基于监管资本套利的商业银行资本质量分析
发布时间：2018-10-21 17:24
【摘要】：监管资本套利是指银行通过资产证券化等金融创新，绕过资本监管“粉饰”其资本金实力的行为，其动机来源于银行节约资本税——经济资本与监管资本之差的内在要求。由于巴塞尔协议资本监管框架存在缺陷,监管资本套利行为随之产生，随后在西方发达国家迅速发展。监管资本套利降低了资本监管的有效性,加剧了银行业的系统性风险,并催生了大量的资产证券化产品,成为美国次贷危机的重要原因。 在我国金融业尤其是银行业的改革发展过程中，需要及时汲取经验教训。如果拒绝对金融产品进行创新来达到杜绝监管资本套利的目的，这不仅使我国金融业长远发展缺乏动力，而且阻碍了我国融入全球金融一体化的进程。因此，现阶段在金融监管中，尤其要加强对银行业的资本监管，不仅要提高资本充足率保证监管资本充足，，还有促使监管资本更充分的反映银行风险，提高资本监管质量。因此我们要充分考虑到监管资本套利存在的风险和收益，在不同的阶段采取合理措施，在实现监管资本套利带来的好处的同时，切实防范可能产生的危险。
[Abstract]:Regulatory capital arbitrage refers to the bank's behavior of "whitewashing" its capital strength by means of financial innovation such as asset securitization, and its motive is derived from the inherent requirement of the difference between economic capital and regulatory capital. Because of the defects of the Basel capital regulatory framework, the regulatory capital arbitrage came into being, and then developed rapidly in the western developed countries. Regulatory capital arbitrage reduces the effectiveness of capital supervision, exacerbates the systemic risk of banking, and gives birth to a large number of asset securitization products, which has become an important reason for the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. In the course of the reform and development of our financial industry, especially the banking industry, it is necessary to learn the experience and lessons in time. If we refuse to innovate financial products to achieve the goal of eliminating regulatory capital arbitrage, this will not only make the long-term development of China's financial industry lack power, but also hinder the process of our country's integration into global financial integration. Therefore, in the current financial supervision, especially to strengthen the capital supervision of the banking sector, not only to improve the capital adequacy ratio to ensure the adequacy of regulatory capital, but also to promote the regulatory capital to reflect the risks of banks more fully, improve the quality of capital supervision. Therefore, we should take full account of the risks and benefits of regulatory capital arbitrage, take reasonable measures at different stages, while realizing the benefits of regulatory capital arbitrage, and effectively guard against the possible risks.
【学位授予单位】：山西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F830.9
[Abstract]:Regulatory capital arbitrage refers to the bank's behavior of "whitewashing" its capital strength by means of financial innovation such as asset securitization, and its motive is derived from the inherent requirement of the difference between economic capital and regulatory capital. Because of the defects of the Basel capital regulatory framework, the regulatory capital arbitrage came into being, and then developed rapidly in the western developed countries. Regulatory capital arbitrage reduces the effectiveness of capital supervision, exacerbates the systemic risk of banking, and gives birth to a large number of asset securitization products, which has become an important reason for the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. In the course of the reform and development of our financial industry, especially the banking industry, it is necessary to learn the experience and lessons in time. If we refuse to innovate financial products to achieve the goal of eliminating regulatory capital arbitrage, this will not only make the long-term development of China's financial industry lack power, but also hinder the process of our country's integration into global financial integration. Therefore, in the current financial supervision, especially to strengthen the capital supervision of the banking sector, not only to improve the capital adequacy ratio to ensure the adequacy of regulatory capital, but also to promote the regulatory capital to reflect the risks of banks more fully, improve the quality of capital supervision. Therefore, we should take full account of the risks and benefits of regulatory capital arbitrage, take reasonable measures at different stages, while realizing the benefits of regulatory capital arbitrage, and effectively guard against the possible risks.
【学位授予单位】：山西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F830.9
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