预算软约束下银行债务对公司资本投资的影响研究

发布时间：2018-10-05 21:11

【摘要】：国内外诸多研究表明，预算软约束是新兴和转型经济体制度环境的典型特征之一，它的存在会扭曲企业的微观行为。中国的资本市场是“新兴加转轨”的市场，它恰好为研究预算软约束下公司投融资行为提供了一个难得的机会：在银行债务是我国上市公司资本投资主要资金来源、银行贷款决策和企业投资决策都可能受到政府行为影响这一背景下，银行作为债权人的监督职能还能否得到发挥，并通过债务的治理作用抑制上市公司的过度投资行为呢？为此，本文采用规范分析与实证分析相结合的方法，探讨了预算软约束下我国制造业上市公司银行债务对公司资本投资的影响。在理论研究部分，以委托代理理论、信息不对称理论为基础，分析了负债融资影响公司资本投资的作用机理；并进一步结合预算软约束理论和我国相关制度背景，分析了预算软约束对公司负债和投资之间关系的影响；在实证研究部分，针对负债对资本投资影响的“两面性”，在区分公司成长性的基础上，分组检验我国上市公司银行债务对其资本投资的影响，并分析了背后不同的影响机制；同时引入不同产权控制人虚拟变量，以考察不同预算软约束预期下银行债务治理程度的不同。结果表明，总体上我国上市公司银行债务对资本投资起到一定治理作用；但国有控股上市公司因具有更强的预算软约束预期，因而相对非国有控股上市公司而言其银行债务对投资扩张的抑制作用较弱；而相对于中央政府控制的国有上市公司，地方政府控制的国有上市公司银行债务对投资扩张的抑制作用更弱。最后，针对研究结果提出了以下政策建议：政府适度减轻对金融领域的干预；强化银行改革，鼓励多元化竞争；硬化企业预算约束，提高国企改革成效；发展债券市场，，拓宽负债融资渠道。
[Abstract]:Many studies at home and abroad show that soft budget constraint is one of the typical characteristics of institutional environment in emerging and transition economies, and its existence will distort the microcosmic behavior of enterprises. China's capital market is a "burgeoning plus transition" market, which provides a rare opportunity to study the investment and financing behavior of companies under soft budget constraints: bank debt is the main source of capital investment for listed companies in China. Under the background that bank loan decision and enterprise investment decision may be influenced by government behavior, can the supervision function of bank as creditor be brought into play, and the excessive investment behavior of listed company can be restrained through the governance function of debt? Therefore, this paper uses the method of normative analysis and empirical analysis to discuss the impact of bank debt on the capital investment of listed manufacturing companies in China under soft budget constraints. In the theoretical research part, based on the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper analyzes the mechanism of debt financing affecting the capital investment of companies, and further combines the theory of soft budgetary constraints and the relevant institutional background of our country. This paper analyzes the impact of soft budgetary constraints on the relationship between corporate debt and investment, and in the empirical study, on the basis of the growth of regional branch, aiming at the "dual character" of the impact of debt on capital investment, The paper examines the impact of bank debt on capital investment of listed companies in China, analyzes the different influencing mechanisms behind it, and introduces virtual variables of different property rights controllers. In order to investigate the different degree of bank debt governance under different budget soft constraint expectations. The results show that, on the whole, the bank debt of listed companies in China has a certain governance effect on capital investment, but the state-owned holding listed companies are expected to have stronger budget soft constraints. As a result, the bank debt of the non-state-controlled listed companies has a weaker inhibitory effect on investment expansion, while that of the state-owned listed companies controlled by the central government is weaker than that of the state-owned listed companies controlled by the central government. Local government-controlled state-owned listed companies' bank debt has a weaker effect on investment expansion. Finally, the paper puts forward the following policy recommendations: the government should moderate the intervention in the financial field; strengthen the banking reform to encourage diversified competition; harden the enterprise budget constraints, improve the effectiveness of state-owned enterprise reform; and develop the bond market. Broaden the financing channels for debt.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【参考文献】