信息披露质量、终极控制人与企业财务风险的实证研究

发布时间：2018-09-11 17:06

【摘要】：随着全球经济一体化的发展，企业在经营过程中所面临的环境日益复杂，，瞬息万变。所有者、债权人、管理层及董事会能否得到及时、可靠的信息，决定了他们所作的决策的质量，从而影响了企业财务风险。我国的资本市场是一个新兴的、年轻的市场，信息披露机制并不完善。根据信号理论、契约理论等基础理论我们可知，无论信息披露质量如何，所有者、债权人和管理层依然会根据他们各自的动机做出相应理解和行为，而他们的行为将都会作用于企业，最终影响到企业财务风险。在我国，许多上市公司本身就是产权改革的产物，这部分上市公司的终极控制人依然是各级政府及国有资产监督管理部门。它们受政府干预的程度较非国有控股公司更大，享有某些产业扶持政策等，同时承担了一些政府的多重目标。这些对企业经营管理有利也有弊，最终也都将影响企业财务风险；而另外一部分上市公司为非国有控股公司，这些公司都在我国市场经济条件成长起来的，他们也有着先天的优势，但也面临着更多的约束和挑战。国有控股公司和非国有控股公司由于产权性质的不同，各相关利益者也会就这个区别做出不同的行为，进而影响到到企业财务风险。本文主要采用了实证研究的方法，同时辅以必要的理论解释和说明。从理论和实践两个方面对信息披露质量、终极控制人与企业风财务险之间的关系进行了实证研究。从而为企业控制财务风险，防范和控制企业危机提供实证和理论依据。
[Abstract]:With the development of global economic integration, the environment that enterprises face in the process of operation is becoming more and more complex and changing rapidly. The ability of owners, creditors, management and boards to obtain timely and reliable information determines the quality of their decisions and thus affects the financial risk of the enterprise. China's capital market is a new, young market, information disclosure mechanism is not perfect. Based on signal theory, contract theory and other basic theories, we can see that regardless of the quality of information disclosure, owners, creditors and management will still make corresponding understandings and actions according to their respective motives. And their behavior will affect the enterprise, and ultimately affect the financial risk. In China, many listed companies themselves are the product of property rights reform, the ultimate controller of this part of listed companies is still governments at all levels and state-owned assets supervision and management departments. They are more subject to government intervention than non-state holding companies, enjoy certain industrial support policies, and undertake multiple government goals. These are beneficial and harmful to the operation and management of enterprises, and will eventually affect the financial risks of enterprises. The other part of the listed companies are non-state-owned holding companies, and these companies have all grown up in the market economy conditions of our country. They also have innate advantages, but also face more constraints and challenges. Due to the difference of property rights between state-owned holding companies and non-state-owned holding companies, different stakeholders will make different behaviors on this distinction, which will affect the financial risk of enterprises. This paper mainly adopts the method of empirical research, accompanied by necessary theoretical explanation and explanation. This paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between the quality of information disclosure, the ultimate controller and the financial risk of enterprise wind from the aspects of theory and practice. Thus, it provides empirical and theoretical basis for enterprises to control financial risks and prevent and control corporate crises.
【学位授予单位】：新疆财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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