managers work hard or not is related to the performance of the enterprise. Shareholders'interests are bundled together, and the adoption of this equity incentive mechanism can make them pay attention to the long-term development of the enterprise, which is conducive to the improvement of the performance of the enterprise; moreover, many of the shareholders of the listed companies on the GEM are senior managers of the enterprise, and the interests of these controlling shareholders are one of the interests of the enterprise. Of course, of course, we are willing to do our best to improve the company's performance.
4. there is a significant negative correlation between circulating shares and operating performance of GEM companies.
Most of the holders of tradable shares are individual shareholders, and their distribution is extremely scattered. These tradable shareholders have the phenomenon of "hitchhiking". They have neither enthusiasm nor ability to participate in the governance of enterprises. The increase of the proportion of tradable shares in enterprises means that the degree of decentralization of the enterprise's equity becomes greater, and the decentralized ownership structure arrangement will produce. There are two problems: one is that the shareholders'supervisory ability to the managers of the enterprise will be weakened, the other is that the shareholders' enthusiasm to supervise the managers of the enterprise is also weak, so it has a negative impact on the business performance of the enterprise.
5. ownership concentration is positively related to the operating performance of GEM companies.
On the one hand, when the proportion of major shareholders increases, the tightness of the combination of the interests of the major shareholders and the interests of the company will increase, and the good and bad management of the company will play a great role to the major shareholders of the company. At this time, because of the convergence of the interests of the major shareholders and the interests of the company, the major shareholders will have more incentive to supervise and manage and effectively solve the problem. On the other hand, in our GEM enterprises, the first largest shareholder often plays the role of manager and presides over the daily affairs of the enterprise, because he personally assumes the role of manager will be greatly reduced because of the separation of shareholders and managers. And the length of the principal-agent chain avoids the problem of principal-agent. Because the manager is the owner of the enterprise at this time, the two are essentially unified, so the goal they are pursuing at this moment is the same. In this case, the shareholders of the enterprise do not need to deliberately supervise the various acts of the supervisor, because of common interests. Driven by profit, managers will consciously pursue the maximization of shareholders'interests, which is conducive to improving the performance of enterprises.
Looking at the above research, this article has its own characteristics in the following aspects:
1. The paper chooses a new angle of view. As the GEM has just been established in China's capital market for a short time, it is an emerging sector of China's capital market. Up to now, many domestic scholars have not studied the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance, and most of them have focused on the Shanghai and Shenzhen main board. This study is based on many existing literatures at home and abroad, choosing the listed companies on the GEM as the research perspective, studying the ownership structure of the listed companies on the GEM. The relationship between ownership structure and operating efficiency and performance of GEM listed companies, on the one hand, is a supplement to previous studies, on the other hand, it also provides some empirical data for the optimization of ownership structure of GEM listed companies. Because the use of Tobin Q must have a prerequisite, that is, the capital market is effective, the price of assets can fully reflect all kinds of information, so the use of Tobin Q as a business performance measurement index of foreign literature, such as: Morek, Shleifer and Vishmy (1988), McConnell and Servae (1990), and so on. Some domestic scholars are also Tobin Q value is used as the research variable (Sun Yongxiang, Huang Zuhui (1999), Zhang Hongjun (2000), Yu Xiaoming (2003). However, this paper argues that the development of China's capital market is not sound, the use of Tobin Q value to measure the performance of enterprises seems inappropriate, this paper uses financial accounting indicators, many domestic scholars are using financial accounting. Chen Xiao, Jiangdong (2000) used the return on net assets and the profit margin of the main business to represent the business performance of enterprises, Wu Shukun (2002) used the total asset profit margin to measure the business performance of enterprises, Wei Le (2010) used the main business profit margin index, Wang Ling (2010) used the return on net assets (ROE), core business assets. Based on the GEM perspective, this paper uses the earnings per share (EPS), which reflects the overall profitability of the enterprise, as the company's operating performance, and from the perspective of financial management, uses the net cash per share of the enterprise's operating activities. Flow (CPPS) is another alternative indicator of company performance. The reason why we choose this indicator is that the net operating cash flow per share can reflect the ability of enterprise to earn cash flow. At the same time, asset-liability ratio and company size are moderately introduced into the model as control variables.
3. Considering the particularity of the ownership structure of the listed companies on the GEM, this paper does not divide the ownership into state-owned shares, legal person shares and circulating shares directly as previous scholars (Chen Xiao, Jiangdong (2000)). From the latter statistical analysis, we can see that the proportion of senior executives in the main board market is only 0.74%, small and medium-sized. The proportion of senior managers holding shares is 12.83% in the listed companies on the board, but the proportion of senior managers holding shares in the listed companies on the GEM is as high as 32.07%. The proportion of senior managers holding shares has a very significant correlation with the company's performance. Therefore, the index of senior managers holding shares is added to the board, and the other three indicators are used as an alternative variable of ownership structure. As for the index selection of ownership concentration degree, this paper does not regard Z index as the index of ownership checks and balances (Fan Lihong (2007), Chen Deping, Chen Yongsheng (2011), but as the substitute variable of ownership concentration degree together with CR1 index and H5 index, and draws the conclusion that Z index and GEM listed companies. Performance has a weak positive correlation.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F276.6;F224
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 谢芳;;中小企业公司治理与财务绩效——基于深交所中小企业板的研究[J];财会通讯;2011年09期
2 吴淑琨;股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究——1997～2000年上市公司的实证研究[J];中国工业经济;2002年01期
3 阮梓坪;汪睿;;中小企业股权结构与公司治理绩效研究——基于委托代理理论解释的实证研究[J];中国管理信息化;2008年08期
4 张红军;中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析[J];经济科学;2000年04期
5 孙永祥,黄祖辉;上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J];经济研究;1999年12期
6 陈晓,江东;股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性[J];经济研究;2000年08期
7 周业安;金融抑制对中国企业融资能力影响的实证研究[J];经济研究;1999年02期
8 闻岳春;叶美林;;中国创业板上市公司治理与绩效的实证研究[J];上海金融学院学报;2011年03期
9 苏武康;上市公司股权属性与公司绩效实证研究[J];开放导报;2003年05期
10 雷岩;廖慧芳;;上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的关联性研究——基于我国制造业上市公司的实证研究[J];科技创业月刊;2011年02期
相关硕士学位论文 前2条
1 申鹏伟;创业板上市公司治理结构与绩效关系研究[D];兰州理工大学;2011年
2 樊丽红;基于中小企业板的股权结构与公司绩效关系研究[D];西南财经大学;2008年
，本文编号：2227726
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/zhqtouz/2227726.html
最近更新
教材专著
